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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was particularly
active in the government contracts area in 1993. During 1993, the
Federal Circuit issued forty precedential government contracts
decisions based on appeals either from the United States Court of
Federal Claims, formerly the United States Claims Court,' or federal
agency boards of contract appeals. By comparison, the Federal
1. The U.S. Claims Court was redesignated the U.S.,Court of Federal Claims on October
29, 1992. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (FCAA), Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902(a), 106
Stat. 4506. For clarity, this Article uses the current name of that court.
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Circuit issued twenty-one decisions in 19912 and thirty-one decisions
in 1992. s
The 1993 term proved notable for the frequency with which the
Federal Circuit overturned the decisions of these tribunals. During
this term, the appellate court reversed the contract appeals board or
the Court of Federal Claims in more than fifty percent of its
decisions.4 In bid protest cases, the Federal Circuit reversed the
General Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) in three out of
five decisions.5 In cases involving jurisdictional issues, the court
reversed the boards and the Court of Federal Claims on nine of
twelve occasions.6 For cases involving substantive contract issues, the
court reversed the boards and the Court of Federal Claims in eight
out of eighteen cases.7 Finally, in cases involving procedural issues
2. See VictorJ. Zupa & BrianJ. Siebel, Government Contracts: 1992 Analysis and Summary,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1993).
3. Id. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the Court
of Federal Claims and from final decisions (with minor exceptions) of the agency boards of
contract appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a) (3) (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 607(g) (1) (1988).
4. This percentage includes only precedential decisions reversing the lower board or court
in whole or in part.
5. See Best Power Technology Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993), rev g
GSBCA No. 11400-P, 92-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 24,625 (1991); CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233
(Fed. Cir. 1993), reuv GSBCA No. 11523-P, 92-1 B.C. (CCH) 1 24,702 (1991); AT&T
Communications, Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revgGSBCA.No. 11857-P, 93-
1 B.C. (CCH) 25,314 (1992); Birch & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Christopher, 4 F.3d 970 (Fed. Cir.
1993), vacating GSBCA No. 11643-P, 92-3 B.CA (CCH) 25,082 (1992); Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1993), affl'gGSBCA No. 11776-P, 93-1 B.CA (CCH)
125,401 (1992).
6. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
affgASBCA No. 33244,91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 124,132 (1991); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. Stone, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 1993), revg ASBCA No. 38023, 91-3
B.CA (CCH) 1 24,046 (1991); Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759
(Fed. Cir. 1993), revgASBCA No. 42170,92-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 24,511 (1991);Johnson Controls
World Servs., Inc. v. Garrett, 987 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revgASBCA No. 40233, 91-3 B.C.A.
(CCH) 24,219 (1991); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
af'gASBCA No. 38323, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,373 (1991); Heyl & Patterson v. O'Keefe, 986
F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993), rev'g in part and affg in part ASBCA Nos. 40604, 42589, 91-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 23,972 (1991); Sadelmi Joint Venture v. Dalton, 5 F.3d 510 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revg
ASBCANos. 38288,41025,91-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 24,103 (1991); Garrettv. General Elec. Co., 987
F.2d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aJJ'gASBCA Nos. 36005, 38152, 39696, 91-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 23,958
(1991); Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993), remanding 24 Cl. Ct. 763
(1991); Bumside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1993), revt24 Cl. Ct. 553 (1991).
7. Aleman Food Servs. v. United States, 994 F.2d 819 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revk25 Cl. Ct. 201
(1992); Sanchez & Son v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993), af/'g in part and vacating
in part 24 Cl. Ct. 14 (1991); Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
affg inpart and rev'g in part DABCA Nos. 83-301-1, 84-351-1, 91-2 B.C. (CCH) 1 23,890 (1991);
Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Keso, 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993), a ffgASBCA Nos.
37981, 38166, 38167, 38168, 38467, 40151, 92-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,870 (1992); General Eng'g
& Mach. Works v. O'Keefe, 991 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993), afJ'gASBCA No. 38788, 92-3 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 25,055 (1992); S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir.
1993), aFg 26 Cl. Ct. 759 (1992); Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir.
1993), rev'gASBCA No. 37297, 91-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 23,810 (1991); Foley Co. v. United States,
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or recovery of attorney fees, the court reversed the board or court in
one out of five instances.'
This Article analyzes precedential and significant nonprecedential
government contracts decisions by the Federal Circuit. Part I surveys
bid protest decisions; Part II reviews the most active area of the court
in 1993,jurisdiction; and Part III analyzes cases on contract interpreta-
tion. Specifically, Part III addresses decisions on the strict enforce-
ment of contract terms, patent and latent ambiguity, mandatory
contract clauses, the Variation in Estimated Quantity Clause, and
government warranty of specifications. Part IV reviews a decision
concerning void and voidable contracts; Part V discusses estoppel
against the Government; and Part VI addresses the Sovereign Act
doctrine. Part VII summarizes various procedural decisions involving
discovery, sanctions, and default judgment. Part VIII discusses
damage calculation and Part IX reviews cases on recovery of attorney's
fees.
I. BID PROTESTS
In 1985, Congress passed the Brooks Act,9 which granted the
GSBCA jurisdiction over bid protests in procurement contracts
involving automated data processing equipment (ADPE). 0 Pursuant
to an amendment to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA)," the
Federal Circuit was in turn granted jurisdiction to review the board's
bid protest decisions. 2 In exercising this power during the past
seven years, the Federal Circuit has reversed the GSBCA a significant
number of times, particularly when the decisions concerned the
11 F.3d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1993), affg26 Cl. Ct. 936 (1992); Rice v. Martin Marietta Corp., 13 F.3d
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revkgASBCA No. 35895, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,094 (1992); Godley v.
United States, 5 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1993), vacating and remanding 26 Cl. Ct. 1075 (1992);
Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revg
in part and vacating in part 24 CL. Ct. 553 (1991); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797
(Fed. Cir. 1993), revu" 26 Cl. Ct. 904 (1992), vacated and rek'g in banc granted, Aug. 18, 1998;
Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revg 26
Cl. Ct. 146 (1992).
8. In re United States, Misc. No. 370 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1993); In reUnited States, Misc.
No. 374 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1993); Information Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d
792 (Fed. Cir. 1993), revg26 Cl. Ct. 314 (1992); Boeing Co. v. United States, 991 F.2d 811 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), rev'25 Cl. Ct. 441 (1992).
9. See 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
10. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1) (1988) (providing GSBCA with jurisdiction to hear protests
related to purchase, lease, and maintenance of automatic data processing equipment by federal
agencies).
11. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988).
12. Id. § 607(g) (1) ("The decision of an agency board of contract appeals shall be final,
except that.., a contractor may appeal such a decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.").
1420
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRAcrS
board's bid protest jurisdiction.'" In 1993, the Federal Circuit
continued this trend by reversing the board in three out of five
precedential decisions; two of these reversals involved jurisdictional
questions.
The Federal Circuit faced a basic jurisdictional issue when it
considered whether a procurement constituted an ADPE procurement
for purposes of the Brooks Act in Best Power Technology Sales Corp. v.
Austin. 4 In Best Power, the question was whether the GSBCA should
determine Brooks Act jurisdiction based on the nature of the item
being offered or on the nature of the solicitation issued by the
procuring agency.15 The court concluded that the nature of the
solicitation, not the bidder's offered product, provided the appropri-
ate basis for determining the board's protest jurisdiction. 6
Best Power protested the decision of the General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA) to reject Best Power's offer to enter into a contract
under the Multiple-Award Schedule program' 7 to provide the
Government with uninterruptible power supplies (UPS).18 On
July 27, 1990, GSA issued a solicitation inviting offers for Multiple-
Award Schedule contracts, including UPS. 9 Best Power responded
by offering a full line of UPS products specifically designed for data
processing equipment.2 ° GSA rejected Best Power's offer after it was
unable to negotiate a satisfactory price.2'
When Best Power protested to the GSBCA, the GSA argued that the
board lacked jurisdiction over the protest because the solicitation was
not subject to the Brooks Act. 22 In rejecting this argument, the
13. See, e.g., US West Communications Serv., Inc. v. United States, 940 F.2d 622, 626-27
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that board lacks jurisdiction over bid protest by subcontractor relating
to ADPE procurement conducted by management and operating contractor operating nuclear
facility for Government); United States v. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp., 857 F.2d 1444, 1447
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that board lacks jurisdiction over Postal Service procurements of
ADPE); Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Appeals, 792
F.2d 1569, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that board lacks jurisdiction over bid protest
involving procurement not conducted under Brooks Act).
14. 984 F.2d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
15. Best Power Technology Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
16. See ia. at 1176 ("[W]e hold thatwhen the GSBCA... addresses the question of whether
a given procurement is one for ADPE, it must look to the nature of the items called for.").
17. Under the Multiple-Award Schedule program, GSA negotiates and contracts with
manufacturers and suppliers to provide generic supplies and services at specific prices. Id. at
1174.
18. The term "uninterruptible power supplies" refers to equipment that maintains a steady
power supply to electrical equipment in the event of a power outage. Id. at 1175.
19. Id. at 1174.
20. Id. Best Power's UPS products prevent stored data from being lost by monitoring a
protected device and, in the event of a power surge, shutting down that device. Id.
21. Id. at 1175.
22. Best Power Technology Sales Corp., GSBCA No. 11400-P, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,625,
at 122,835 (1991), revld, 984 F.2d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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board found that Best Power's products were designed solely to be
used with computers,23 concluding that the company's UPS products
were ancillary equipment within the meaning of the statutory
definition of ADPE.24  The GSBCA then held that the agency
properly rejected Best Power's offer.' Both Best Power and the
Government appealed the board's decision.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Government that
the GSBCA lacked jurisdiction over the company's protest.26 The
court held that the board should have looked to the nature of the
solicitation, and not to the product offered by Best, to determine
jurisdiction:27 failure to do so, the court admonished, would allow
an offeror to dictate Brooks Act jurisdiction based on the type of
product it offered.2 ' The court reasoned that because the UPS
sought in the solicitation could be used either for computers or for
other non-ADPE, the solicitation was not seeking ADPE2
The Federal Circuit differed with the GSBCA on other substantive
legal issues in the past year. For example, in CAC, Inc. v. Stone,"°
the court examined whether the lack of a delegation of procurement
authority from the GSA Administrator renders a contract void3' and
whether an agency is permitted to adopt a new theory of its case on
appeal.
32
On April 1, 1991, the Department of the Army solicited bids for
engineering and data processing support services. 3  CACI and VSE
Corporation both submitted proposals.'M The Army awarded the
contract to VSE on September 30, 1991, causing CACI to protest the
23. Id. at 122,838. The board also found that Best's products were capable of automatically
storing, controlling, manipulating, and processing data and information. Id. at 122,836.
24. Id. at 122,838.
25. Id. at 122,839-40 ("We cannot conclude that the agency may not demand a greater
reasonable discount than that offered by the protester as a condition to having its products
placed on the multiple award schedule.").
26. See Best Power Technology Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(stating that GSA reasonably determined that "the solicitation did not constitute a procurement
subject to' the [Brooks] Act").
27. Id. at 1176.
28. Id. at 1175.
29. Id. at 1177 (finding that UPSs "may be used to protect computers or they may be used
to protect other kinds of equipment, such as machine tools").
30. 990 F.2d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
31. CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993). To procure ADPE, executive
agencies generally need a delegation of procurement authority from the GSA Administrator.
40 U.S.C. § 759(b) (1988). This delegation is not necessary for ADPE procurements involving
the national defense and certain "radar, sonar, radio, or television equipment." Id.
§ 759(a) (3) (B)-(D); see also GSA Federal Information Resources Management Regulation
(FIRMR), 41 C.F.R. §§ 201-1.002-2, 201-4.001 (1993).
32. CACT, Inc., 990 F.2d at 1234.
33. Id. at 1233.
34. Id.
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award to the GSBCA. GACI's protest alleged, inter alia, that the Army
violated the Federal Information Resources Management Regulation
(FIRMR) 5 by failing to obtain a delegation of procurement authority
(DPA) from the GSA Administrator before proceeding with the
acquisition." In response to CACI's motion for summary relief, the
Army argued that even though it had not obtained such authority, the
deficiency was being corrected and should not render the VSE
contract void.37
The GSBCA held that the contract violated the FIRMR, but refused
to suspend performance of VSE's contract, finding that the Army
required VSE's services and that suspension of contract performance
would therefore be disruptive and detrimental to the Government.
38
The board denied CACI's protest on the merits," concluding that
the initial lack of a DPA was not fatal because the Army was taking
prompt action to obtain one.4 ° CACI appealed this determina-
tion.41
Before the Federal Circuit, the Army contended that it had
misinterpreted applicable regulations in presenting its case to the
GSBCA and should have argued that the regulations in effect when
the subject solicitation was issued provided blanket authority to
contract for data processing support services without a DPA.42 The
court refused to consider this argument, however, because it was
raised for the first time on appeal.43
The Federal Circuit ultimately reversed the GSBCA, holding that
the lack of a DPA rendered the Army's contract award to VSE null
and void.44 The court stated that when illegality is clear, it has no
choice but to invalidate the award and the contract.4' The court
determined that in a case such as this in which "there is a facial
absence of actual authority to enter into the contract," the illegality
35. 41 C.F.R. §§ 201-223.1 (1993).
36. CACI, Inc.-Federal, GSBCANo. 11523-P, 92-1 B.CA. (CCH) 24,702, at123,275 (1991),
rev'd 990 F.2d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
37. Id. at 123,279-80.
38. Id. at 123,279.
39. Id. at 123,280.
40. Id. at 123,279.
41. CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
42. Id. at 1234.
43. Id. at 1235.
44. Id. at 1236. In United States v. Amdal Corp., the court held that a contract award that
violates a statute or regulation is void ab initio. 786 F.2d 387, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For further
discussion of void or voidable contracts, see infra Part IV.
45. CAC, Inc., 990 F.2d at 1235.
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is "plain and clear," and the board erred in holding that a procure-
ment or contract may proceed without a valid DPA.46
The Federal Circuit reversed the GSBCA again in AT&T Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc.47 For the first time, the court examined
whether a modification to FIS2000 (the Government's comprehensive
telecommunications procurement) exceeded the scope of that
contract, thereby impermissibly bypassing statutory requirements for
competition. 8
In 1986, the GSA solicited offers for the FTS2000 acquisition. The
solicitation covered extensive telecommunication services, provided
for offerors to propose additional features and schedules not
specifically included in the solicitation, and contained the standard
changes and service improvements clauses. 49 The solicitation also
required the contractor to present an annual plan to assess areas of
growth, new locations, and the application of new telecommunication
services." The GSA awarded contracts to AT&T and Sprint in
1988."' On March 4, 1992, AT&T submitted a proposal to modify
the scope of work by adding "T3" circuits as a fourth type of
dedicated transmission service under the contract's service improve-
ments clause.52  When GSA accepted AT&T's proposed enhance-
ment, Wiltel, Inc., a potential competitor, protested that these
additional services exceeded the scope of the FTS2000 contract and
argued that they therefore should be the subject of a separate
procurement.
53
The GSBCA reviewed Wiltel's protest and held that the service
improvements clause did not authorize the addition of T3 services to
the contract because T3 was a new form of telecommunication
service, not an improvement to the existing services, and must,
therefore, be the subject of a separate procurement.' In reaching
this conclusion, the board focused on the differences between T3
service and the existing T1 service, and the incremental difference
46. Id. at 1236.
47. 1 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
48. AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the boards of contract appeals have frequently addressed
this issue. SeeRalph C. Nash &John Cibinic, Contract Changes: The Fast Technique When It's Right,
7 NASH & CmINIC REPORT 1 62, at 163-65 (1993).
49. AT&T, 1 F.3d at 1203-04.
50. Id. at 1204.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1203.
54. Wiltel, Inc. v. General Servs. Admin., GSBCA No. 11857-P, 93-1 B.CA. (CCH) 1 25,314,
at 126,111 (1992), rev'd, 1 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1424
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1425
between the cost of a T3 line and a TI line.5" Further, the board
found it significant that the GSA had rejected offers to supply T3
services in the original procurement.
56
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the board.57 The court
found that the FTS2000 contract envisioned a comprehensive set of
telecommunications services that necessarily would require numerous
changes throughout its ten-year contract period. 8 The court then
determined that the solicitation specifically contemplated the addition
of state-of-the-art technology as it became commercially available.59
According to the court, T3 was merely a different kind of dedicated
transmission service already required under the contract'
In addition, the court found that the board erred by focusing on
the technological differences between T1 and T3 services, instead of
comparing the modified contract to the scope of the original
contract.61 The court stated that a major factor in determining the
scope of the original contract is whether offerors for the original
contract could have anticipated the modification.62 The Federal
Circuit cited other GSBCA decisions involving the FTS2000 con-
tract,63 supporting its holding that the addition of T3 services was
precisely the kind of contract modification that offerors would have
anticipated -with the availability of more advanced technologies.'
55. Id. ("We first note that the 'type of work' that T-3 can provide ... is 'work' that T-1
cannot perform.").
56. Id. at 126,113.
57. AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1993). wiltel
has requested a rehearing in banc of the Federal Circuit's panel decision. See 60 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 166 (Aug. 23, 1993).
58. AT&T, 1 F.3d at 1205.
59. Id. at 1206.
60. Id. (finding that T3 fell within scope of FTS2000 contract because of contractor's
obligation to provide improvements).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1207 (noting that important factor in determining scope of contract is whether
solicitation for original contract advised offerors of "the potential for the type of changes...
that in fact occurred"). This is similar to prior GAO and court decisions relating to the cardinal
change doctrine. The focus of the analysis is the major difference between the two tests; the
cardinal change doctrine focuses on the changes clause and the scope of the contract, while the
Federal Circuit test focuses on the scope of the original competition. See American Air Filter
Co., 57 Comp. Gen. 567, 572-73, affld, 57 Comp. Gen. 285 (1978); Allied Materials & Equip. Co.
v. United States, 569 F.2d 562, 563-64 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Nash & Cibinic, supra note 48, [62, at 163.
63. AT&T, 1 F.3d at 1207. The court, however, actually cited only one case, MCI
Telecommunications Corp., GSBCA No. 10450-P, 90-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 22,735 (1990). In that
case, the board denied MCI's protest against Sprint's enhancement of its switched voice service.
Id. The board found that the FTS2000 contract permits the Government to obtain service
enhancements as they become available. Id.
64. The Federal Circuit's decision is consistent with prior GSBCA and GAO precedent,
including prior board decisions dealing with the FTS2000 procurement. SeeMCITelecommuni-
cations Corp. v. General Serv. Admin., GSBCA No. 11963-P, 93-1 B.C.. (CCH) 1 25,541, at
127,222 (1992) [hereinafter MCI II]; MCI Telecommunications Corp., GSBCA No. 10450-P, 90-2
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AT&T Communications ratifies previous board decisions finding that
contract modifications do not require competition if the change was
"within the scope of the competition." 5 The Federal Circuit,
however, explained that the focus of this test is "on what the competitors
should have anticipated to be within the scope of the competition."6
Thus, the Government can preserve its flexibility to choose between
soliciting new services or modifying existing contracts by including
broad language in solicitations and contracts, and by stating that it
will seek contract changes in accordance with technology developed
concurrent with performance.67
In a dispute over a bid rejected for deficiencies, the Federal Circuit
in Birch & Davis International, Inc. v. Christophe vacated the
GSBCA's judgment and found that the Agency for International
Development (AID) improperly excluded bids containing minor,
correctable deficiencies from the competitive range.69 In Birch &
Davis, AID issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the design and
installation of a computer system for the Egyptian Health Insurance
Organization.7" Birch & Davis International, Inc. (Birch) submitted
three proposals, and four other companies each submitted one
proposal.71  Four of the seven proposals, including two Birch
proposals, were found technically acceptable despite numerous
deficiencies. 7' Based on the initial ranking of proposals, the con-
tracting officer then established a competitive range of one offeror.
73
Birch protested the contracting officer's decision to exclude it from
the competitive range, arguing that the deficiencies in its bid were
merely informational.74 Birch also alleged that the technical and
cost evaluations were fatally flawed.75
While acknowledging the contracting officer's broad discretion in
establishing a competitive range, the GSBCA noted that the decision
to establish an initial competitive range of one offeror was subject to
B.C.- (CCH) 22,735, at 114,132 [hereinafter MCI]; see also Neil R. Gross & Co., B-237434, 90-
1 C.P.D. 1 212, at 2-3, affd, B-237434.2, 90-1 C.P.D. 1 491 (1990).
65. Nash & Cibinic, supra note 48, 1 62, at 163.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 4 F.3d 970 (Fed. Cir. 1993).





74. Id. at 972-73.
75. Id. at 972.
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close scrutiny.76 Nonetheless, the board concluded that the determi-
nation was reasonable. 7 Birch appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the board's decision. 8
The court noted that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)79
requires a contracting officer to include in the initial competitive
range all competitors with a reasonable chance of award."0 Thus,
the court recognized a tension between a contracting officer's
substantial discretion to determine a proposal's merits and the FAR's
presumption requiring the inclusion of even questionable bids in the
competition.8" The Federal Circuit agreed with the GSBCA and the
GAO in giving "close scrutiny" when a contracting officer determina-
tion results in a competitive range of one." It determined, however,
that the GSBCA had not in fact "closely scrutinized" the contracting
officer's decision. 3 Had the board done so, the court concluded,
it would have found that Birch's proposal had a reasonable chance of
being selected for award. 4 Consequently, the court concluded that
Birch's proposal should have been included in the competitive
range.8
The Federal Circuit affirmed one GSBCA bid protest decision in
1993. In Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bentsen,86 the Federal Circuit
upheld the GSBCA's decision to deny Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
Inc.'s (Lockheed) protest against the award of the Treasury Multi-User
Acquisition Contract (TMAC) to AT&T Federal Systems.87
On January 4, 1989, the Treasury Department issued a solicitation
for office automation systems, software, and maintenance/support
76. Birch & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., GSBCA No. 11643-P, 92-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 24,881, at 124,097-98 (1992), vacated, 4 F.3d 970 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
77. Id.
78. Birch & Davis Int% 4 F.3d at 974.
79. 48 C.F.R. (1994).
80. Birch &Davis Int'% 4 F.3d at 973 (stating that FAR requires contracting officer not to
eliminate competitors from initial range if there is "any 'reasonable chance' that they will be
selected").
81. See id. (noting tension between "necessarily broad discretion of agency to determine
what bids are realistically competitive" and FAR, which requires that "when there is doubt, the
questionable bid should be included").
82. Id. at 974. The court cited to several board and comptroller general decisions
upholding this principle. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 1, 5 (1983) (noting
that GAO promotes competition by "giving close scrutiny to such decisions where only one firm
remains for negotiations"); Apt Corp., GSBCA No. 9237-P, 88-1 B.C. (CCH) 1 20,411, at
103,249 (1987) ("A decision which results in the inclusion of only one offeror will be subjected
to close scrutiny.").
83. Birch & Davis 1ntl 4 F.3d at 974.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 4 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
87. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d 955, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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services for the Internal Revenue Service.8" Section M of the
solicitation stated that the award would be made to the offeror whose
proposal represented the best overall value to the Government. 9
Among the offerors submitting proposals were Lockheed, IBM, and
AT&T.9" Despite making an offer considerably more expensive than
Lockheed's and twice as costly as IBM's, AT&T was awarded the
contract.9 IBM and Lockheed protested, alleging that Treasury
failed to conduct a proper cost-technical tradeoff.92  The GSBCA
sustained their protests and ordered Treasury to conduct such an
analysis.9" Pursuant to this directive, Treasury performed the analysis
and affirmed its decision to award the contract to AT&T.
94
Lockheed and IBM protested again, but this time the board found
that Treasury had adequately supported its selection.95 Lockheed
then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The court ruled that procuring agencies are to be accorded great
discretion in conducting best value procurements.96 Accordingly, it
upheld the board's determination that Treasury had conducted an
adequate cost-technical tradeoff because the agency properly weighed
the technical merit of the AT&T proposal against its comparatively
higher cost and reasonably concluded that AT&T represented the best
value to the Government.97
This decision is not surprising in light of the significant discretion
the courts and boards of contract appeals typically afford contracting
officers.98 These tribunals are reluctant to second-guess an agency's
source selection decision and, with rare exception, will not overturn
an agency evaluation shown to be reasonably based.99 The courts
and boards are especially reluctant to overturn an agency's best value
determinations because they do not have the necessary expertise or






93. Id. at 958. Alternatively, the board directed the agency to amend the solicitation if it
had in fact intended for cost to play a minimal role in the evaluation. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 959.
97. Id. at 959-60.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 959 (citing numerous cases detailing broad discretion accorded agency
evaluation and selection decisions); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 1544,
1552 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that board erred in its discretion because it disregarded plain
meaning of licensing provision).
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situation in Birch & Davis, where the contracting officer selects a
competitive range of one, 00 demonstrates one of the most common
exceptions to this general rule. This exception stems from the
competition requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984 (CICA). 01 In such a case, the boards appear to believe that
Congress' interest in promoting competition overrides the discretion
normally afforded agency selection decisions.0 2
In 1993, the Federal Circuit also decided a pre-award bid protest
appeal from the Court of Federal Claims. Under the Tucker Act,
103
the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to consider pre-award
protests predicated on an implied-in-fact promise by the Government
to "fairly and honestly consider" bids.104 In Motorola, Inc. v. United
States,"05 the Federal Circuit determined that the Court of Federal
Claims lacked jurisdiction over a bid protest where the protester had
not submitted a bid in response to the subject procurement and
therefore had no implied-in-fact contract with the Government. 06
Motorola and other contractors responded to the Government's
invitation to develop a specification for the procurement of a
positioning device known as the Precision Lightweight Global
Positioning System Retriever (PLGR).1°7 The Government subse-
quently issued a nondevelopment item solicitation for technical
proposals and bid samples for the PLGRs.08 Motorola did not
submit a proposal in response to this solicitation, believing that the
Government had improperly restricted the solicitation to nondevelop-
ment item PLGRs.1'
Instead of responding with a proposal, Motorola filed an action in
the Court of Federal Claims to enjoin the Government from
100. Birch & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Christopher, 4 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that
contracting officer's selection of competitive range of one warrants close scrutiny by Board of
Contract Appeals and Comptroller General).
101. 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-253(c) (1988); see also United States v. Thorson Co., 806 F.2d 1061,
1064 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that CICA was "designed to obtain 'full and open competition'
by providing that (1) contractors were given adequate opportunities to bid, and (2) the
government received sufficient bids to ensure that it obtained the lowest possible price").
102. Birch & Davis Int' 4 F.3d at 973-74 (stating that CICA requirement of full and open
competition allows court to determine whether "excluded competitors have a reasonable chance
of being selected") (emphasis added).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1988).
104. See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (holding that
contractor's manifestation of intent to be bound warrants promise from Government to fairly
and honestly consider contractor's bid).
105. 988 F.2d 113 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
106. Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 988 F.2d 113, 114 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
107. Id. at 114-15.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 115.
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proceeding with selection and award pursuant to the procure-
ment.n1 The complaint alleged an implied contract resulting from
the Government's request for, and Motorola's submission of,
information to assist the Government in developing the solicita-
tion."' Motorola maintained that the Government breached this
contract by issuing a solicitation restricted to nondevelopment item
PLGRs, and as a result, prevented Motorola from competing."
2
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Motorola's complaint for
failure to state a claim, holding that Motorola was precluded from
challenging the nondevelopment item restriction and the bid sample
requirement because it had failed to make an offer in response to the
solicitation."' The court reasoned that responding to a Govern-
ment request for information differed materially from actually
submitting a bid."4 According to the court, a bid, unlike the
response that was made by Motorola, bound an offeror to the
Government's terms and conditions and thus gave rise to the
Government's obligation to consider the submission fairly and
honestly."' In this ruling, the court failed to follow its own prece-
dent from two prior decisions reaching the opposite conclusion."'
In a per curiam opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the opinion
of the Court of Federal Claims." 7 The Federal Circuit, however,
attempted to retreat from a categorical requirement for the submis-
sion of a bid or proposal as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, carefully
noting that "[o]rdinarily a bid is required to establish that a pre-award
implied in fact contract exists.""' Moreover, the Federal Circuit
adopted the decision of the Court of Federal Claims "to the extent
consistent with the above" language." 9
Despite this cautionary language, the Motorola decision is disappoint-
ing because it effectively prohibits the Court of Federal Claims from




113. Id. at 115-16.
114. Id. at 116.
115. Id.
116. See Magnavox Elecs. Sys. Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1373, 1378 (1992) (rejecting
argument that implied-in-fact obligation on behalf of Government fails to arise from single-
source procurement because it does not allow solicited responses for competitive bid); Standard
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 54, 57-58 (1984) (holding that statements of interest and
capability that do not constitute bids nevertheless constitute contract claims that must be
considered fairly and honestly).
117. Motorola, 988 F.2d at 114.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
1430
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CoNTRACTs 1431
on procurements due to the restrictive nature of the solicitation. 2
Nonbidders seeking to challenge the restrictiveness of a solicitation
thus may be left without a remedy in federal court, especially in those
circuits where § 1491(a) (3) of the Tucker Act has been interpreted
to preclude district court jurisdiction over pre-award bid protests.'
II. JURISDICTION
A. Establishing a Claim Under the Contract Disputes Act
Although some fifteen years have passed since the enactment of the
CDA,"' there remains considerable litigation surrounding the Act's
requirement of a "claim." The CDA itself states only that claims must
be submitted to the contracting officer in writing, and that claims
over $50,000 must be certified by the contractor."2 The FAR gives
additional guidance and defines a claim as "a written demand or
written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter
of right, the payment of money in a sum certain. ... A voucher,
invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute
when submitted is not a claim [under the CDA]. "
Most of the litigation surrounding the existence of a "claim"
involves two issues: the requirements for a proper certification and
the definition of a "dispute.""z Neither issue had received much
120. See id. (determining that solicitation must be followed by bid in order to create
justiciable implied-in-fact contract).
121. There is currently a split among the circuits concerning whether district courts have
concurrentjurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims over pre-award bid protests. Only two
circuits have held that federal district courts have pre-award jurisdiction. See In re Smith &
Wesson, 757 F.2d 431, 435 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (3) did not divest
district court ofjurisdiction in pre-award construction claims); Coco Bros. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d
675, 676 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that district court has jurisdiction in both pre- and post-award
cases). Two other circuits have held that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over pre-award
bid protests. SeeJ.P. Francis & Assocs. v. United States, 902 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding that use of term "exclusive jurisdiction" is not ambiguous, despite contrary authority);
United States v.John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that statute
limits equitable powers in pre-award stage to Claims Court); see also International Mailing Sys.
v. United States, 3 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 273 (D.D.C. 1984) (ordering case to be decided
in Claims Court); American Dist. Tel. v. Department of Energy, 555 F. Supp. 1244,1247 (D.D.C.
1983) (finding that court did have jurisdiction over post-award contract disputes); Opal Mfg. Co.
v. UMC Indus., 553 F. Supp. 131, 132-33 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding that court had no jurisdiction
for pre-award contract cases); London Fog Co. v. Defense Logistics Agency, No. 4-82-1334 (D.
Minn. Dec. 22, 1982) (finding language of statute unambiguous and refusing jurisdiction).
122. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
123. 41 U.S.C. § 605.
124. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.Rt § 33.201 (1993).
125. See, e.g., Skelly & Loyv. United States, 685 F.2d 414,416 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Paul E. Lehman,
Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 352, 354-55 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (discussing Contract Disputes Act and
its legislative history that claim be properly certified); United States v. Black Hawk Masonic
Temple Ass'n, 798 F. Supp. 646, 648 (D. Colo. 1992) (noting disputes involving interpretation
of lease terms are included within Contract Disputes Act).
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attention until 1991, when the Federal Circuit issued two decisions
that altered the claims litigation landscape. In United States v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp.,2 6 the Federal Circuit strictly interpreted
the FAR provision defining who may properly certify a claim. 2  The
court also held that "the certification requirement is a jurisdictional
prerequisite that must be satisfied by the contractor before it may
appeal the contracting officer's claim denial." 28
In that same year, the Federal Circuit added another procedural
hurdle to prosecution of a claim under the CDA. In Dawco Construc-
tion, Inc. v. United States," the court held that there must be a
genuine dispute between the contractor and the Government before
a justiciable claim exists under the CDA.1'° Given that the submis-
sion of a proper claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite under the
Act,' the boards and Court of Federal Claims are compelled to
dismiss cases involving claims that do not meet the Dawco and
Grumman requirements.
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the CDA, manifested in
Dawco and Grumman, has created more confusion than clarity in the
claims litigation area. The following section reviews Federal Circuit
case law interpreting the requirement for submission of a claim and
recent legislative developments designed to remedy the confusion
surrounding the contract disputes process.
1. Certification
For claims exceeding $50,000, the CDA requires that the contractor
"certify that the claim is made in good faith, that the supporting data
are accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief,
and that the amount requested accurately reflects the contract
adjustment for which the contractor believes the government is
liable."'32 While the CDA provides the requisite claim certification
language, it is silent about who is qualified to certify the claim. The
126. 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir.), cet. denied 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
127. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575,580-81 (Fed. Cir.) (rejecting
argument that certifying senior company official should have both primary responsibility for
execution of contract and physical presence at location of primary contract activity), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
128. Id. at 579.
129. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
130. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (asserting that
actual dispute must exist, not merely disagreement in negotiations that may ultimately lead to
dispute).
131. W.M. Schlosser Co. v. United States, 705 F.2d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (agreeing that
if claim is faulty, court has no jurisdiction).
132. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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FAR provides guidance in this area under § 33.207(c) (2), which
requires that the certifying official be either: "(i) a senior company
official in charge at the contractor's plant or location involved; or
(ii) an officer or general partner of the contractor having overall
responsibility for the conduct of the contractor's affairs. ' 1
In 1982, the Court of Claims, the predecessor court to the Federal
Circuit, held that proper certification is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal from a contracting officer's final decision. 34 In later
cases, the boards of contract appeals and the courts have also held
that an improper or defective certification precludes consideration of
a claim.135  Nine years later, in Grumman, the Federal Circuit
drastically narrowed the category of individuals who could certify
claims on behalf of a corporation by strictly construing the require-
ments of § 33.207(c) (2).136 In particular, the court held that the
phrase, "overall responsibility for the conduct of the contractor's
affairs," referred to corporate affairs in general, not just to a
corporate department, such as financial affairs. 7 As a result of this
narrowed category of acceptable certifiers, many corporate officials
with financial responsibilities could no longer certify claims on behalf
of their companies because they were not in a position of general
corporate responsibility.
The Federal Circuit's rigid interpretation of the FAR in Grumman
led to extensive litigation over certification and the dismissal of
numerous appeals for lack of jurisdiction.131 In response, Congress
enacted the Federal Court Administration Act (FCAA) 3 9 in 1992,
which amended the CDA to provide that a "defect in the certification
shall not deprive a court or an agency board of contract appeals of
133. 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c) (2) (1993).
134. Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 352, 355 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (rejecting
contractor's argument that its failure to certify its claim was correctable technical defect and
holding that absence of certification was jurisdictional defect that could not be corrected on
appeal).
135. See, e.g., Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. United States, 878 F.2d 1426, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (finding that proper certification is jurisdictional prerequisite); Aiken Advanced Sys., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 39225, 90-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 22,590, at 113,371 (1990) (asserting that board has
consistently held that "[a] proper certification either repeats the CDA's wording verbatim or
asserts its substantial equivalent").
136. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 580-81 (Fed. Cir.) (finding
that overall responsibility required is not satisfied by overall financial responsibility), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
137. Id. at 581.
138. See, e.g., Universal Coatings/Won Ill Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 241, 243 (1991);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 108 (1991); KDH Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct.
34, 42 (1991).
139. Pub. L No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4518 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (Supp. IV 1992)).
1433
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1417
jurisdiction over that claim." 4 ° A contractor may now correct a
defective certification of a post-FCAA claim at any time prior to entry
of a final judgment by a court or board of contract appeals. In
addition, the FCAA broadened the category of persons who may
certify a claim to include "any person duly authorized to bind the
contractor with respect to the claim."' 4 ' The new law also provides
that interest on a claim begins to accrue from either the date when
the contracting officer received the claim or the date of enactment of
the FCAA, whichever is later.'
While the FCAA has removed the jurisdictional impediments of
faulty claim certification as well as the Government's incentive for
litigating that issue, the statutory amendments are inapplicable to
claims pending before the Court of Federal Claims or boards prior to
October 29, 1992, the effective date of the Act.'43 For these claims,
prior law is applicable. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit decided seven
certification cases in 1993 under the CDA as it stood prior to the 1992
amendments.'" In the first six of these cases, the court reversed
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decisions that
the certifying official or the claim certification language did not meet
the FAR requirements. 4 5 These cases appeared to represent a move
away from the rigidity of Grumman's narrow categorization of
acceptable certifiers, perhaps in response to widespread criticism of
the decision and the subsequent enactment of the FCAA.
The most recent certification case, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. Garrett (Newport News II),146 however, represented a stark
departure from this trend. In Newport News II, the Federal Circuit not
only forcefully reasserted the validity of the Grumman categorization,
it issued a point-by-point rebuttal to all arguments raised against
140. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 611.
143. As of September 30, 1992, the close of the last quarter before the effective date of the
FCAA, there were 2198 cases docketed at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) alone.
144. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547, 1549 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Garrett, 991 F.2d 1379, 1380-82 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Stone, No. 91-1383, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469, at *18 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
5, 1993); Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759, 763"65 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc. v. Garrett, 987 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Ingalls
Shipbuilding, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 486, 487 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v.
O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 483-85 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
145. Santa Fe Eng'rs, 991 F.2d at 1380-82; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 91-1383, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 7469, at *18; Fischbach &Moore Int' 987 F.2d at 763-65; Johnson Controls, 987
F.2d at 741; Ingalls Shipbuilding, 986 F.2d at 487; Heyl & Patterson, 986 F.2d at 483-85.
146. 6 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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Grumman and the jurisdictional impact of an improper certifica-
tion." In its lengthy opinion, the court took the unusual step of
writing a separate section that responded in detail to the arguments
raised in the dissent.'4
Newport News I1involved a claim against the Navy, filed in 1986, for
roughly $8.5 million in purportedly allowable and allocable costs
arising from the acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) by
another company. 14  The NNS Controller, John B. Burling, Jr., who
certified the claim, was an elected officer with oversight responsibili-
ties for NNS' accounting and financial activities. 5 ' He was not,
however, the top financial official, and he reported to NNS' director
of finance, who, in turn, reported to NNS' vice president of fi-
nance.' Although Burling had authority to sign invoices pertain-
ing to government contracts, he lacked authorization to execute
contract documents.
1 52
The Navy's contracting officer issued a final decision denying the
company's claim,' and NNS appealed to the ASBCA. The board
dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding
that Burling was not qualified to certify the claim. T4  NNS then
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal.'55
Applying FAR § 33.207(c) (2), the Federal Circuit determined that
Burling was not in charge at the contractor's plant or the location
involved. 6 Rather, it found that Burling merely had responsibility
for the company's accounting matters, which did not include primary
responsibility for contract performance. 57 The court also dismissed
as self-serving an affidavit that asserted that Burling was vested with
unrestricted authority to certify claims; accordingly, the court found
the affidavit insufficient to establish that Burling had primary
responsibility for contract performance under FAR
147. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (asserting that court was required to decide appeal with. Grumman as binding precedent).
148. Id. at 1556-64.





154. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., ASBCA No. 33244, 91-2 B.CA. (CCH)
1 23,865, at 119,559, afT'd, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,132, at 120,777 (1991), affld, 6 F.3d 1547
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
155. Nwport News I, 6 F.3d at 1549 (affirming that NNS had failed to properly certify its
claim).
156. Id. at 1555.
157. Id.
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§ 33.207(c) (2) (ii).' s  Moreover, the court found that Burling
worked in the accounting department at NNS' headquarters, which
was not the primary location of contract performance for purposes of
FAR § 33.207(c) (2) (i)." 9
In finding that Burling was not a senior company official or general
partner having overall responsibility for the conduct of the
contractor's affairs, the court noted the importance of looking beyond
formal titles and de facto assertions of authority.'6° The court
determined that Burling's responsibility and authority as a corporate
officer extended only to financial and accounting matters.161 Even
in that area, the court noted, Burling was three levels down from the
top. Consequently, the court concluded that Burling lacked authority
to certify the NNS claim. 62
Before reaching its conclusion, the court disposed of several
arguments that NNS had raised against dismissal of its claim.'
63
First, NNS asked for an in banc review of Grumman."6  The court
refused, noting that its rules only permitted an in banc rehearing in
cases "that require answers to a precedent-setting question of
exceptional importance,"65 or where there is a conflict between the
panel opinion and Supreme Court or prior Federal Circuit prece-
dent."6 Finding neither, the court ruled that it was bound to follow
precedent set in Grumman.
167
Next, NNS argued that the FAR requirements exceeded those
specified in the CDA, and were thus invalid." The court, rejecting
this argument, repeated and reaffirmed its analysis in Grumman, and
concluded that the FAR properly "filled in the gaps" left open in the
CDA regarding who may certify claims. 169
NNS then argued that Congress did not authorize the Government
to promulgate binding regulations affecting jurisdiction. 170  The
court rejected this assertion and determined that Congress, under 41






163. Id. at 1550-53.
164. Id. at 1550.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1550 n.1.
167. Id. at 1550.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1551-52.
170. Id. at 1552.
171. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, § 8(h), 41 U.S.C. § 607(h) (1988).
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Policy to "issue guidelines with respect to criteria for the establish-
ment, functions, and procedures of the agency boards."'72 Citing
Grumman, the court concluded that enforcement of FAR
§ 33.207(c) (2) was within the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's
scope of authority.'7 3
NNS then argued that the contracting officer waived the certifica-
tion requirement by issuing a final decision on the claim.174 In
response to this argument, the court rebuked NNS for failing to
"come to grips with the extensive precedent holding that proper
certification is a jurisdictional prerequisite. '"17' The court then
cited a litany of cases establishing that a proper certification is a
jurisdictional prerequisite that may be raised at any stage of a
proceeding.1 76 The court therefore concluded that the decision of
the contracting officer waiving certification was invalid, and that there
was no claim on which NNS could base its waiver argument.
77
Finally, NNS argued that the ASBCA's application of Grumman was
an "impermissible retroactive application of a new construction of
FAR § 33.207(c)(2).' q 7 NNS reasoned that a 1991 interpretation
of a regulation should have no bearing on a 1986 certification.
179
In response, the court cited James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,8 '
in which the Supreme Court held that "it is error to refuse to apply
a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule
has already done so.""' Thus, because the Grumman standards were
applied to Grumman itself, the court determined that the board
properly applied Grumman to the NNS claim.
182
In summary, the court concluded that FAR § 33.207(c) (2) was a
valid and proper interpretation of the CDA certification requirement,
that an improper certification was indeed ajurisdictional defect, and
that Grumman would apply retroactively notwithstanding the date of
172. Newport News 1, 6 F.3d at 1552.
173. Id. (noting that "the regulation is clearly within the congressionally delegated authority
of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy") (citing United States v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 578 (1991)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1988)).
176. Id. at 1553 (citing United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. United States, 878 F.2d 1426, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Thoen
v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d
352, 355 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
177. Id. at 1553-54.
178. Id. at 1554.
179. Id.
180. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
181. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991).
182. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547, 1554 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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certification. 8 3 Newport News H is significant for two reasons. First,
it is now apparent that the court does not intend to relax the
inflexible standards of Grumman, despite the passage of the FGAA.
Litigants in cases docketed prior to the FCAA's effective date should
therefore expect a literal application of FAR § 33.207(c)(2) as
established by Grumman and its progeny. It also appears that the
court intends Newport News H to be the definitive word on arguments
that could be raised against the application of Grumman.
The court decided six other certification cases in 1993.184 All six
cases were decided prior to Newport News 1, and were somewhat
diminished in significance by that decision. Nevertheless, four of
these cases established principles that may be of some value to
contractors faced with certification problems.
In the first case, Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. O'Keefe, the Federal
Circuit held that a company official with overall responsibility for
contract performance was a proper certifying official, even though he
was not in charge at the location of contract performance.'86
Ingalls held a contract to construct the LHD-1 Amphibious Assault
Ship for the Navy.187 The company submitted a claim certified by
Mr. E.B. Robbins, corporate vice president, to the' contracting
officer." Mr. Robbins' duties included the power to execute all
contracts of a routine nature, and the authority to execute judicial
process and pleadings.'89 He also supervised and directed the
operations of the contract administration department, negotiated new
contracts and claims, and supervised and directed the preparation of
contract change estimates. 9' His office, as well as the office of the
183. In a lengthy dissent, SeniorJudge Bennett argued that Grumman should be reheard in
banc. Id. at 1564 (Bennett, J., dissenting). Citing the reactions of the bench, the bar, and
industry associations, as well as the enactment of the FCAA, Judge Bennett called Grumman
"flawed precedent" and Congress' action "the ultimate embarrassment to the court." Id. at 1565.
Judge Bennett's careful and reasoned analysis of Grumman can hardly be duplicated in the
context of this Article. Suffice it to say, it is unfortunate that his persuasive appeal to abandon
Grumman fell upon a rather unreceptive audience. While the court was unpersuaded, it is
instructive that the majority found it necessary to include in its opinion an equally lengthy
rebuttal to all of the arguments raised by Judge Bennett.
184. Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Garrett, 991 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Stone, No. 91-1383, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 1993);
Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1993);Johnson Controls
World Ser's., Inc. v. Garrett, 987 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Ingalis Shipbuilding, Inc. v. O'Keefe,
986 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
185. 986 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
186. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 486, 489-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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president to whom he reported, was located at the shipyard where the
LHD-1 was under construction.191
The board granted the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Robbins was not a proper
official to certify the claim in accordance with the CDA and the
FAR.192 More specifically, the ASBCA found that Mr. Robbins did
not meet the "in charge" language of the CDA and the FAR, as
interpreted by Grumman.193 Among other factors, the board noted
that Mr. Robbins was not in charge of the shipyard, and needed the
approval of the company president to sign any contract claim over two
million dollars.'94
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed on the certification issue
and remanded the case to the board, holding that Grumman did not
require the person certifying the claim to be in charge of the entire
plant or location; he or she need only be in charge of the contract
under which the claim arose. 95 In a footnote, the court observed
that "as a kind of short hand, panels [of the board] may have referred
to an individual as being 'in charge of the plant' as synonymous with
'in charge of the contract. '' 1 6 The court specifically noted that in
cases where it had used the "in charge of the plant or location"
language, it was merely describing factual evidence rather than
establishing a legal standard.'97 The court then further examined
Mr. Robbins' duties and concluded that the evidence established that
he was in charge of the contract..9
On the day it decided Ingalls, the Federal Circuit also decided Heyl
& Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe. 99 In this case, the court held that the
191. Id.
192. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., ASBCA No. 38323, 91-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 23,904, at 119,754
(1991), rev'd, 986 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 486, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
196. Id. at 489 n.2.
197. Id.
198. The ASBCA utilized the Ingalls opinion to provide guidance in two subsequent cases.
In George Hyman Construction Co., ASBCA Nos. 44155, 44361, 44362, 93-2 B.CA (CCH)
25,870, at 128,718 (1993), the board used Ingalls to conclude that the FAR did not require a
minimum presence at the contract site by the certifying official. Thus, an official satisfied the
requirements of FAR § 33.207(c) (2) (i) if she visited the job site less than once a week but was
present at "significant times." Id.
In Wesphal GmbH & Co. KG, the board also followed the Ingalls rationale that the certifying
official "need not be in charge of the plant or location, only of the contract." Westphal GmbH
& Co. KG, ASBCA Nos. 39941, 39943, 40780, 40781, 40782, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,898, at
128,830 (1993). The board in Westphal held that the certifying official was a senior company
official for purposes of his authority to certify claims because as a branch manager, he had
ultimate responsibility for all area projects. Id.
199. 986 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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language used in a certification must only "substantially comply" with
the language of the CDA2 0°
Heyl & Patterson entered into a contract with the Navy to design,
fabricate, and install a derrick at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard.2"'
After an exchange of letters regarding an equitable adjustment to the
contract, Heyl & Patterson submitted a formal, certified claim to the
contracting officer. The certification stated that "the data are
accurate and complete," rather than "the supporting data are accurate
and complete," as required under the CDA 202
The ASBCA dismissed this claim, holding that it was not properly
certified.0 3 In particular, the board noted that the lack of the word
"supporting" left it "wondering what data it is that is accurate and
complete."0 4 Heyl & Patterson appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit reversed the board and remanded for
adjudication of the claim on the merits.0 5 The court stated that it
had previously considered whether a certification had to use the exact
language of the CDA in United States v. General Electric Corp.206 In
General Electric Corp., the court held that the CDA required only
"substantial compliance" rather than literal compliance with the
certification language.0 7 The court in Heyl & Patterson also cited
precedent for the proposition that "certain 'magic words' [of the CDA
certification] need not be used."2 °0 The court concluded that the
contractor's omission of the word "supporting" did not affect its
substantial compliance with the certification requirement.2 9 In fact,
the court noted that common sense indicates that the contractor
would not have submitted the data had it not been supporting.210
To infer that the certification was referring to any other data, the
court noted, would be nonsensical.211  The court thus concluded
that the board had jurisdiction over the claim.
212
200. Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
201. Id. at 481.
202. Id. at 483.
203. Heyl & Patterson, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40604, 42589, 91-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 23,972, at
119,987 (1991), rev'd, 986 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
204. Id. at 119,986.
205. Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
206. 727 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
207. United States v. General Elec. Corp., 727 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
208. Hel & Patterson, 986 F.2d at 483 (holding that contractor need not make explicit
request for final decision and that request can be implied from context of submission) (citing
Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
209. Id. at 485.
210. Id. at 484.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 485. The ASBCA has considered the impact of Heyl & Patterson on its oym
precedent. In Cox & Palmer Construction Corp., ASBCA No. 43438, 93-3 B.C.A. (CCH) I
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Less than a month later, the Federal Circuit again reviewed an
ASBCA decision on certification, this time focusing on both the
qualifications of the certifying official and the sufficiency of the
language used in the certification. In Fischbach & Moore International
Corp. v. Christopher,"' the court again held that the actual certifying
language need only substantially comply with the wording in the CDA
and the FAR,214 and found that an executive vice president is
presumed to have the "overall responsibility" for purposes of the
second prong of the FAR requirement.
215
Fischbach and Moore International Corporation (FMIC) was
awarded a contract to install classified security systems for the
Department of State in certain buildings in China.2 16  The Govern-
ment never issued a notice to proceed, and eventually terminated the
contract for convenience.21 7  Mr. Charles Dirik, FMIC's executive
vice president, certified a claim to the contracting officer for
termination costs.218 In the certification, he used the language "'to
the best of my understanding and belief" rather than the words
"knowledge and belief."219  The contracting officer failed to issue a
final decision on the claim, and FMIC appealed to the ASBCA.2 °
The ASBCA, sua sponte, ordered FMIC to submit evidence that the
certification requirement had been met.22' FMIC's submittal
included a copy of the corporation's bylaws and an affidavit from
Mr. Dirik stating that he was the most senior FMIC official with direct
26,005, at 129,270 (1993), the board found its approach in three earlier cases to be contrary to
that in Heyl & Patterson. Id. (holding contractor claim must repeat CDA wording verbatim or
assert CDA's substantial equivalent and finding defective certification because contractor failed
to include word "all" in its statement that data submitted to Government was accurate and
complete to best of contractor's knowledge) (citing Triasco Corp., ASBCA No. 42465, 91-2
B.C.A. (CCH) 1 23,969, at 119,977-78 (1991); Gauntt Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 33323,87-3 B.CA
(CCH) 1 20,221, at 102,412 (1987) (stating that contractor's use of words "all data used" instead
of "the supporting data" rendered contractor's certification unacceptable because contractor's
wording restricts certification to "unidentified" data that contractor chose to use); Duininck
Bros., ASBCA No. 42680, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,215, at 121,119 (1991) (concluding that
contractor's use of words "the following is supporting data" rendered certification ineffective
because contractor must certify "all" supporting data, notjust data contractor chose to submit)).
Accordingly, the court's decision in Cox &Palmer renders these cases nonprecedential. Id.
213. 987 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
214. Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
215. Id.; see also FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c) (2) (ii) (1993) (stating that "an officer... having
overall responsibility for the conduct of the contractor's affairs" may certify claim).
216. Fischbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 760.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 762.
220. Id. at 760.
221. Id. at 760-61.
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knowledge of 'the China project, and was the most senior official with
overall responsibility for the company's affairs on the project.22
2
The ASBCA nonetheless dismissed FMIC's claim for lack of
jurisdiction.223 The board first held that the use of the word
"understanding" instead of "knowledge" rendered the certification
fatally defective because the word "understand" was not the substantial
equivalent of "knowledge."24  The board then held that Mr. Dirik,
as the person certifying the claim for his company, did not satisfy
either prong of the FAR § 33.207(c) (2).225 For the first prong, the
board stated that the company did not submit any evidence as to
whom was in charge at the site.226 For the second prong, the board
found that the affidavit did not indicate that Mr. Dirik had "'overall
responsibility for the contractor's affairs' generally."227 Upon dismiss-
al, FMIC appealed.228
Again, the Federal Circuit reversed the ASBCA.229 With respect
to the certification language of the FMIC claim, the court held that
under United States v. General Electric Corp.,230 substantial compliance
with the language of the CDA is sufficient.23' Furthermore, the
court found that the word "understanding" was actually broader than
"knowledge,"2 2 referring to the Government's attempted distinction
222. Id. at 761.
223. Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp., ASBCA No. 42170, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,511, at
122,330 (1991).
224. Id. at 122,332. Other boards of contract appeals have apparently been more lenient
than the ASBCA in their acceptance of language that does not "parrot" the FAR. In Maxima
Corp., ENGBCA No. C-9208139, B.CA. (CCH) (1993) (unreported), the Department of Energy
Board of Contract Appeals found that a certification that stated that the company certified the
information was sufficient in that it substantially complied with the FAR. Id. at 6-9. In PJ. Dick
Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA Nos. 11847,11860, 93-1 B.CA. (CCH) '125,411,
at 126,603 (1992), the GSBCA approved certification language that did not exactly match the
FAR, noting that other BCAs were "extremely restrictive" in this area. Id. at 126,604. In
contrast, the ASBCA rejected similar certification language that was expressly approved by the
contracting officer in Bontke Bros. Construction Co., ASBCA No. 39437, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
24,611, at 122,770 (1991) (holding that contractor's statement that claim was "accurate and
complete to the best of contractor's knowledge" rendered certification defective because
contractor failed to certify that supporting data were accurate and complete).
225. Fischbach & Moore, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 122,333.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. Apparently the Government and the ASBCA were unable to heed the admonition
in Hey & Patterson that "the government is not well-advised to challenge every deviation, no
matter how slight, meaningless, or harmless." Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480,
483 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
229. Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
230. 727 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (indicating that certification statement, which was
in substantial compliance with CDA, provided board with jurisdiction over dispute).
231. Fischbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 763.
232. Id.
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as "hyper-technical" and "mere semantics."" The court also
rejected the Government's assertion that the certifying official had to
have personal knowledge of the supporting data in the claim."3 4
According to the court, the phrase "to the best of my knowledge and
belief," as stated in the FAR, signifies indirect, rather than direct,
knowledge.3 5
Regarding the FAR requirements for a certifying official, the
Federal Circuit held, in accordance with United States v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. (Newport News 1),21s that an executive
vice president is presumed to have the overall responsibility for the
conduct of the contractor's affairs under FAR § 33.207(c) (2) (ii).237
Rather than focusing on the evidentiary record to ascertain
Mr. Dirik's exact duties, the court found that the Government failed
to rebut sufficiently the presumption of overall responsibility accorded
Mr. Dirik by virtue of his corporate title."8 Thus, the court reaf-
firmed Newport News ,239 concluding that the Government has the
burden to submit specific evidence that a given executive vice
president lacks the requisite responsibility to make a certification.
240
Newport News land Fischbach & Moore together create a presumption
in favor of the contractor based solely on the title of the certifying
official. 241 The burden then shifts to the Government to present
specific evidence in rebuttal.242 In fact, the court in Fischbach &
Moore extended the application of the presumption established in
Newport News I In Newport News I, the Government raised the
certification issue in response to the contractor's summary judgment
motion rather than waiting until the board raised the issue sua
sponte.24' Thus, in Newport News I, the burden shifted to the
233. Id.
234. Id. at 762.
235. Id.
236. 933 F.2d 996 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
237. Fischbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 764 (indicating that in order to show that high-ranking
corporate official did not have authority to certify claim, Government must come forth with
evidence or substantial allegations showing lack of authority); see also United States v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 933 F.2d 996, 999 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that
corporate executive vice president, by virtue of title, has requisite authority to certify claim);
FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c) (1993).
238. Fischbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 764-65.
239. See id. at 765 (citing Newport News Ias controlling authority).
240. Id. at 764.
241. See i. (citing Newport News I for proposition that certification by corporate officer
indicates corporate assertion that officer has authority to act in situations where corporate
officer's title is not inconsistent with his action).
242. See i. (stating that to show corporate official did not have authority to certify claim,
Government must present evidence indicating lack of authority).
243. United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 933 F.2d 996, 996 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
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Government to create "a genuine issue of material fact so as to
preclude summary judgment."2" In Fischbach & Moore, the court
itself shifted the burden to the Government after the contractor made
a prima facie showing that Mr. Dirik was a certifying official.245
The court in Fischbach & Moore, however, fell short of delineating
which corporate titles will pass the presumption test.246  In
Grumman, the court held that a senior vice president and treasurer
was not a proper certifying official.247 There, the court stated that
"a CEO or one of equivalent status would satisfy the [requirement]."248
While the court in Fischbach & Moore cited a CEO as an example of
an obviously proper certifying official,249 it took no position on the
qualifications of any lower job titles.
Finally, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Stone,"0 the Federal
Circuit again reversed the ASBCA, holding that an insurance company
executive responsible for the completion of a construction contract
was a proper certifying official.251 In Hartford Accident, Juno Con-
struction Corporation entered into a contract with the Department of
the Army to build an Armed Forces Reserve Center in New Jersey.12
AsJuno's surety on the project, Hartford would assume the remaining
rights and obligations under the contract in the event that Juno
defaulted. 3 Mr. Stephen Pazar of Hartford supervised project
performance on the Juno contract.2
4
A year after project completion, Mr. Pazar certified a claim on
behalf of Hartford for money that the Government had allegedly
overpaid to Juno. 5 The contracting officer denied the claim and
244. Id. at 999.
245. See Fischbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 764-65 (stating that Government did not meet its
burden of proof concerning lack ofauthority in case where corporation relied solely on title of
executive vice president to establish official's authority to act).
246. Id. at 765 (stating only that corporate title of executive vice president fails presumption
test).
247. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 580-81 (Fed. Cir.) (stating
that officers whose responsibilities are limited to financial affairs of corporation are not proper
certifying officials), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991); see also Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v.
United States, 878 F.2d 1426, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that official whose sole
responsibility concerned contractor's financial affairs was not proper certifying official).
248. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 581.
249. Fischbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 764.
250. No. 91-1383, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 1993).
251. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Stone, No. 91-1383, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469, at
*12 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 1993).
252. Id. at *2.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at *3.
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Hartford then appealed to the ASBCA." 6 As it had done in prior
cases, the board raised the issue of proper certification sua spon-
te. 57  Hartford submitted evidence referencing Mr. Pazar's sole
responsibility for the completion of the contract, and that he was a
"senior company official."" s The board found this evidence insuffi-
cient to prove that Mr. Pazar was a proper certifying official because
the record did not establish where his position fell within the overall
company hierarchy. 9 The board noted specifically that none of
the proffered evidence contained "an unqualified statement that
Mr. Pazar is a company official."2  Thus, the board dismissed
Hartford's claim for lack of jurisdiction whereupon Hartford
appealed. 61
The Federal Circuit, reversing the board,262 distinguished the case
from Grumman.263 Contrary to the ASBCA, the court found that
Mr. Pazar was indeed in charge at the site.2' According to the
court, the official need not be the site supervisor in charge of the
actual construction work;21 that person, in many cases, would be a
subcontractor.2  Consequently, the court reasoned that a qualified
certifying official must simply be the individual who has responsibility
for the activities at the site on behalf of the contractor.267
As for the requirement that the certifying official be a senior
company official, the Hartford court rejected the board's argument
that Hartford had made no "unqualified statement that Mr. Pazar is
a senior company official."21 The court reviewed the statements
made by Hartford and concluded that, within the context of a surety
taking over a construction project, the company had described Mr.
Pazar as a senior official in charge at the location.269 Furthermore,
the Federal Circuit found that neither the Government nor the
256. Id. (stating that contracting officer denied claim because claim was not properly
certified).
257. Id. at *4.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *6.
260. Id.
261. I&
262. Id. at *12.
263. Id. at *10.
264. Id. at *12.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 11-12.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 1& at *11.
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ASBCA cited any evidence in conflict with Hartford's assertions.7 °
Thus, the court found that Mr. Pazar was a proper certifying official.
Two other Federal Circuit decisions addressing certification issues
deserve brief mention. In Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v.
Garrett,271 the court confirmed that neither the position in the
corporate hierarchy of the person certifying nor the fact that another
officer has "overall responsibility" is alone determinative of whether
that individual may certify contract claims.272 These facts are only
criteria to be taken into account in determining whether an officer
has overall responsibility under FAR § 33.207(c) (2) .27' Finally, in
Sadelmi Joint Venture v. Dalton, 4 the court held that a certification
signed by a senior official of one member of ajoint venture met the
CDA requirements when each member of thejoint venture wasjointly
and severally liable for the obligations of the venture.275
Taken together, the Federal Circuit's 1993 certification decisions
signal a migration by some members of the court away from the rigid
requirements of Grumman. Whether the court took this approach on
its own, or in response to the criticisms that led to the FCAA
amendments,276 the result is the same. First, the certifying official
need only be in charge of the contract, not the plant or location of
contract performance; 27 7 second, corporate reporting relationships
and the sharing of responsibilities are simply factors the tribunal
should take into account in determining the qualification of a
certifying official;271 third, a presumption exists that an executive
vice president is a proper certifying official;2 79 fourth, the substantial
270. Id. at *12-13. Without so stating, the court appears to have used the presumption
approach of Newport News I and Fischbach & Moora That is, the contractor does not need to
present evidence supporting its assertions of proper certification qualifications; rather the
burden is on the Government to present evidence rebutting the assertions. See supra notes 236-
49 and accompanying text (discussing presumption enunciated in Newport News land Fischbach
& Moore).
271. 987 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
272. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc. v. Garrett, 987 F.2d 738, 741-42 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
273. Id. at 741. The court noted that more than one person in a company can have overall
responsibility for corporate affairs so as to qualify as a certifying official. Id. The court also
made it clear that a person can satisfy the "overall responsibility" even though he or she has to
report to other individuals. See id. at 741-42 (noting that regulation refers to "an officer" having
overall responsibility as opposed to "the officer" having overall responsibility).
274. 5 F.3d 510 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
275. Sadelmijoint Venture v. Dalton, 5 F.3d 510, 511-12 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
276. See Lynda T. O'Sullivan & Mark P. Willard, Government Contracts: 1991 Analysis and
Summay, 41 AM. U. L REy. 911, 915-17 (1992) (analyzing Grumman dissent and reviewing
criticisms of Grumman decision, including proposals to amend FAR certification requirements).
277. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 486, 489-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
278. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc. v. Garrett, 987 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
279. Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759, 764-65 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 933 F.2d 996, 999 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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equivalent of the words used in the FAR is sufficient for proper
certification-the contractor need not use "magic words."28
Additionally, the responsibilities of the certifying official must be
reviewed in the context of the setting of the contract.28 Finally, the
presumption in favor of the contractor that the certifying agent was
qualified, announced in Fischbach & Moore and Newport News I, may go
beyond the company titles and may apply in cases where the
contractor merely asserts that the certifying official meets the
requirements, without submitting supporting evidence.282 The latest
Federal Circuit decision in this area, Newport News II, however,
indicates the preference of at least some of the Federal Circuitjudges
to preserve the status quo established in Grumman.283
As stated previously, except as to cases pending before the Court of
Federal Claims or the boards prior to October 29, 1992,284 these
certification cases most likely were rendered moot with the passage of
the FCAA. The Act, however, left some issues unanswered. For
example, the FCAA states that in the case of a defective certification,
"the court or agency board shall require a defective certification to be
corrected."2" What happens if an error is not discovered before
final action, or the contractor cannot or will not correct the certifica-
tion? Can all defects be corrected, whether substantive or procedur-
al?286 Another issue concerns when and how an official has been
280. Fschbach & Moore, 987 F.2d at 763.
281. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Stone, No. 91-1383, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469, at
*10-12 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 1993).
282. Id. at *11-12.
283. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547, 1554-56 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding that official who certified claim was not qualified to do so because he only
had responsibility for contractor's financial affairs and accounting activities and did not have
responsibility for contract performance and therefore could not properly certify claim under
CDA).
284. The Government evidently has no intention of giving up on the advantage it held prior
to the passage of the FCAA. In Engineered Maintenance Services, ASBCA No. 45261, 94-1
B.CA. (CCH) 26,292, at 130,780 (Aug. 16,1993), the Government sought to dismiss an appeal
of a defectively certified claim because the appeal was dated October 28, 1992, but postmarked
on October 29, 1992. The Government asserted that because it was possible that the appeal was
in the control of the Postal Service prior to the effective date of the FCAA, the board should
apply the old law. Id.
285. FCAA, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C.
§ 605(c)).
286. The House Report on P.L. 102-572 suggests that the term "technically defective" was to
be used to describe certification defects that could be corrected before final action. See H.R.
REP. No. 1006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.N. 3921, 3937 (stating
that to avoid needless repetition of administrative and judicial processes, contractor should be
able to amend certification during litigation where certification defect was not due to bad faith,
fraud, or reckless and intentional disregard of statutory certification requirements). The term,
however, is not reflected in the enacted statute. The obvious issue then is whether a substantive
defect can simply be corrected by the contractor before final disposition of the claim.
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"duly authorized."21 7  These and other issues promise that certifica-
tion will not fade away as a problem for contractors.
2. The existence of a dispute
Few decisions of the Federal Circuit have created as much
controversy and confusion as Dawco Construction, Inc.288 As stated
previously, the Federal Circuit in Dawco held that there must be a
dispute between the contractor and the Government before the
contractor may advance a claim cognizable under the CDA.289 After
Dawco, the courts and boards generally concluded that the parties
must first come to something of an impasse before the demand of the
contractor may be transformed into a CDA claim.2
0
In 1992, however, the Federal Circuit held in Transamerica Insurance
Corp. v. United States"P1 that the courts and the boards should apply
a "common sense" analysis in determining the existence of a dis-
pute. 2 In this regard, the Transamerica decision appeared to signal
a departure from the rigid application of the Dawco "dispute" require-
ment."3 In 1993, the Federal Circuit addressed the Dawco require-
ment on two occasions.
In the first case, Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 4 the court
appeared to follow the Transamerica reasoning, moving further away
from a strict interpretation of Dawco that negotiations be complete
before the contractor may advance a claim. 5 In Santa Fe Engineers,
287. The House Report on P.L. 102-572 provides examples of"technically defective" certifica-
tions, such as "certification by the wrong or incorrect representative of the contractor (when the
person making the certification was authorized by the contractor to certify on its behalf)." Id.
One must question, however, how such a certification can be defective if the Act permits
certification by individuals authorized by the contractor. Clearly, the boards and courts will
eventually be faced with the issue of whether contractor designation of certifying individuals
alone is sufficient to satisfy the amended CDA.
288. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
289. See Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
290. See, e.g., Facilities Sys. Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 25 CI. Ct. 761, 765 (1992) ("For
purposes of the CDA, a dispute arises only when the parties have reached an impasse in their
negotiations.") (citing Dawco Constr., 930 F.2d at 879); Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States,
22 Cl. Ct. 757, 765 (1991) ("[T]he parties must have reached something approaching impasse
... before a claim can arise."), afrd, 960 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
291. 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
292. See Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(applying common sense analysis to question of whether dispute exists, and holding that
"[tihere is no necessary inconsistency between the existence of a valid CDA claim and an
expressed desire to continue to mutually work toward a claim's resolution").
293. See Zupa & Siebel, supra note 2, at 1114-15 (criticizing rigid Dawco dispute requirements
because of potential to create confusion and uncertainty in area of claim certification).
294. 986 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
295. See Hey & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 486 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that
negotiations between contractor and Government will not preclude existence of claim in dispute
under CDA).
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Inc. v. Garrett,9 ' however, the second case, the court was unwilling
to extend the Transamerica analysis to any stage of the proceedings
prior to a breakdown in negotiations.Y
7
While its impact on jurisdiction was not immediately recognized,
the Government has developed the "dispute" requirement established
in Dawco into a highly effective tool for dismissing claims and
prolonging litigation." s With the certification issue tentatively
resolved by the FCAA amendments to the CDA, questions arising
from Dawco as to whether a dispute exists will likely become one of
the most common jurisdictional controversies in the contract disputes
process.
The Federal Circuit further refined the Dawco rule in Heyl &
Patterson, Inc. v. O7Keefe.2" There, the court held that, while it is not
necessarily inconsistent with the CDA to continue to negotiate a valid
claim towards a resolution, the contractor must explicitly or implicitly
request a final decision on the claim before advancing a cognizable
dispute claim under the CDA. °
In this case, the contractor, Heyl & Patterson, entered into a
contract with the Department of the Navy to design, fabricate, and
install a derrick at the Norfolk Navy Shipyard."'1 On November 3,
1987, Heyl & Patterson submitted to the contracting officer a request
for an equitable adjustment which was not certified and contained no
request for a final decision.30 2 Instead, the letter asked only for a
"preliminary position" and offered to engage in negotiations.u
Heyl & Patterson submitted a second letter providing additional cost
details on the claim, decreasing the amount requested, and stating
that it would submit a "formal request" after a proposed meeting with
296. 991 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
297. Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Garrett, 991 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that no
claim in dispute existed at time contractor sent proposal to Navy for sole reason that no Navy
representative had denied contractor's right to compensation). The court distinguished the
Transamerica facts because in that case there was positive proof that the contractor's claim was
in dispute at the time it was submitted to the government contract officer. Id. at 1584.
Therefore, the court in Santa Fe is apparently refusing to extend the "common sense" dispute
analysis from Transamerica to any point in the contractual relationship before the Government
denies the contractor's right to compensation.
298. See Zupa & Siebel, supra note 2, at 1123 (asserting that "cases that cite Dawco are too
numerous"); see also ABA Section Urging New FAR Definition to State that Matter Need Not Be "In
Dispute, "59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 181-82 (Feb. 15,1993) (discussingABA's suggested revisions
to FAR intended to address decisions like Dawco and eliminate "in dispute" requirement for
government contract claims).
299. 986 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
300. See Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 484-86 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
301. Id. at 481.
302. Id. at 481-82.
303. Id. at 481.
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the contracting officer.114  Heyl & Patterson sent a third letter
containing a certification and stating that the company was "anxious
to proceed with the settlement."30 5  The letter offered to provide
the Navy with more information if necessary.
306
After the contracting officer denied the claim, Heyl & Patterson
appealed to the ASBCA.1 7 The board dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, concluding that the claimed amount was not in
dispute at the time Heyl & Patterson submitted each of the three
letters because the parties were still conducting negotiations.3°' The
board followed the holdings of Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United
State 9 and Sun Eagle Corp. v. United State31° and concluded that
Heyl & Patterson's use of the word "claim" coupled with its transmis-
sion of a certification did not transform the cost submission into a
claim.31 1 Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 2
Heyl & Patterson appealed to the Federal Circuit. The court
agreed with the board that the three letters indicated that the parties
were negotiating and further noted that none of the three letters
either explicitly or implicitly requested a final decision.3 The
court therefore affirmed the decision of the board that the Heyl &
Patterson submission was not the subject of a dispute and therefore
did not constitute a CDA claim. 314
Significantly, the court in Heyl & Patterson attempted to distance
itself from the strict interpretations of Dawco expressed in the Essex
Electro and Sun Eagle cases cited by the board.13 Rather than
agreeing with the board that negotiations must clearly end for a
dispute to exist, the court simply concluded that the board's factual
findings were not arbitrary or capricious, nor were they unsupported
304. Id. at 482, 485.
305. Id. at 481-82.
306. Id.
307. Heyl & Patterson, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40604, 42589, 91-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 24,233, at
121,995 (1991).
308. Id. at 121,996.
309. 22 Cl. Ct. 757, 765 (1991) (holding that parties must be unable to resolve dispute
amongst themselves before there can be claim), afld, 960 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 408 (1992).
310. 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 473 (1991) ("[A] claim only exists when the parties have clearly
abandoned negotiations ... ."), modified in par4 1991 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 388 (Aug. 7, 1991).
311. Hey &Patterson, 986 F.2d at 482.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 485-86. The court explained that a request for a final decision does not require
the use of certain "magic words," but can be implied from the context of the submission. Id.
at 483.
314. Id. at 486.
315. See id. at 485 (indicating that existence of n egotiations is not necessarily inconsistent
with claim in dispute under CDA).
1450
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CoNTRACTs
by substantial evidence.316 The court then attempted to bridge the
gap between Dawco and Transamerica. Citing Transamerica, the court
agreed that "[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between the
existence of a valid CDA claim and an expressed desire to continue
to mutually work toward a claim's resolution.""'7  Rather than
deciding whether the negotiations in Heyl & Patterson precluded the
existence of a claim, the court found that the lack of either an
explicit or implicit request for a final decision defeated the presence
of a claim.1
In Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. v. Garrett,319 the Federal Circuit retroac-
tively applied the rule enunciated in Dawco."2° Santa Fe Engineers
and the Navy entered into a contract for the construction of a space
shuttle facility in California. 2' After discovering that soil conditions
were unsuitable and would prevent the construction of a ramp, the
Navy issued a stop-work order and then requested that Santa Fe
submit an adjusted cost proposal reflecting a downward equitable
adjustment in the contract price for the deletion of the ramp from
the scope of work. 2 In response, Santa Fe submitted a cost
proposal including a request for a time extension. Santa Fe also
informed the Navy that it considered its cost proposal to be a claim
and proceeded to certify it in compliance with the CDA. 1
4
Over the next two and one-half years, Santa Fe and the Navy
engaged in meetings and correspondence in an attempt to effect the
proposed changes .31 During the course of this exchange, the
Government requested, and Santa Fe provided, additional information
in support of the cost proposal.326 Santa Fe also requested addition-
al meetings with the Navy in order to continue negotiations and, at
one point, reduced the amount of time in its extension request.
327
Finally, approximately two and one-half years after Santa Fe had
submitted its cost proposal, the Navy informed the contractor that it
found insufficient justification for a time extension.328 At that
316. Id.
317. Id. at 486.
318. Id.
319. 991 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
320. Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Garrett, 991 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
321. Id. at 1580.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1581.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1582-83.
328. Id. Santa Fe submitted its original cost proposal in August 1984 and the Navy rejected
the time extension in March 1987. Id.
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point, Santa Fe wrote to the Navy and asked the contracting officer
to issue a written final decision concerning the cost proposal
claim.31 Santa Fe did not attach a claim certification to this let-
ter. 330 The contracting officer denied the claim, and Santa Fe
appealed to the ASBCA.331
The ASBCA dismissed the Santa Fe appeal, holding that at the time
Santa Fe submitted its certified claim, the parties were not in
dispute."3 2 Although the board did find that a dispute existed as of
Santa Fe's last letter to the Navy, it noted that the letter was not
accompanied by a claim certification and therefore could not be
considered a claim.33
Santa Fe appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit. The court
affirmed, finding that during the two and one-half year exchange, the
Navy had never actually denied Santa Fe's right to compensation. 34
Rather, as evidenced by the meetings and correspondence, the Navy
was in the process of collecting more information from and negotiat-
ing with Santa Fe in order to reach a decision. 35 As the court
noted, it was not until the Navy notified Santa Fe that there was
insufficientjustification for a time extension that Santa Fe responded
with a request for a final written decision.336 At this point, the court
stated, the parties reached an "impasse" and a disputed claim
arose.
3 7
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the ASBCA that Santa Fe's
request for a final decision was not properly certified. 3 Santa Fe
had not executed a new certification when it requested the final
decision, and the previous certification was ineffective because it did
not relate to a then-existing dispute. 3 9 Even if the certification was
somehow valid, the court reasoned, Santa Fe had subsequently
provided the Navy with additional data which was never certified."0
The court also distinguished Santa Fe facts from the Transamerica
decision, finding in Transamerica, unlike in Santa Fe, a preexisting
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1581.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1583.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1582, 1595.
335. I& at 1582-83.




340. I& at 1583-84.
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dispute when the contractor requested further negotiations3 41
According to the court, Transamerica stood for the proposition that a
request for further negotiations does not vitiate an already cognizable
CDA dispute. 42 Because Santa Fe certified its submission prior to
the onset of a dispute, it did not advance a claim under the CDA. 4'
Heyl & Patterson and Santa Fe left unresolved the debate over
whether the "impasse" analysis of Dawco and its progeny should prevail
over the "common sense analysis" of Transamerica. Although Santa Fe
seems to permit Transamerica-type negotiations only after the existence
of a valid dispute, some boards seem willing to allow them before that
stage. For example, in Saco Defense, Inc.,3" the ASBCA stated that
the "impasse" and "abandonment of negotiations" tests of Essex Electro
and Sun Eagle could "lead to perverse results, inconsistent with the
purposes of the CDA."' 4 The board reasoned that requiring such
a deadlock could drag out negotiations and discourage contractors
from pursuing serious negotiations. 46 As a result, some boards have
applied Dawco and Transamerica in a liberal manner to avoid dismissal
of claims, perhaps based in part on the widespread criticism of
Dawco.34  Some boards have found that a contractor's initial submis-
sion of a demand for compensation sets up a dispute, while a
subsequent submittal establishes a valid CDA claim 4' Nevertheless,




342. Id. at 1583.
343. Id. at 1583-84.
344. ASBCA Nos. 44792, 45171, 93-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,029, at 129,387 (1993).
345. Saco Defense, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 44792, 45171, 93-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,029, at 129,387
(1993).
346. Id.
347. For example, in Bill StrongEnterprises, Inc., the board found that a dispute existed where
the parties disagreed as to the amount of the claim, despite the absence of a request for a
contracting officer's decision or a breakdown of negotiations. Bill Strong Enters., Inc., ASBCA
Nos. 42946, 43896, 93-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,961, at 129,097 (1993).
348. See e.g., Raven Indus., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 44048, 44049,93-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,031, at
129,391 (1993) (stating that delay costs included in request for equitable adjustment were in
dispute because they had been submitted to contracting officer previously); Conference
Communications, Inc., ASBCA No. 44295, 93-1 B.C. (CCH) 1 25,558, at 127,295 (1992)
(holding that invoice was not in dispute when submitted, but letter sent later converted it into
CDA claim); Electrodynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 43224, 93-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,303, at 126,054-
55 (1992) (calling first submittal routine request for payment and second submittal valid claim
because it was in response to contracting officer's decision disallowing bulk of claimed costs).
The court in Electrodynamics held that the contracting officer's decision more appropriately
placed the matters into dispute. Electrodynamics, 93-1 B.CA. (CCH) at 126,054-55.
349. See, e.g., CPT Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct 451,456 (1992) (finding no claim where
parties are in negotiation posture, even if contractor invokes CDA and refers to submittal as
claim); Reflectone, Inc., ASBCA No. 43081, 93-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 25,512, at 127,056 (1992)
(determining that request for equitable adjustment could not be claim because amount had
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By nature, board and court decisions concerning the "dispute"
requirement tend to be highly fact-oriented. 30  The most practical
solution may be to amend the FAR to eliminate the dispute require-
ment.35' The ABA Public Contract Law Section has recommended
such a change," 2 but the Department of Justice has vigorously
opposed that approach.353 No matter what form it takes, relief is
essential. As Professor Nash stated: "Wouldn't it be nice (and
productive too) if both the Government and its contractors could
spend their litigation dollars resolving substantial disputes?" 354
3. CDA claims involving non-monetary disputes
The Federal Circuit has traditionally recognized that the boards of
contract appeals are empowered to adjudicate non-monetary disputes,
such as contract terminations for default."'s In Overall Roofing &
Construction, Inc. v. United States,"6 however, the Federal Circuit held
that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over non-
monetary claims because that court only has jurisdiction "to the
extent that the government has waived its sovereign immunity."57
Statutory and judicial precedent indicated that suits before the Court
of Federal Claims were "limited to demands for money presently due
and owing.""35 In 1992, Congress enacted the FCAA in an effort to
render the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims coextensive
with that of the boards, thereby overruling Overall Roofing and
expanding the court's jurisdiction to embrace certain non-monetary
never been requested prior to submittal). But see Hughes Aircraft Co., Electron Dynamics Div.,
ASBCA No. 43877, 93-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,133, at 129,902 (1993) (acknowledging that where
Government denies entitlement liability, dispute arises on contractor's initial quantification of
claim, thus allowing valid CDA claim to be filed immediately).
350. See CPT Corp., 25 Cl. Ct. at 454-56 (basing discussion of "dispute" requirement on
complex fact pattern); Reflectone, Inc., 93-1 B.CA (CCH) at 127,056 (relying heavily on specific
facts of case in reaching decision).
351. See ABA Section ProposesAmendment ofFARDefinition of Contract 'Claim, 59 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 11, at 370 (Mar. 22, 1993) (reporting ABA sentiment that would "eliminate the
sources of increasing litigation" regarding dispute requirement).
352. See id.
353. SeeJustice Opposes ABA Sections Recommendations RegardingDefinition of Contract 'Claim, 59
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at552 (Apr. 26, 1993) (discussingJustice Department's assertion
that amendment "would be inconsistent with well-settled law and purposes of the Contract
Disputes Act").
354. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Contract Disputes Act Claims: Improvements in the Rules, 7
NASH & CIBINIc REP. 1 1, at 5 (1993).
355. See Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that boards
of contract appeals "have historically accepted appeals from a [contracting officer's) decision
terminating a contract for default before either the government or the contractor submitted a
monetary claim").
356. 929 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
357. Overall Roofing & Constr., Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
358. Id. at 689.
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disputes."s 9 The legislation, however, left largely unresolved the
question of what kinds of non-monetary disputes constitute appealable
CDA claims. That issue was discussed by the court in Garrett v. General
Electric Co., ° an appeal of an ASBCA decision.
In Garrett, the Federal Circuit considered whether the Navy's
directive to General Electric (GE) to correct or replace defective jet
engines was an appealable claim under the CDA. 61 The court held
that the Navy's directive was a choice of remedy under the contract
and, as such, constituted an appealable claim under the Act."52
GE entered into a contract with the Navy to manufacture approxi-
mately 1200 jet engines for use in the F/A-18A aircraft. 63 After
accepting several of these new engines, the Navy discovered that a
certain engine component caused damage to both the engine and the
aircraft." Based on GE's investigation, performed under a separate
contract, the Navy concluded that latent defects caused the engine
failures and the contracting officer directed GE to replace the
defective parts at no additional cost to the Government.3" GE
appealed the contracting officer's decision. The ASBCA exercised
jurisdiction over GE's appeal, holding that the contracting officer's
final decision was a demand for relief that met the definition of a
"claim" under both the FAR and the CDA.3 6
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's exercise of jurisdic-
tion.36 In determining whether the Navy's directive constituted an
appealable claim, the court looked to the FAR, the language of the
contract, and the facts of the case.3' It noted that the GE contract
reiterated the language of the FAR by defining a claim as a written
demand for the payment of money, the adjustment or interpretation
of contract terms, or "other relief' arising under or relating to the
contract.369 The court reasoned that the Navy's directive to replace
359. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (FCAA), Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907(b)(1),
106 Stat. 4506, 4519 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1992))
(including non-monetary disputes in jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims).
360. 987 F.2d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
361. Garrett v. General Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 748.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 748-49. The contract provided that in the event of latent defects, remedies would
include correction or replacement at no additional cost, reduction in contract price for delays,
or repayment of an equitable portion of the contract. Id. at 748.
366. General Elec. Co., ABSCA Nos. 36005, 38152, 91-2 B.C. (CCH) 1 23,958, at 119,947
(1991) (stating that contracting officer's decisions constituted one of three types of claims over
which court has jurisdiction), af/'d, 987 F.2d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
367. Garret, 987 F.2d at 748.
368. Id. at 749-50.
369. Id. at 749.
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the defective parts at no additional cost constituted "other relief." 7 1
As such, where the FAR and the contract defined "claim" to include
a demand for "other relief' arising under or relating to the contract,
the Navy's choice of a remedy under the contract constituted a claim
against the Government under the CDA.
371
In the first post-FCAA Federal Circuit case to address the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Federal Claims over non-monetary claims, the
court announced that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
over actions that were awaiting final judgment upon enactment of the
FCAA.3 72  In Sharman Co. v. United States, 73 the Federal Circuit
held that a contractor's appeal of a default termination, while
improperly entertained by the Court of Federal Claims initially, was
presently subject to the jurisdiction of that court.374
Sharman entered into a contract with the U.S. Marine Corps to
manufacture steel water tanks." When steel prices escalated,
Sharman repudiated the contract.3 76 The Government then termi-
nated Sharman's contract for default and, in a separate letter, later
sought the return of unliquidated progress payments.377
Sharman filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking to
convert the default termination of the contract into a termination for
convenience and to recover all uncompensated costs, including
progress payments and other monies.37 8  The Government moved
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that there
was no final decision under the CDA.
379
The Court of Federal Claims denied the Government's motion to
dismiss the company's default termination claim.38 The court held
that in light of Overall Roofing, it would not have jurisdiction over the
370. Id. Although the FCAA was not applicable in this case, the court did note that, in light
of the expanded jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, the decision "preserves
jurisdictional parity between the Court of Federal Claims and the boards," as envisioned by the
CDA, by providing the boards with jurisdiction over the instant non-monetary dispute. Id. at
750.
371. Id. at 749. In addition, the court noted that the ASBCA's decision was final because it
resolved all the open issues and had "immediate legal consequences." Id. at 751.
372. Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
373. 2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
374. Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1573.
375. Id. at 1566.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1567.
378. Sharman Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 763, 765 (1991), rev'd, 2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 768.
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default termination standing alone."' The court concluded,
however, that it had jurisdiction to entertain the default termination
claim because it was closely related to the monetary claim for return
of unliquidated progress payments.82 The court found a close
relation between the claims because Sharman had filed an amended
complaint specifically challenging the Government's right to the
unliquidated progress payments, and the Government then filed a
counterclaim for recovery of these payments. 3  The court ultimate-
ly held that the Government was entitled to the return of unliquidat-
ed progress payments.3s
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the money
claim advanced by Sharman was separate and distinct from the default
termination decision. sM5 Regarding the default termination, the
court noted that, at the time of its decision, the Court of Federal
Claims correctly determined that Overall Roofing deprived it of
jurisdiction when the default termination claim stood alone." 6 The
FCAA, however, which went into effect on October 29, 1992,
expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to include
non-monetary disputes.8 ' The Federal Circuit also noted that the
FCAA applied to any case that had not been the subject of a final
judgment before the FCAA's enactment date.38s The court there-
fore remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims for a decision
on the merits.8 9
381. Id. at 766 (citing Overall Roofing & Constr., Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
382. Id. at 767. The Federal Circuit commented that the Court of Federal Claims did not
explain how the default termination notice and the Government's demand for return of
progress payments constituted a final decision and, ultimately, a claim under the CDA. Sharman
Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
383. Sharaan, 2 F.3d at 1568, 1570.
384. Id. at 1566.
385. Id. at 1570. The court analyzed the chronology of the notice of default termination and
the letters between Sharman and the contracting officer, and concluded that prior to Sharman's
filing of a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, there had never been a contracting officer's
final decision, and thus no dispute or claim on which an appeal could be based. Id at 1569-73.
386. Id. at 1572.
387. See FCAA, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing forjurisdiction over non-
monetary disputes). The Act, in relevant part, states: "[T]he Federal Claims Court shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor
arising under section 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, including a dispute
concerning termination of a contract." Id.
388. Sharnan, 2 F.3d at 1572.
389. Id. at 1573.
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B. Scope of the Contract Disputes Act
In Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. United States, 9 ° the
Federal Circuit determined that the Court of Federal Claims had CDA
jurisdiction over a claim for increased costs arising from a Department
of Labor (DOL) decision. 39' The court reversed the lower court's
ruling that the claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DOL
under the contract's "Disputes Concerning Labor Standards"
clause.
392
Burnside-Ott contracted with the Navy to provide helicopter
maintenance services. Under the Service Contract Act of 1965, s93
Burnside-Ott was required to pay its employees minimum wages and
fringe benefits determined by the DOL. 94 The contract contained
a DOL wage determination, which established wage rates for
technicians and aircraft workers.3 9- During contract performance,
several technician employees of Burnside-Ott filed a complaint with
the DOL regarding their wage rates.3 16  After an investigation, the
DOL issued a new wage determination for the option year of the
contract that deleted the technician classification and later ordered
Burnside-Ott to reclassify its technicians as higher-paid aircraft workers
for the base year of the contract.397 After exhausting its right to an
administrative appeal at the DOL, Burnside-Ott paid its technician
employees as aircraft workers for the base and option years of the
contract.3 98 The company then submitted a claim to the contracting
officer, seeking reimbursement of these costs.
3 99
390. 985 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
391. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574,1575 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
392. Id. at 1580, 1583. The clause stated: "Disputes arising out of the labor standards
provisions of this contract shall not be subject to the general disputes clause of this contract.
Such disputes shall be resolved in accordance with the procedures of the Department of Labor
set forth in 29 CFR Parts 4.6, and 8." Id. at 1578.
393. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1988) (setting forth service contract labor standards for
government contracting).
394. See Burnside-Oft, 985 F.2d at 1575 (establishing that Labor Department applied Service
Contract Act of 1965 to Burnside-Ott contract); see also Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C.
§ 351(a) (1) (stating that Secretary of Labor determines minimum wages paid to workers
performing government contract).
395. Bumside-0t4 985 F.2d at 1576.
396. See id. (reporting that employee complaints rejected their "technician" classification,
which commanded lower minimum wage).
397. Id.
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After the contracting officer denied the claim, Burnside-Ott sued
in the Court of Federal Claims on five alternative grounds: (1) the
Price Adjustment clause of the contract, (2) the Changes clause of the
contract, (3) breach of contract, (4) equitable estoppel, and
(5) mutual mistake.' Relying on Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. United
States,"1 the Court of Federal Claims, inter alia, ruled that the
"Disputes Concerning Labor Standards" clause of the contract
divested the court of jurisdiction over the claim because the dispute
"arose exclusively out of the labor standards provisions of the
contract" and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DOL. 2
In reversing the Court of Federal Claims' decision, the Federal
Circuit determined that the claim centered on the parties' mutual
rights and obligations under the contract, not on matters reserved
exclusively to the DOL.4 3  The court reasoned that Burnside-Ott
was requesting a determination of the effect of the DOL's decision on
its contract rights rather than challenging the decision of the
DOL. °4 Even though the Labor Department ruling formed part of
the "factual predicate" of the action before it, the court concluded
that the contractor had nonetheless advanced a CDA claim involving
the terms and conditions of the contract. 4 5 In so holding, the
court distinguished the case from Emerald Maintenance on the grounds
that Burnside-Ott, unlike Emerald Maintenance, had both challenged
the DOL ruling through that agency's administrative process and paid
its employees higher wages in accordance with the DOL's final deci-
sion. °6
Thus, in Burnside-Ott, the court effectively limited the application of
the somewhat inflexible rule enunciated in Emerald Maintenance. 7
The Burnside-Ott decision recognizes an important distinction between
the review of the propriety of a DOL wage determination and a
request to decide which party bears the risk of increased contract
400. Id. at 1576-77.
401. 925 F.2d 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that Department of Labor hadjurisdiction over
claims involving determination of prevailing wage rate).
402. Burnside-OQt 985 F.2d at 1575 (citing Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United
States, 24 Cl. Ct. 553, 561-63 (1991)).
403. See id. at 1580 (maintaining that existence of factual issue reserved exclusively to
Department of Labor does not preclude Claims Court's jurisdiction over case).
404. Id.
405. See id. ("Because the DOL's ruling in this case forms only part of the factual predicate,
the Claims Court does have jurisdiction over [Burnside's CDA claim].").
406. Id.; see also supra note 401 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Emerald
Maintenance).
407. See Burnside-01t 985 F.2d at 1580 (distinguishing Emerald Maintenance from Bunside-Ott
based on factual and procedural differences).
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costs resulting from that determination. °8 In the latter case,
questions of contract interpretation are presented and judicial review
is necessary to ensure that the contractor does not bear the burden
of cost increases where the Government, either through its actions or
contractual obligations, is liable to the contractor for some or all of
these costs.' In apparent recognition of this distinction, at least
two other Court of Federal Claims judges have narrowly construed
Emerald Maintenance and asserted jurisdiction over such claims.41°
C. Timeliness of Appeals from Final Decision of Contracting Officer
Under the CDA, a contractor must appeal an adverse decision of
the contracting officer to the Court of Federal Claims within twelve
months of receipt of the decision.411 The CDA time limit on
appeals is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.412 In Wood-Ivey
Systems Corp. v. United States,413 the Federal Circuit held that the
filing of an appeal in the Court of Federal Claims on the first business
day after the expiration of this twelve-month period was timely where
the last day of that period fell on a Saturday.1 4
Wood-Ivey, pursuant to a Navy contract to manufacture a shipboard
aircraft altitude positioning system, filed a claim for an equitable
adjustment and received the contracting officer's final decision
denying its claim on December 8, 1989.' The statutory twelve-
month period for appealing this decision to the Court of Federal
Claims ended on December 8, 1990, which was a Saturday.416
Under Court of Federal Claims Rule (RCFC) 6(a), when a filing
deadline falls due on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last
timely day for filing the pleading is deemed to be the next working
day.417 Accordingly, Wood-Ivey filed its complaint on the following
408. Id.
409. See id. at 1580-81 (allowing contractor to bring contract claim against Government to
recover amount of cost increases).
410. See United Int'l Investigative Servs. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 892, 902 (1992) (stating
that Labor Department does not have exclusivejurisdiction over labor-related disputes); Aleman
Food Servs. Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 201, 208 (1992) (grantingjurisdiction where certain
contract provisions required Claims Court review), rev'd on othergrounds, 994 F.2d 819 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
411. See 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(1), (3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
412. See Borough of Alpine v. United States, 923 F.2d 170, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (enforcing
CDA time limit and stating that Claims Court lacks power to review untimely appeals).
413. No. 92-5019 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9, 1993).
414. Wood-Ivey Sys. Corp. v. United States, No. 92-5019, slip op. at 7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9,
1993).
415. Id. at 1-2.
416. Id. at 2.
417. Cr. FED. CLAIMS R. 6(a); see also Structural Finishing, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. CL
447, 450 (1988) (extending time limit of RCFC 6(a) where deadline falls on Saturday).
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Monday.418 The Court of Federal Claims, however, dismissed the
case as untimely, reasoning that RCFC 6(a) could not be applied to
expand the statutory time periods for filing a CDA claim because such
periods are jurisdictional.419
Wood-Ivey appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit, which
vacated and remanded for adjudication on the merits.420 The court
analogized RCFC 6(a) to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), which
several courts have found applicable to statutory periods for filing a
claim. 421 The court further noted that the Court of Federal Claims
had previously applied its time limit rules to suits against the
Government with no incident.42 2 Finally, the court found that the
application of RCFC 6(a) to the CDA twelve-month statute of
limitations did not enlarge the statutory jurisdiction of the court.
4 23
III. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
On several occasions during 1993, the Federal Circuit applied well-
established rules of contract interpretation to determine the parties'
rights and obligations under government contracts. 424  Following
these rules, judges normally determine first whether the contract is
ambiguous, meaning whether it is subject to more than one reason-
able interpretation." If the contract is ambiguous, they determine
418. Wood Ivey, No. 92-5019, slip op. at 2.
419. Id. at 2-3.
420. Id. at 1.
421. Id. at 3-4 (citing Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1949); Frey v.
Woodward, 748 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1984);Jackson v. United States Postal Serv., 666 F.2d 258,
259.60 (5th Cir. 1982); Milam v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 860, 862 (11th Cir. 1982);
Kollios v. United States, 512 F.2d 1316, 1317 (1st Cir. 1975);Johnson v. Flemming, 264 F.2d 322,
323 (10th Cir. 1959)).
422. Wood-Ivey, No. 92-5019, slip op. at 3-4 (citing Structural Finishing, Inc. v. United States,
14 Cl. Ct. 447, 450 (1988)).
423. Id. at 5-6. Indeed, the GSBCA reached a similar decision with respect to the 10-day
filing period for suspension of contract awards in bid protest cases. See Syscon Corp., GSBCA
No. 10890-P, 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 23,523, at 117,945-46 (1990). The GAO reached the opposite
conclusion, however, holding that the last timely day is the working day before the Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday on which the 10th day falls. SeeEcon Inc., B-223923, 86-2 C.P.D. 1 489,
at 2 n.1 (1986).
424. See, e.g., Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(discussing established approach to problems of contract ambiguity); Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co.
v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying traditional methods of interpretation
toward government contract); Aleman Food Servs., Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 819, 822 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (applying "plain language" rule for government contract interpretation).
425. See, e.g., Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(agreeing that contrary contract interpretations by opposing parties were both reasonable);
Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is a generally
accepted rule... that if a contract is reasonably susceptible [to] more than one interpretation,
it is ambiguous.").
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whether the ambiguity is patent or latent.426  If the ambiguity is
obvious, or patent, then the contractor's failure to seek clarification
precludes recovery.427 If the ambiguity is found to be not obvious,
or latent, then the court applies the rule of contra proferentum to
construe the contractual term against the Government.42
A. Strict Enforcement of Unambiguous Contract Terms
In three decisions in 1993, the Federal Circuit continued its
practice of strictly enforcing unambiguous contract terms. In Aleman
Food Services, Inc. v. United States,41 the Federal Circuit looked to the
plain meaning of a contract in addressing the Federal Government's
liability for a state-mandated change in rates for workers' compensa-
tion and employment insurance.43 ° The Federal Circuit held that
a contract clause providing for a price adjustment based on a DOL
wage determination does not apply when a state government, rather
than the DOL, increases state workers' compensation and unemploy-
ment insurance rates.31
Aleman was awarded a fixed-price contract to provide food services
at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas."' The contract required
Aleman to obtain workers' compensation and unemployment
compensation insurance.3 3 The contract also included a Price
Adjustment clause providing for an equitable adjustment when
Aleman changed its wage rates or fringe benefits in response to a
revised DOL determination.3 4 Shortly before DOL issued a new
wage determination increasing the prevailing wage rate, the State of
Texas increased workers' compensation insurance premiums and the
unemployment tax rate.43 5 The Air Force compensated Aleman for
the increases in workers' compensation and unemployment insurance
resulting from DOL's increased wage determination by applying the
426. Compare Fruin-Colnon Corp., 912 F.2d at 1429 (explaining presence of latent defect) and
Edward R Marden Corp., 803 F.2d at 705 (finding facially different interpretations indicative of
latent defect) with Ring Constr. Corp. v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 190, 192 (Ct. Cl. 1958)
(finding patent defect in government contract).
427. See WPC Enters., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 876-77 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (expressing
contractor's duty to inquire about major patent discrepancy).
428. See Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (ruling
that existence of latent defect in government contract must be construed against drafter).
429. 994 F.2d 819 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
430. Aleman Food Servs., Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 819, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
431. Id. at 823.
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earlier Texas insurance rates to the new wage base.436 Aleman
submitted a claim for its increased costs due to the increase in
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance rates for both
its initial wage base and for the increased wage base resulting from
the DOL determination.437 The contracting officer denied the
claim. 438
On appeal to the Court of Federal Claims,439 the court held that
Aleman was entitled to compensation for the increased costs
associated with the rate change because the service contract mandated
that Aleman provide its employees with workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance at the higher rate.' 0 The court reasoned
that these increased costs were "fringe benefits" for purposes of the
Price Adjustment clause.441 Reversing the Court of Federal Claims,
the Federal Circuit determined that the Price Adjustment clause
granted the contractor an equitable adjustment solely for changes to
wages and fringe benefits resulting directly from a DOL wage
determination. 2 Because the increased labor rates were the result
of a change in Texas state law and not a direct result of the DOL
determination, the court found that Aleman was not entitled to
compensation for these additional labor costs.'
The Federal Circuit also looked to the plain meaning of contract
terms in Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States' and confirmed the
traditional rule that the Government is entitled to strict compliance
with the terms of the contract."5  Sanchez received a contract to




439. Aleman Food Servs., Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 201 (1992), rev'd, 994 F.2d 819
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
440. See Aleman, 994 F.2d at 820, 821 (clarifying that Clause 71 of contract obligated Aleman
to comply with Labor Department determination of minimum prevailing fringe benefits).
441. See Aleman, 25 Cl. Ct. at 209 ("Because of [the costs' classification as fringe benefits],
the modification of the contract in response to the wage determination should have included
the entire increase in Aleman's cost.").
442. See Alman, 994 F.2d at 823 (stating that expenses from fringe benefits are not
compensable under Price Adjustment clause because Labor Department did not cause
increases).
443. Id. at 822.
444. 6 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
445. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also S.S.
Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1314, 1323 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (characterizing
Government's insistence on compliance with contract specifications as proper). As an exception
to this rule, the Federal Circuit has held that the Government is not entitled to demand strict
compliance if the work performed is adequate for its intended purpose and the cost of
correcting the work is economically wasteful. Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998,
1007-08 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 965 (1993).
446. Sanchez, 6 F.3d at 1541.
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The contract required the use of steel-sheathed cable for a data
transmission line.447 Sanchez experienced delivery problems from
its steel-sheathed cable supplier and therefore offered to provide
aluminum-sheathed cable as a substitute.44' The Army rejected
Sanchez's offer, asserting that aluminum would not block magnetic
interference as well as steel.49
Sanchez incurred performance delays as a result of the additional
time required to obtain steel-sheathed cable and submitted a claim for
the associated costs. 450 The contracting officer denied the claim,
and Sanchez appealed to the Court of Federal Claims. 51 The Court
of Federal Claims granted the Government's motion for summary
judgment, finding that the Government was entitled to the steel-
sheathed cable it had contracted to receive.45 Sanchez appealed to
the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit held that Sanchez failed to carry the burden of
demonstrating that aluminum-sheathed cable was suitable for the
intended purpose."53 According to the court, Sanchez, at the very
least, was required to proffer evidence that the aluminum-sheathed
cable possessed the same magnetic interference blocking properties
as the steel-sheathed cable.4' Because Sanchez had produced no
such evidence, the court found that summary judgment was properly
entered against it."5
The Federal Circuit similarly looked to the plain meaning of a
contract clause dealing with purchase credits in a timber sales
contract in Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan."56 In Alaska
Lumber, the court held that the contract clause allowed purchase
credits to be offset against other contracts only for the period that
Alaska Lumber was paying more than the base rate.45
Alaska Lumber entered into a timber purchase contract with the
Forest Service in 1956. Pursuant to the contract, the company was
required, inter alia, to build roads to remove the timber, and the
Forest Service was obligated to compensate the company for its road





452. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 14, 15 (1991), afJd in part and vacated
in part, 6 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
453. Sanchez, 6 F.3d at 1542.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. 2 F.3d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
457. Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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construction costs.45' Every five years, the stumpage rate that Alaska
Lumber was to pay for the timber was redetermined."9 The stump-
age rate, however, could not fall below the contract's minimum base
rate.4 ° The contract also permitted Alaska Lumber to apply for a
rate redetermination based on adverse economic conditions. 6' The
parties later incorporated a purchaser credit system into the contract
allowing Alaska Lumber to apply credits earned through road
construction for the purchase of timber on the contract at issue as
well as other timber sales contracts.4 62 Alaska Lumber, however, was
only allowed to use credits to offset the above-base-rate portion of the
stumpage rate.463 The contract required the company to reimburse
the Forest Service for purchaser credits transferred to other contracts
that were subsequently rendered ineffective by a change in stumpage
rates.
46
During the years 1981-1985, the Forest Service established a
stumpage rate significantly in excess of the base rate.46 In June
1982, Alaska Lumber requested a rate redetermination.466 In May
1983, the Forest Service granted the request and reduced the
stumpage rate to the base rate retroactive to July 1982.467 The
Forest Service then billed Alaska Lumber for the amount of purchaser
credit the company had transferred to other contracts since 1981. 46
Alaska Lumber paid the amount billed and then filed a claim for
reimbursement. 9 When the contracting officer denied the claim,
the company appealed to the Agriculture Board of Contract Ap-
peals.
4 70
The board determined that when Alaska Lumber's stumpage rate
was reduced to the base rate, there was no margin above base against
458. Id. at 390.




463. Id. at 391.
464. Id.
465. See id. (explaining that new stumpage rate was $86.29 per board foot while base rate was
$1.48 per board foot).
466. See id. (adding that, in requesting determination, ALP claimed adverse economic
conditions).
467. See iU. (stating that Government adjusted stumpage rate to match base rate of $1.48 per
board foot).
468. See id. (reporting Forest Service's assertion that rate redetermination rendered
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which the company could apply its credit.47' The board thus
concluded that all purchaser credits received from 1981 forward were
properly payable to the Government.47 2  In so doing, the board
focused entirely on two provisions in the Alaska Lumber contract.
Section 4C-2 provided: "Effective Purchaser Credit transferred from
this contract subsequently determined to be ineffective under terms
of this contract shall be replaced by cash payments."4 3 In addition,
section 4C-3 provided: "Transferred Purchaser Credit may not be
used to cover payments for Base Rates ....
The Federal Circuit construed the above provisions to mean that
Alaska Lumber could transfer its purchaser credit to other contracts
during the 1981-82 period in which it was buying timber at prices
above the base rate. 5 When Alaska Lumber was purchasing timber
at the base rate, however, it could not transfer the credit to other
contracts . 7 6 The Federal Circuit concluded, therefore, that Alaska
Lumber could transfer purchaser credits so long as the company was
paying above the base rate. 7
It should be noted, however, that the Federal Circuit in Alaska
Lumber failed to recognize that the base rate had been retroactively
reduced and that Alaska Lumber had already applied purchaser credit
to all of the stumpage rate value above the base rate it incurred
between January 1981 and July 1982 on the contract at issue and
other contracts.478  The use of purchaser credits had already, in
effect, reduced Alaska Lumber's stumpage rate for this period to the
base rate.47 9 Thus, allowing the company to transfer the excess
purchase credits earned on the contract would result in Alaska
Lumber paying less than the base rate. 8 The AGBCA found that
allowing Alaska Lumber to receive purchaser credit on other contracts
for this period would relieve the company of the obligation to pay the
471. Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co., AGBCA Nos. 83-301-1, 84-351-1, 91-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
23,890, at 119,684-85 (1991), aff'd in part and reu'd in par, 2 F.3d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1993). One
administrative law judge concurred in the judgment, concluding that the purchaser credit
modification should have been rescinded. Id. at 119,694 (Eaton, A.LJ., concurring).
472. Id. at 119,685.
473. Id. at 119,681.
474. Id.
475. Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
476. Id. at 392-93.
477. Id.
478. See id. at 391 (stating that Forest Service's grant of reduced rates was retroactive from
January 1, 1981 toJuly 1, 1982).
479. Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co., AGBCA Nos. 83-301-1, 84-351-1, 91-2 B.C. (CCH) [
23,890, at 119,686 (1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in par4 2 F.3d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
480. See id. (adding that payment of less than base rate is "contrary to the clear language of
the contract").
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base rate."' The Federal Circuit did not adequately address this
finding in its decision.
B. Ambiguous Contract Terms
In Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso,4 2 the Federal
Circuit upheld an ASBCA determination that a contract clause was
not latently ambiguous."' Community Heating entered into a
contract with the U.S. Navy to remove and replace a condensate and
steam system.484 The contract drawings depicted condensate lines
penetrating concrete walls.4' The drawings also contained annota-
tions that reflected the existence of manhole walls and building
walls. 486 The annotations provided that a steel sleeve or caulking
was required to be placed over the condensate line and that an
existing manhole had to be patched with concrete.' 8
Because Community's estimate was relatively low in comparison to
the Government's estimate and to the next low bidder's proposal, the
Government sought verification of Community's bid by meeting with
the company to determine its understanding of the scope of the
project.4' After the meeting, Community's representative wrote to
the contracting officer clarifying its interpretation that certain conduit
sleeves shown on the contract drawings were only for the new
manholes. 489 The Government responded to Community's letter
without expressly objecting to the company's interpretation, but stated
that the award would only be made in "strict accordance with the
terms of the Invitation for Bids."49  Community subsequently
confirmed its bid, and the Navy awarded the contract to Communi-
ty.491  After the contract was awarded, the Government directed
Community to furnish conduit sleeves in new and existing man-
holes.492 Community then brought a claim for additional compensa-
481. See id. (stressing that base rate was offset by transfer and use of purchaser credit).
482. 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
483. Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
484. Id. at 1577.
485. Id. at 1579.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 1579 n.4.
488. Id&; see also Competition in ContractingAct, 41 U.S.C. § 253b(d) (1988) (stating that bid
verification in such circumstances is required); FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 14A06(1) (requiring contracting
officer to seek bid verification when there appears to be mistake in bid).
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tion, arguing that the contract only required installation of conduit
sleeves at new manholes.493
The ASBCA ruled in favor of the Government, holding that the
contract was "unambiguous" because the contract clearly required
installation of conduit sleeves for both new and existing man-
holes.4 94 The board concluded that Community's construction of
the contract was unreasonable and should be rejected.495
Before the Federal Circuit, Community argued that the contract
contained a latent ambiguity and that the Government acquiesced to
its pre-award interpretation of the contract.4 96 The Federal Circuit,
however, held that Community's pre-award letter did not bind the
Government to Community's interpretation because that interpreta-
tion was unreasonable. 497  Analyzing Community's claim in accor-
dance with well-established principles of contract interpretation, the
court determined that even if the contract was ambiguous, the
ambiguity was patent, not latent.498 Because the Government's
response to Community's pre-award letter did not address the issue
of conduit sleeves, the court concluded that Community had an
obligation to request further clarification of the issue.499 By failing
to request additional clarification from the Government, the court
concluded that Community bore the risk of the erroneous interpreta-
tion. °0
In contrast, the Federal Circuit held that a contract term in Sanchez
& Son, Inc. v. United StateP0 1 could be subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, and that triable issues of fact existed
concerning whether the contract was patently ambiguous." 2 The
dispute in Sanchez centered on whether the contract required the
installation of rollover protection structures (ROPS) on a specific
piece of equipment.503  The contract included, for reference, a
safety manual that listed the equipment requiring ROPS." 4 Despite
the fact that trenchers were not specifically included in the safety







499. Id. at 1580.
500. Id.
501. 6 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
502. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
503. Id. at 1542.
504. Id. at 1544-45.
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the trenchers."° Sanchez submitted claims for the costs associated
with the delay in obtaining steel-sheathed cable and costs of installing
ROPS on its trenchers. °6 When the contracting officer denied the
claims, Sanchez appealed to the Court of Federal Claims. 7
The court granted the Government's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the contract plainly required ROPS on the
trenchers.5 8 Sanchez then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
vacated the grant of summary judgment on the ROPS claim.5" The
Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims incorrectly
determined that the contract terms, with regard to the trenchers,
were unambiguous as a matter of law.510  Furthermore, the court
stated that Sanchez's reading of the contract may be reasonable
because trenchers were not specifically listed among the equipment
requiring ROPS.11 The existence of a genuine issue of material
fact concerning how the safety manual could be read and interpreted
by engineers and experts in the field, therefore, precluded summary
judgment.-
12
C. Mandatory Contract Clauses
The "Christian" doctrine, first stated in the Court of Claims
decision in G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States,5"' provides that
a contract clause required by regulation will be read into a contract,
if it does not otherwise appear there, if incorporation of the clause
furthers a significant or deeply ingrained public procurement
policy.514 In 1993, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of incor-
poration of contract clauses under the Christian doctrine on two
occasions.
In General Engineering & Machine Works v. O'Keefe, 15 the Federal
Circuit held that the Christian doctrine may be used by the Govern-
ment to incorporate a clause requiring segregation of material
handling costs.51" General Engineering and the Navy entered into
505. Id. at 1542.
506. Id.
507. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 14, 15 (1991), aff/d in part and vacated
in par4 6 F.3d 1539, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
508. Id. at 21-22.




513. 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
514. G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 350 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
515. 991 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
516. General Eng'g & Mach. Works v. O'Keefe, 991 F.2d 775, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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a contract in 1982, the terms of which required General Engineering
to provide supplies and services to a shock test facility.?17 The
Request for Proposal (RFP) contained a provision for reimbursement
of General Engineering's costs of furnishing incidental material in
addition to a percentage for handling as specified by General
Engineering. 18  Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 7-103.7"'1
was specifically incorporated into the contract. 20 Another provi-
sion, which directed invoices to be prepared in accordance with DAR
7-901.6,521 was not incorporated. 22 DAR 7-103.7 was more general
in nature than DAR 7-901.6.523 The latter provision allowed reim-
bursement of material handling costs only if the costs were clearly
excluded from the hourly rate that General Engineering included in
its invoice for the material handling charge.524
General Engineering, however, did not keep the material handling
costs in a separate cost pool.5" After completion of the last order
on the contract, a government audit of General Engineering's
material handling costs disclosed the fact that this amount was not
recorded independently of the hourly rate calculation.2 6  The
contracting officer then issued a demand for repayment of the
charges for the material handling fees.527 Although General Engi-
neering took notice of this demand by beginning installment
repayments, the company simultaneously submitted a claim for
reimbursement of those same payments.528 The contracting officer
denied the claim and General Engineering appealed to the
ASBCA. 529
On appeal, the board held that DAR 7-901.6 was required to have
been incorporated into the contract.50  Noting that General
Engineering's failure to segregate its material handling costs resulted
in those costs being included in the hourly rate, the board could not
517. Id. at 777.
518. Id.
519. Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR), 32 C.F.R. § 7-103.7 (1982).
520. General Eng'g, 991 F.2d at 777.
521. DAR, 32 C.F.RL § 7-901.6.
522. General Eng 991 F.2d at 777.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 777-78. A separate cost pool is necessary to prevent the double billing of material
handling costs in both the hourly rate and the material handling rate. Id.




529. General Eng'g & Mach. Works, ASBCA No. 38788, 92-3 B.C. (COH) 25,055, at
124,867, affld, 991 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
530. Id. at 124,871 (finding that Government was justified in obtaining repayment because
General Engineering failed to maintain separate cost pool).
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determine whether General Engineering charged the Government
twice for the same expense.5"' Accordingly, the ASBCA denied the
company's appeal.532
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's ruling.533 According
to the court, the purpose of DAR 7-901.6-to discourage the
unnecessary and wasteful spending of government funds-was
sufficiently ingrained in policy to trigger application of the Christian
doctrine.13' The court therefore concluded that DAR 7-901.6 was
incorporated into the contract by operation of law.535 In so doing,
the court determined that the inclusion of two "payments" clauses in
the contract did not create an inconsistency;536 DAR 7-901.6 merely
defined the application of DAR 7-103.7.-37
The Federal Circuit also addressed the Christian doctrine in S.J.
Amoroso Construction Co. v. United States,538 and again applied the
doctrine in favor of the Government.5  In Amoroso, the court
specifically held that the doctrine may cause the incorporation of a
Buy American Act (BAA) clause different from the one actually
incorporated by the drafter.5 °
Amoroso and the Corps of Engineers entered into a contract for
the construction of a commissary.541 The contract included the
BAA-Supplies Clause (FAR Clause 52.225-3)42 rather than the
appropriate BAA-Construction Clause (FAR Clause 52.225-5)." 43
Under the BAA-Supplies Clause, the end item delivered to the
Government must be manufactured in the United States even though
each component comprising the end item need not be manufactured
domestically'44 Under the BAA-Construction Clause, however, each
component delivered to ajob site must be produced domestically. 45
Amoroso's steel subcontractor proposed to supply steel manufac-
tured by a foreign entity, and informed Amoroso that it would incur
significant extra expense if required to supply domestically manufac-
531. Id. at 124,872.
532. Id.
533. General Eng'g, 991 F.2d at 780.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 781.
537. Id.
538. 12 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
539. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 F.3d 1072, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
540. Id. at 1077.
541. Id. at 1073.
542. 48 C.F.R. § 52.225-3 (1986).
543. Id. § 52.225-5.
544. Id. § 52.225-3(a).
545. Id. § 52.225-5(a).
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tured steel."4  When Amoroso sought clarification from the con-
tracting officer concerning the acceptability of foreign steel, the
contracting officer denied its use, citing the BAA-Construction
Clause.'? Consequently, the subcontractor supplied U.S.-manufac-
tured steel and made a claim for the increased costs, which Amoroso
submitted to the contracting officer on the subcontractor's behalf.54
Following the contracting officer's denial of the claim, Amoroso
appealed to the Court of Federal Claims.54 The court affirmed the
contracting officer's decision, finding that the BAA-Construction
Clause should be incorporated into the contract pursuant to the
Christian doctrine.550 The court reasoned that because supplying
foreign steel would contravene the requirements of the BAA-Construc-
tion Clause, the Government was entitled to domestic steel at no
increased cost, notwithstanding the fact that the BAA-Supplies Clause
included in the contract may have permitted the use of foreign
steel.5"
Amoroso appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
decision of the Court of Federal Claims.552 The appellate court
held that the BAA-Construction Clause fulfilled an important statutory
purpose, demonstrated by the separate statutory references within the
BAA553 designed to foster procurement of contracts for public works
(construction contracts) and materials for public use (supply
contracts)." Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's
decision that the Christian doctrine required the inclusion of the
BAA-Construction Clause in the contract.555
Judge Plager concurred in the ruling despite his view that the case
should have been decided as a matter of contract interpretation. 556
According to Judge Plager, both the Corps and Amoroso understood
the BAA-Construction Clause to be the operative BAA clause under
the contract.557 The judge disagreed with employing the Christian
546. Amoroso, 12 F.3d at 1073-74.
547. Id. at 1074.
548. Id.
549. SJ. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 759 (1992), affd, 12 F.d 1072
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
550. Id. at 765-66.
551. Id. at 768-77.
552. Amoroso, 12 F.3d at 1078.
553. 41 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
554. Compare4l U.S.C. § 10b (outlining guidelines for public works contracts) udth 41 U.S.C.
§ 10d (outlining guidelines for public use contracts).
555. Amoroso, 12 F.3d at 1078.
556. Id. at 1078-79 (Plager,J., concurring).
557. Id. at 1079.
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doctrine when the case could be resolved on more conventional
contract interpretation grounds.
5 58
D. Government Warranty of Specifications
The Government commonly employs two broad types of specifica-
tions in government contracting: design specifications and perfor-
mance specifications. 59  Design specifications are usually very
detailed, requiring a "build to print" approach from which the
contractor generally is not permitted to deviate.560 Performance
specifications, by contrast, normally set forth only the performance
characteristics of an end product and permit the contractor to
determine much or all of the design or process at issue.-6 1 For this
reason, performance specifications are generally not found to dictate
the precise details of a contractor's performance.
62
When the Government provides design specifications, the Govern-
ment makes an implied warranty of their adequacy.63 This warran-
ty, in turn, usually operates to make the Government liable for any
problems regarding the end product that were incurred by a
contractor following the specifications.5 64 Accordingly, contractors
wishing to take advantage of this warranty attempt to show that a
given specification is a design specification. It is well settled, however,
that although the Government may specify a minor "design" require-
ment for some aspect of a performance specification, that require-
ment alone does not transform an overall performance specification
into a design specification.565
In Blake Construction Co. v. United States,566 the Federal Circuit held
that the mere fact that a specification cannot be performed precisely
does not, by itself, transform a "design" specification into a "perfor-
mance" specification.56 The Blake decision is consistent with prior
558. Id. at 1079-80.
559. See generalyJOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT




563. See, e.g., Inlet Go., ASBCA No. 9095, 1964 B.CA. (CCH) J 4093, 19,998-20,001 (1964)
(finding that Government did not provide contractors with design specific contract, and
therefore, there was no implied warranty).
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. 987 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 438 (1993).
567. Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 438
(1993).
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case law establishing that one or more minor aspects of a specification
will not operate to change its overall character."
Blake entered into a contract with the Navy to construct replace-
ment medical facilities.569 The contract drawings indicated that an
electrical conduit would be installed in the overhead area along the
central corridor of the facilities.57° The drawings also contained
certain "diagrammatic notes" providing, inter alia, that the contractor
"shall relocate [conduit] feeders as per existing conditions and shall
coordinate with other trades." n71 Blake's subcontractor proceeded
to install the conduit underground along the corridor, asserting that
the drawing notes permitted the subcontractor to relocate the conduit
so as to avoid conflict with other trades, such as mechanical and
plumbing.7 2 After the Government required the subcontractor to
relocate the conduit to the overhead area, the subcontractor, through
Blake, submitted a claim for the costs of the cable relocation.
73
The contracting officer denied the claim and Blake appealed to the
Court of Federal Claims.
574
Before the court, Blake argued that the conduit specifications were
performance specifications that described one objective-installation
of the conduit so as to avoid conflict with other trades. 75 In
support of that contention, Blake pointed to notes on the specifica-
tions expressly requiring the avoidance of other trades.5 76  Blake
argued that, because the conduit could not be installed exactly as
depicted in the drawings, the specifications lacked the clear "road
map" characteristic of design specifications and were by definition
performance specifications.
5 77
In response to these arguments, the Court of Federal Claims found
that the specifications were performance specifications primarily
because the diagrammatic notes indicated that the drawings did not
568. See, e.g., Zinger Constr. Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 979,981 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating
that "labels do not independently create, limit, or remove a contractor's obligations"); Penguin
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 934, 937 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that terms "design
specification" and "performance specifications" are not self-determining); Aleutian Constructors
v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 372, 379 (1991) (finding that most contracts contain both
specifications).




573. Id. at 744-45.
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have to be followed exactly.'78 The court concluded that the
government directive to relocate the conduit constituted a construc-
tive change to the contract.5 79 Accordingly, the court awarded Blake
an equitable adjustment for the additional costs incurred for
relocation.
8s
The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of Federal Claims, observing
that the real issue was not whether the drawings and notes should be
labeled "design" or "performance" specifications, but how much
discretion the specifications gave the contractor in the placement of
the conduit." The court noted that, although the drawings gave
the contractor some discretion to work around other trades, the trial
court had defined too broadly the amount of discretion
permitted. 2 On these bases, the court found that the fact that the
conduit could not be installed overhead in the precise manner
depicted by the drawings did not automatically relieve the contractor
of the obligation to install the conduit overhead.8 3 The court
therefore concluded that the Government properly ordered the
relocation of the conduit, and vacated the judgment of the court
below.
584
E. Variation in Estimated Quantity Clause
The "Variation in Estimated Quantity" clause is normally included
in unit-price contracts when the exact contract quantity cannot be
determined with reasonable accuracy.5" The clause entities a
578. Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 177, 182-83 (1992), rev'd, 987 F.2d 743
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
579. Id.
580. Id. at 189.
581. Blake Constr., 987 F.2d at 746.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 747.
584. Id.
585. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Variation in Estimated Quantity Clause: Groping For
Meaning, 3 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 65, at 137; see 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-11 (1992). This section is
referred to as the Variation in Estimated Quantity clause. The clause provides:
If the quantity of a unit-priced item in this contract is an estimated quantity and the
actual quantity of the unit-priced item varies more than 15 percent above or below the
estimated quantity, an equitable adjustment in the contract price shall be made upon
demand of either party. The equitable adjustment shall be based upon any increase
or decrease in costs due solely to the variation above 115 percent or below 85 percent
of the estimated quantity.
48 C.F.R. § 52.212-11.
The clause is essentially the same as it appeared in the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR), the predecessor regulation to the FAR. See 32 C.F.R. § 18.509-5 (1969).
The last sentence of the clause was incorporated into the provision by ASPR Revision No. 27,
dated April 15, 1968. The note accompanying ASPR Revision No. 27 provides:
The clause in 7-603.27 "Variation in Estimated Quantities," is revised to make more
explicit that only the quantities which exceed 115%, or are less than 85% of the
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contractor to a price adjustment when the Government's require-
ments deviate from the estimated contract quantity by more than a
stated percentage.8 6 The purpose of the clause is to allocate the
risk of increased costs, resulting from the quantity variation, to the
Government. 8 7  Notwithstanding the clear intent of the clause,
courts had employed two different methods of calculating an
equitable adjustment under the clause. In 1993, the proper approach
was firmly resolved by the Federal Circuit in Foley Co. v United
States.
5a8
In Victory Construction Co. v. United States,"9 the Court of Claims
first determined that a proponent of an equitable adjustment under
the clause must establish that the unit costs had increased or
decreased as a result of the difference in quantity and that an
adjustinent under the clause must be based on the difference in cost
directly attributable to the quantity variation, such as economies of
scale.59 The court concluded that the clause did not contemplate
the complete repricing of the work for purposes of calculating an
equitable adjustment.591
The Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals reached the
opposite conclusion in Bean Dredging Corp.592 In Bean Dredging, the
contractor sought a price adjustment after the Government ordered
quantities in excess of the upper threshold percentage set forth in the
contract.9 Citing Victory Construction, the Government maintained
that the contractor had not established that the cost of producing
units above the threshold percentage was greater than the cost of
producing units under the threshold.594 The board, however, held
that the proper basis for determining an equitable adjustment under
the "Variation in Estimated Quantity" clause was the difference
between the cost of producing the units outside the percentage range
estimated quantities are subject to adjustment under this clause.
ASPR Rev. No. 27 (Apr. 15, 1968). Interestingly, the note accompanying the revision provides
a much clearer statement of the method ofcalculating an equitable adjustment under the clause
than ASPR Revision No. 27 itself. Had the language of the note been substituted for ASPR
Revision No. 27, it is likely that the clause would never have been the subject of such extensive
litigation.
586. Nash & Cibinic, supra note 585, 1 65, at 137-38.
587. Nash & Cibinic, supra note 585, 1 65, at 137.
588. 11 F.3d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
589. 510 F.2d 1379 (Ct. CI. 1975).
590. Victory Constr. Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 1379, 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
591. Id. at 1386-87.
592. ENGBCA No. 5507, 89-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 22,034, at 110,824 (1989) (finding that
contractor was entitled to repricing of contract price).
593. Bean Dredging Corp., ENGBCA No. 5507, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,034, at 110,816
(1989).
594. Id. at 110,819-21.
1476
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
and the contract unit price."' The board stated that the Victory
Construction interpretation was mere dicta and would impermissibly
preserve the profit or loss bid by the contractor in the unit price.596
The Federal Circuit resolved this difference in 1993 in Foley Co. v.
United States, holding that recovery under the "Variation in Estimated
Quantity" clause requires proof of an actual increase or decrease in
costs due solely to the quantity variation.597 In Foy, the contractor
agreed to remove and dispose of sludge at a unit price of $308 per
ton, based on an estimated quantity of 6600 tons.59 Ultimately,
Foley removed 23,937.51 tons of sludge."9 While the Government
paid Foley $308 per ton for 115% of the estimated quantity under the
contract, it compensated Foley for the remaining sludge removal at
$295 per ton.' Foley submitted a claim for the difference between
the $308 and $295 unit prices of the sludge removed in excess of
115% of the estimate. 6°1
The contracting officer denied Foley's claim, determining that the
"Variation in Estimated Quantity" clause only entitled Foley to its
actual costs plus a reasonable profit for removal of sludge in excess of
115% of the contract estimate. 61 2 Because this amount was less than
that already paid to Foley for the additional work, the contracting
officer demanded a refund. 3
Foley filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, maintaining
entitlement to the $308 original unit price for sludge removal in
excess of 115% of the estimated contract quantity. 4 The Govern-
ment argued that it was entitled to a downward equitable adjustment
595. Id. at 110,822-23.
596. Id. at 110,821-22; see also Burnett Constr. Co. v. United States, 26 CI. CL 296, 297 (1992)
(concluding that contractor was entitled to equitable adjustment under "Variations in Estimated
Quantity" clause); Aoki Corp., ENGBCA No. PCC-62, 91-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 23,848, at 119,523
(1991) (finding that contractor was entitled to equitable adjustment in accordance with Bean);
B&L Constr. Co., ENGBCA No. 5700,91-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 23,575, at 118,207 (1990) (allowing
contractor equitable adjustment based on Government's estimates because contractor had not
recorded his own actual costs); B&L Constr. Co., ENGBCA No. 5772, 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
23,612, at 118,322 (1990) (finding that Government may use its own equipment cost guide
in determining equitable adjustment due contractor); Wayne L. Grist, Inc., ENGBCA No. 5503,
90-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 22,915, at 115,047 (1990) (finding that contractor was entitled to equitable
adjustment for costs incurred when Government did not provide survey bench marks as
required). But see Clement-Mtarri Co., ASBCA No. 38170, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,567, at
127,332 (1992) (rejecting Bean and finding that contractor was not entitled to cost of overrun
quantity).
597. Foley Co. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1032, 1035-36 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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in the unit contract price under the precedent established in Bean
Dredging and adopted by the court in Burnett Construction v. United
States.6"' On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
determined that the Victory Construction case was controlling and
rejected the pricing methodology established by Bean Dredging and
Burnett Construction. 6 The court granted Foley's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that recovery under the "Variation in
Estimated Quantity" clause requires proof of an actual increase or
decrease in costs resulting from the quantity variation. 67 The court
concluded that the Government had not proven that Foley experi-
enced a per unit cost decrease for the removal of sludge over the
threshold percentage."° The court also granted Foley recovery of
the full amount of its claim.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court, determin-
ing that the plain meaning of the "Variation in Estimated Quantity"
clause requires that an equitable adjustment be based on increases or
decreases in actual costs.61 ° The court noted that the Government's
interpretation of the clause would require "the establishment of a new
unit price for the overrun amounts by an equitable adjustment of the
contractor's unit profit, even where the contractor's unit costs
remained constant."6" Rejecting the Government's attempts to
distinguish the Victory Construction decision from the instant case, the
court stated that Victory Construction was binding precedent and must
be followed." 2 The court therefore concluded that Foley was
entitled to payment at the contract unit price for the sludge it
removed in excess of the 115% of the contract estimate.13
Whether or not Victory Construction was in fact controlling prece-
dent, the Federal Circuit in Foley properly interpreted the "Variation
in Estimated Quantity" clause to prohibit the entire repricing of
605. Foley Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct 936, 944 (1992). Interestingly, the Department
ofJustice took inconsistent legal positions in the Court of Federal Claims in Foley and Burnett io
its attempt to deny each contractor recovery. See id.; Burnett Constr. Co. v. United States, 26
Cl. Ct. 296, 296 (1992).
606. Foley, 26 Cl. Ct. at 941-44.
607. Id. at 936.
608. Id. at 944.
609. Id. at 946.
610. Foley Co. v. United States, 11 F.d 1032, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
611. Id. at 1034.
612. Id. at 1035-36.
613. Id. Judge Lourie concurred in the result on the basis of the precedential authority of
Vwtoy Construction. Id. at 1036 (Lourie, J., concurring). While Judge Lourie opined that the
"Variation in Estimated Quantity" clause "should be interpreted to require a determination of
a net increase or decrease in total cost resulting from the quantity variation, rather than a
change in unit cost," he believed that the Victory Construction precedent was controlling. Id.
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quantities exceeding 115% of the contract estimate and to limit the
adjustment only to those changes that were solely the result of the
differences in quantities.614 As Professor Cibinic has noted, repric-
ing these quantities, as the board did in Bean Dredging, is contrary to
the equitable adjustment principles which were designed to keep the
contractor "whole" when the Government modifies a contract.
615
Under the Bean Dredging rationale, the contractor can recover losses
on the adjusted units for underbid contracts and the Government can
recover a contractor's excess profits on adjusted units for overbid
contracts.616 While such a result may foster equity between the
parties, it is well beyond the scope of the "Variation in Estimated
Quantity" clause. The significance of the Federal Circuit decision in
Foley is that its standard will preserve any loss or excess profit built
into the contract unit price, thereby promoting the intent and
purpose of the clause.
F Cost Accounting Standards
One of the most important decisions issued by the Federal Circuit
this year focused on cost accounting standards. The court in Rice v.
Martin Marietta Corp.617 reversed the ASBCA and held that DAR 15-
203(c)618 requires contractors to deduct from their costs a pro rata
share of general and administrative (G&A) expenses based on
unallowable costs.6"' Due to this change in accounting standards,
the Federal Circuit's decision is likely to have an immediate impact on
all contractors performing cost reimbursement-type contracts who
previously aligned their accounting practices to conform to the
ASBCA decision. The ultimate result of Martin Marietta is that
contractors will now recover less from the Government in cost-
reimbursement contracts.
Martin Marietta entered into a fixed-price incentive contract in
1979.62' The contract included DAR 15-203(c), which stated in part
614. The Vzctory Construction decision involved a pre-ASPR Revision No. 27 Variation in
Estimated Quantity clause, but relied on the Revision to support its conclusion. Victory Constr.
Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Accordingly, the board in Bean Dredging
characterized the Victoty Construction interpretation as dicta and did not feel bound to follow the
decision. Bean Dredging Co., ENGBCA No. 5507, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 22,034, at 110,821-22
(1989).
615. Nash & Cibinic, supra note 585, 1 65, at 139.
616. Nash & Cibinie, supra note 585, 1 65, at 139.
617. 13 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
618. DAR, 32 C.F.R. § 15.203(c) (1984).
619. Rice v. Martin Marietta Corp., 13 F.3d 1563, 1565-66 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
620. Martin Marietta Corp., ASBCA No. 35895, 92-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 25,094, at 125,083
(1992), reu'd, 13 F.3d 1563 (Fcd. Cir. 1993).
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that unallowable costs "shall be included in the base and bear their
pro-rata share of G&A costs."62' Martin Marietta's expenses included
a tax gross-up expense, which resulted from payments made to offset
an employee's tax liability as a result of being reimbursed for
relocation expenses.622 This tax gross-up expense was unallowable
under DAR 15-205.25 (c) (4). 23 Martin Marietta did not include this
expense in its G&A allocation base (referred to by the Federal Circuit
as the cost input base) because it did not consider the expense
related to the production of goods and services. 624  The Defense
Contract Audit Agency concluded that this expense, even though
unallowable, must be included in the cost input base. 62 Because
the cost input base is the denominator in the G&A allocation rate
(total G&A divided by cost input base), any increase to the base would
reduce the rate, thus resulting in a reduction in the amount of G&A
allocated to the contract.626 Unable to reach an agreement on this
issue, the contracting officer issued a final decision holding that the
tax gross-up expense must be included in the cost input base.627
On appeal to the ASBCA, Martin Marietta argued that the tax gross-
up expense was properly excluded from the cost input base.
628
Alternately, it asserted that assuming that the expense should be
included in the base, a pro rata share of G&A based on this or other
unallowable costs should not be subtracted from the total G&A
allocated to the contract.629 To support this position, Martin
Marietta argued that Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 410 requires
G&A to be allocated only to final cost objectives.63 Martin Marietta
further contended that attributing any G&A to unallowable costs, as
required by DAR 15-203 (c), would constitute an allocation rather than
an allowability decision. This result would put DAR 15-203(c) in
conflict with CAS 410." According to Martin Marietta, because the
CAS supersedes the DAR,6 32 the GAS must prevail and G&A cannot
be split into allowable and unallowable G&A.
633
621. Id. at 125,084-85.
622. Id. at 125,096.
623. Id. at 125,086 (citing DAR, 32 C.F.R. § 15-205.25(c) (4)).
624. Id.
625. Id. at 125,098.
626. Id. at 125,089.
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The ASBCA held in favor of the Government on the first issue,
ruling that unallowable expenses must be included in the cost input
base.6" Martin Marietta did not appeal this part of the decision.
On the second issue, the board held that CAS 410 and DAR 15-203(c)
were in conflict and that DAR 15-203(c) was therefore unenforce-
able.635 The board concluded that unallowable costs "should not be
burdened with a pro-rata share of G&A expense."636
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the board and held that
there was no conflict between DAR 15-203(c) and CAS 410 because
DAR 15-203(c) was not an allocability provision.63 7 The court held
that disallowing the share of G&A that is proportionate to unallowable
costs requires a subtraction step, but does not require that any of the
G&A be allocated to any unallowable costs.638 The court reasoned
that DAR 15-203(c) does not cause the proportionate share of G&A
expenses to become a component of the unallowable direct costs.6"9
Furthermore, because the G&A expense itself is only an approxima-
tion of the G&A related to the contract, the court determined that
requiring unallowable costs to "bear their pro-rata share of G&A costs"
does not mean that these costs have been allocated to the unallowable
costs. 640 The court concluded that DAR 15-203(c) operates to
disallow G&A expenses in proportion to unallowable costs after the
G&A expense has been allocated to a final cost objective.41
As a result of this decision, contractors who have been calculating
G&A in accordance with the earlier ASBCA decision must now adjust
their practice. In addition, these contractors face the prospect that
the Government may try to recover the now-disallowed G&A.
IV. VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS
The Federal Circuit considered one case during 1993 concerning
whether a contract is void ab initio or merely voidable. 2  Courts
treat a contract that is void ab initio as if it never existed, thereby
634. Id. at 125,096-97; see also Martin Marietta Corp., ASBCA No. 14159, 71-1 B.CA (CCH)
8783 (1971), overrue by Martin Marietta Corp., ASBCA No. 35895, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
25,094, at 125,096 (1992) (stating that 1971 decision was overruled to extent that "it permitted
exclusion of costs from a total cost allocation base solely because they were unallowable costs").
635. Martin Marietta, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH) at 125,099-101.
636. Id. at 125,101.
637. Rice v. Martin Marietta Corp., 13 F.3d 1563, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
638. Id. at 1569.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 1566.
641. Id. at 1569-70.
642. Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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allowing the Government to avoid obligations it otherwise as-
sumed.14s For this type of contract, the contractor normally is
entitled only to the "value of the benefit" it has conferred to the
Government through performance.' A voidable contract, however,
may become fully enforceable unless the Government exercises its
rights to avoid liability in a timely manner. 
6 5
In Godley v. United States, 6 the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded a grant of summary judgment against the Government on
a contract claim that the court below determined was voidable.
647
Godley offered to build a postal facility and lease it to the Postal
Service with an option to buy."8  The Postal Service accepted
Godley's offer and the transaction was handled by an agent of the
Postal Service. 9  In September 1989, the agent was indicted for
conspiracy and bribery, implicating a subcontractor under the Godley
contract.60 The agent pleaded guilty to several counts of conspiracy
and bribery in November 1989.51 Mr. Godley, however, was neither
involved in, nor aware of, the bribery scheme.652
In October 1989, Godley completed construction of the facility, the
Postal Service took possession shortly thereafter, and the parties
entered into a final lease agreement in December 1989.653 In
March 1990, the Postal Service informed Godley that the contract was
not valid because it was tainted by the agent's illegal conduct. The
Postal Service offered to renegotiate the contract, but stopped
payment under the lease.654
Godley submitted a breach of contract claim, which was denied by
the contracting officer. 5 He then appealed to the Court of
643. See generally id. (explaining general scope and purpose of rule that contracts are void ab
initio due to fraud); United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing
Amdahl, GSBCA No. 7859-P-R, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 18,221, at 91,451 (1985) (holding that
rescission, though inequitable, voided contract)); J.E.T.S., Inc. v. United States, ASBCA No.
28642, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,569, at 98,912 (1987) (recognizing that courts have determined
that void contract entitles Government to refund of all monies paid), afld, 838 F.2d 1196 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988).
644. See Ace Van & Storage, Inc., ASBCA No. 23759, 83-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 16,547, at 82,296
(1983) (discussing differences between void and voidable contracts).
645. See id. (describing requirement for timely Government election on voidable contracts).
646. 5 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
647. Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
648. Id. at 1474.
649. Id.
650. Id.
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Federal Claims and filed a motion for summary judgment. 6 The
court granted Godley's motion, holding that "[w]here the prime
contractor is innocent of wrongdoing, the government must exercise
[its] right to avoid the contract within a reasonable time of learning
that it is tainted by wrongdoing. The failure to do so results in the
loss of the right of avoidance."65 7 Because the Postal Service's
acceptance of the building and the lease agreement occurred well
after the agent's indictment, the court found that the Government
wvaived its right to void the contract."8 The Government appealed
the decision to the Federal Circuit.65 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, noting that
in general, a government contract tainted by fraud is void ab initio.
66°
According to the court, however, "[i]llegal acts by a Government
contracting agent do not alone taint a contract."66 1 Rather, some
causal link between the illegality and the contract provisions must also
be present.66
The Federal Circuit found the record to be insufficient to deter-
mine whether the agent's illegal conduct tainted the contract.
663
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further fact finding regarding
the extent to which the illegal acts tainted the contract.6r  In this
regard, the Federal Circuit's decision is somewhat confusing.
Although the court found the record inadequate to resolve the
threshold question of whether the contract was void (and therefore
seemed to suggest that the contract was not voidable), the court also
stated that the contract may in fact be voidable. 5  Hence, the
Federal Circuit's instructions on remand were less than clear.
656. Godley v. United States, 26 CI. Ct. 1075, 1079 (1992), vacated, 5 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
657. Id. at 1081.
658. Id.
659. Godley v. United States, 5 F.Sd 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
660. Id. at 1475 (citingJ.E.T.S., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1196, 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denid, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988)).




665. See id. (noting that Government's acceptance of and entry into building were factors
relevant to issue of whether option to void voidable contract was exercised, but, in themselves,
do not prove contract was voidable rather than void ab initio).
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V. ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Settled precedent holds that in the area of government contract law
the Government is bound by the acts of its authorized representa-
tives,666 even if their decisions are erroneous or otherwise unfavor-
able to the Government. 1 7  In certain circumstances the Govern-
ment may be estopped from escaping liability for the acts or omissions
of its authorized representatives if they have been reasonably relied
on by the contractor.'
In 1990, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond that was viewed by some courts as a death
knell to the application of estoppel against the Govemment.6 9  In
that case, a government employee provided incorrect advice to Mr.
Richmond, causing him to lose six months of federal benefits.67
Richmond sought to estop the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) from enforcing statutory entitlement requirements that would
have denied him his benefits. The Supreme Court held that estoppel
cannot be used against the Government to abrogate a statutory or
regulatory requirement.6"' To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned,
666. See generally Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 389 (1875).
667. Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 681 F.2d 746, 749 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(noting that although contracting officer's modification of contract was erroneous, it was within
officer's actual authority to make mistakes of law and, thus, Government was estopped from
repudiating contract); Winn-Senter Constr. Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 255, 260 (Ct. Cl.
1948) (holding that, under circumstances of case, it was not unfair to hold Government liable
for carrying out order made by mistake); Liberty Coat Co., ASBCA No. 4119,57-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
11576, at 5672 (1957) (holding that where contracting officer makes deviations in contract
within scope of officer's authority, Government is bound by officer's representations).
668. See, e.g.,JANA, Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 1265, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (identifying
four elements of successful estoppel claim in government contracts context: "(1) the
government must know the true facts; (2) the government must intend that its conduct be acted
on or must so act that the contractor asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so
intended; (3) the contractor must be ignorant of the true facts; (4) the contractor must rely on
the government's conduct to his injury"); American Elec. Lab. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1110,
1113 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that Government was estopped from denying payments over
contract price where such extra payments were held out as inducement to continued
performance); EMECO Indus., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652, 657-60 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(applying four elements of estoppel in case where Government was estopped from repudiating
implied contract).
669. 496 U.S. 414 (1990); see also Ralph C. Nash &John Cibinic, 5 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 7,
at 18 ("The Supreme Court has taken a dim view of the application of [estoppel] against the
Federal Government").
670. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 417-18 (1990). The
employee provided Mr. Richmond with erroneous information as to the amount he was allowed
to earn before he would lose his entitlement to disability benefits. Id.; see, e.g., Michigan v. City
of Allen Park, 954 F.2d 1201, 1217 (6th Cir. 1992) ("When public funds are involved the
Supreme Court has adopted 'a most strict approach to estoppel claims.'") (citing Richmond, 496
U.S. at 426).
671. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 423-24.
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would undermine the ability of Congress to control government
spending.
672
Despite the Court's use of some broad language hinting that
estoppel may never issue against the Government,67 a careful
reading of the case indicates that Richmond stands only for the
proposition that the Government cannot be estopped where the
estoppel would cause it to pay money from the public treasury in
contravention of a statute or regulation. 4  Since Richmond, howev-
er, the Federal Circuit has struggled to determine whether estoppel
is ever available against the Government. For example, in JANA, Inc.
v. United States,6'3 the court stated in dicta that it is "not entirely
clear whether the defense of estoppel is still available against the
government in light of the Supreme Court's decision [in Rich-
mond]."676 Several cases in the Court of Federal Claims have fol-
lowed suit, adopting the expansive view of Richmond, as expressed in
JANA.
67
In 1992, the Federal Circuit appeared to liberalize its view on the
availability of estoppel. The court observed in Brush v. Office of
Personnel Management,678 that Richmond was "dictated by the principle
that the federal treasury will be protected from the disbursement of
monies for a purpose not provided for by Congress."6 79 The court
thus hinted that estoppel could still issue against the Government in
certain instances.
In 1993, the Federal Circuit provided further clarification of its view
of estoppel in Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center v. United States.r0
In Burnside-Ott, the contractor maintained, inter alia, that the
Government was estopped from denying liability for the contractor's
672. Ii at 429.
673. The Supreme Court remarked that "not a single case has upheld an estoppel claim
against the government for the payment of money." Id. at 427. The Court also noted that "[als
for monetary claims, it is enough to say that this Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel
against the Government by a claimant seeking public funds." Id. at 434.
674. See id. (stating that "whether there are any extreme circumstances that might support
estoppel in a case not involving payment from the Treasury is a matter we need not address").
675. 936 F.2d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
676. JANA, Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 1265, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
677. See Tri-O, Inc. v. United States, 28 Cl. Ct. 463, 473 (1993) (stating that "it is dubious
whether [estoppel] may be asserted against the Government in light of Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond"); Clawson v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 366,370 (1991) (citing Richmond
and noting that estoppel against Government, if it may ever form basis of monetary relief, will
operate only when conduct of government agent was within that agent's authority).
678. 982 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
679. Brush v. Office of Personnel Management, 982 F.2d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
680. 985 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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increased labor costs."1 The Government initially represented that
certain classes of workers could be employed under the contract, but
later altered the classification scheme, so as to delete those same
classes. u 2
The Court of Federal Claims held that, as a matter of law, estoppel
was inapplicable because the contractor had no valid right to recovery
that would entitle it to prevail. against the Government.6 s The
court also stated that in Richmond, the Supreme Court "all but
slammed closed the door on equitable estoppel claims against the
government."6' Bumside-Ott appealed to the Federal Circuit.'
The Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims improp-
erly relied on Richmond to conclude that the contractor's estoppel
claim was barred as a matter of law:
In particular, the Claims Court erred in concluding that Richmond
stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie
against the government for any monetary claim. The Richmond
holding is not so broad. Richmond is limited to "claim[s] for
payment of money from the Public Treasury contrary to a statutory
appropriation." 6
Because Burnside-Ott's assertion to the right of reimbursement was
grounded in contract rather than statute, and the entitlement was not
contrary to statute or regulation, the court found that Richmond was
simply inapplicable. u 7 In so doing, the court left open the opportu-
nity for plaintiffs to assert equitable estoppel against the Government
in appropriate contract cases.'
681. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1993). The contractor claimed relief from the Government on five alternative bases: (1) a price
adjustment clause in the contract, (2) a changes clause in the contract that provides for
equitable adjustment, (3) breach of contract, (4) mutual mistake, and (5) equitable estoppel.
Id.
682. Id. at 1575-76.
683. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 24 Cl. Ct. 553, 564 (1991) (analogizing equitable
estoppel to "a shield," court noted that party asserting such claim must have valid claim that
would otherwise entitle it to recovery).
684. Id.
685. Burnside-Ott 985 F.2d at 1574.
686. Id. (quoting Office of Personnel Managementv. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,424 (1990)).
687. Id.
688. The Court of Federal Claims has relied on Burtside-Ot and Brush to open the door to
estoppel claims. See Peters v. United States, 28 Cl. Ct. 162, 168-69 (1993) (holding that
discharged servicemen could not assert estoppel claim against Air Force, but recognizing that
Federal Circuit had indicated in Burnside-Olt that Richmond "should not be extended beyond its
precise holding").
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VI. SOVEREIGN AcT DOCTRINE
Under the Sovereign Act doctrine, the United States, as a contrac-
tor, may not be held responsible for the "public and general" acts of
the United States as a sovereign. 9 In this regard, congressional
failure to appropriate sufficient funds under a contract,69 an
Executive order fixing the work week at forty-eight hours,69 a rise
in interest rates,692 and imposition of an embargo693 have all been
considered sovereign acts for which the Government may not be held
liable for breach of contract. Although a contracting agency may not
bargain away the Government's right to perform its sovereign duties,
the contracting officer has discretion to include a provision in the
contract entitling the contractor to a price adjustment if sovereign
acts render performance more costly.694 Such a provision, however,
must convey a right of recovery against the Government in unmistak-
able terms.695
In 1993, the Federal Circuit issued two opinions concerning the
sovereign act defense that are difficult to reconcile. Both cases
involved changes in government policy affecting a discrete industry.
In each case, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Federal
Claims, focusing on the provisions of the contract to determine
whether the contractor had assumed the risk of increased costs
689. See, e.g., Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925) (agreeing with Court of
Claims precedent that United States, as party to contract, cannot be sued for obstruction of
performance of contract resulting from public and general acts as sovereign); Atlas Corp. v.
United States, 895 F.2d 745, 754 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that under Sovereign Act doctrine,
Government "is not contractually liable for acts taken in its sovereign capacity for the public
good"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990). For an excellent discussion of the Sovereign Act
doctrine, see Ronald G. Morgan, Identifing Protected Government Acts Under the Sovereign Acts
Doctrine: A Question of Acts and Actors, 22 PUB. CON. LJ. 223 (1993).
690. See Winston Bros. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 374, 383 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that
failure to appropriate requisite funds did not create government liability where contract
specifically released Government from such liability).
691. See Clemmer Constr. Co. v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 917, 919 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (holding
that contractor was not entitled to recovery for increased costs of completion resulting from
Government's mandating minimum 48-hour work week).
692. SeeAnthony P. Miller, Inc. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 455, 462-64 (1963) (describing
how private bidder on construction project lost deposit to government agency when increase in
interest rate made initial bid untenable).
693. See Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 460 (describing how government agency's embargo on
shipment of silk resulted in $10,811.84 loss to private contractor).
694. See Gerhardt F. Meyne Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 811, 815-16 (Ct. Cl. 1948)
(noting that contracting officer cannot agree to refrain from exercising sovereign power, but
may contract to assume increased costs resulting therefrom).
695. Transohio Say. Bankv. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 618-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (describing history and precedent of "unmistakability doctrine" as applied to
government contracts).
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resulting from the sovereign act. In Winstar Corp. v. United States,69
the Federal Circuit determined that changes in existing law enabled
the Government to vitiate its contractual obligations, 97 while in
Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States,69 the court held
that a specific contract clause rendered the Government liable for
changes in policy. 99
During the early 1980s, Winstar and other plaintiffs entered into
agreements with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) to acquire troubled savings and loans, whereby the FSLIC
promised to fulfill certain monetary contributions and other contrac-
tual responsibilities. 700 The agreements also incorporated any
resolutions and letters of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the
Bank Board) concerning the acquisitions in connection with the Bank
Board's approval.70' In July 1984, the Bank Board issued a "forbear-
ance letter" confirming that, for purposes of reporting to the Bank
Board, Winstar and other plaintiffs would be permitted to amortize
intangible assets over thirty-five years.70 2 At the time of the transac-
tions, supervisory goodwill was an intangible asset critical to the
transactions.
70 3
After these transactions, Congress passed the Financial Institution,
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 7M which
abolished the Bank Board and charged the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion (OTS) with developing new capital standards for savings
associations.0 5  FIRREA and the OTS essentially phased out
supervisory goodwill as an appropriate asset,70 6 causing financial loss
696. 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
697. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797,807-08 (Fed, Cir. 1993) (noting that under
Sovereign Act doctrine, burden of change in law is borne by private party unless contract
specifically places liability for such changes on Government), vacated and rehk in banc granted,
Aug. 18, 1993.
698. 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
699. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 958-59 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (holding that specific clause in contract shifted financial responsibility to Government and
thus vitiated Sovereign Act doctrine defense).




703. Id. at 804 (noting that had Winstar been unable to include supervisory goodwill within
its capital assets, it "would have been subject to immediate liquidation").
704. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1992)).
705. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437(a), 1464(t) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1992); see Winstar Corp., 994 F.2d at 804-
05 (describing effects of new regulatory scheme and transfer of authority from Bank Board to
Office of Thrift Supervision).
706. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (3) (limiting amount of supervisory goodwill in calculating core
capital to applicable percentage of total assets as set forth under new regulatory scheme);
Winstar Corp., 994 F.2d at 805 (describing Office of Thrift Supervision's efforts to limit use of
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to plaintiffs. Winstar, for example, had serious difficulties meeting
the new statutory requirements and ended up in receivership.
70 7
Winstar and the other plaintiffs filed actions in the Court of Federal
Claims alleging breach of contract.708 The court held that the
Government breached an implied-in-fact contract existing between it
and Winstar when Congress enacted FIRREA, which limited the
amortization period to twenty years.7' The court entered judg-
ments in favor of Winstar and all of the other plaintiffs.
710
The Government appealed to the Federal Circuit, contending that
the Bank Board issued the forbearance letter and similar documents
in the exercise of its regulatory function and represented only a
statement of compliance with then-existing regulations which were
perforce subject to change.7 11 The Federal Circuit concluded that
FIRREA constituted a sovereign act by Congress, having "general
applicability for the public gOod" and not targeted specifically at the
plaintiffs.712 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of
Federal Claims after determining that the plaintiffs had assumed the
risk under the contract that the law would change.713  The court
found that Winstar, the Bank Board, and the FSLIC all had agreed to
act in accordance with the law, but did not limit their obligation in
unmistakable terms to the law in effect at the time of contract
formation. 714 Later in the 1993 term the Federal Circuit entered an
order withdrawing its opinion in Winstar, vacating the panel's
decision .71  The court, sitting in banc, will rehear the issues pre-
sented in Winstar later this term.
In the second sovereign act case, Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc.
v. United States,"6 Hughes and NASA entered into a contract in 1985
under which NASA agreed to use its best efforts to launch Hughes'
satellites as part of the space shuttle program. 7  The contract
supervisory goodwill as asset under FIRREA mandate).
707. Winstar Corp., 994 F.2d at 805.
708. SeeWinstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990) (noting that Winstar filed claim
for, inter alia, breach of contract); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 541, 549 (1992)
(ruling that FRIRA regulations constituted breach of contract).
709. Winstar Corp., 25 Cl. Ct. at 549.
710. Id. at 553.
711. Winstar Corp., 994 F.2d at 807.
712. Id. at 809.
713. Id. at 811.
714. See id. (noting that risks associated with regulatory changes must fail on plaintiffs in
absence of any specific contractual provision).
715. Winstar Corp. v. United States, No. 92-5164 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 1993) (granting
rehearing in banc).
716. 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
717. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 955-57 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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contained a specific provision obligating NASA to provide launch
services in accordance with government policy approved by President
Reagan in 1982.718 The contract also contained a general provision
that obligated NASA to provide services consistent with U.S. law and
policy.711 In 1986, after the Challenger space shuttle tragedy,
President Reagan issued an order that restricted NASA from any
further involvement in the business of launching commercial
spacecraft.72 NASA subsequently advised Hughes that it would be
unable to launch the Hughes' satellites.721
Hughes filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging
breach of contract by NASA, and further, that NASA abrogated its
contract rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment.722  On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of NASA. 23
The court based its decision on the fact that the exclusion of Hughes'
satellites from shuttle launches was the result of a valid sovereign
act-a policy decision issued by the President acting within the scope
of his authority.
724
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling.
Without citation to Winstar, the Federal Circuit ruled that under the
specified contract language referring to the policy approved by the
President in 1982, the Government, in unmistakable terms, waived its
right to escape liability for later sovereign acts amending that
policy.7' Further, by including this specific language in the con-
tract, the court concluded that the parties allocated the risk of change
in government policy to NASA, and that NASA was responsible for the
cost of changes resulting from the revision.
726
The Hughes decision appears in conflict with Winstar. In Winstar,
the Federal Circuit found that the parties failed to agree in unmistak-
able terms that the Government would compensate Winstar for
changes in the law, and therefore ruled against the contractor.
7 27
718. Id. at 956.
719. Id.
720. President's Statement on the Building of a Fourth Shuttle Orbiter and the Future of
the Space Program, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1103-04 (Aug. 15, 1986); see also Hughes
Communications, 998 F.2d at 956-57 (describing NASA's response to President Reagan's order).
721. Hughes Communications, 998 F.2d at 957 (describing correspondence between NASA and
Hughes subsequent to President Reagan's order).
722. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123 (1992), reu'd, 998
F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
723. Id. at 140.
724. Id. at 139-40.
725. Hughes Communications, 998 F.2d at 958-59.
726. Id.
727. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 810-11 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting
absence of necessary language in contract), vacated and reh'g in bane granted, Aug. 18, 1993.
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The court in Winstar, therefore, determined that specific contractual
references to existing law, i.e., the ability to amortize supervisory
goodwill over thirty years, did not limit the parties' obligation in
unmistakable terms to the law in effect at the time of contract
formation. 28  By contrast, the court in Hughes concluded that a
contract provision referencing the then-current government launch
policy for the space shuttle obligated the Government to compensate
Hughes for any changes in the policy.
72
As previously noted, the Federal Circuit is now reviewing the
Winstar case in banc and is expected to resolve any apparent conflict
with Hughes. As the Hughes panel recognized, there is a crucial
distinction between enjoining the Government from engaging in
sovereign activity and apportioning liability under a government
contract for sovereign acts.73 While in some instances an award of
compensation may effectively prohibit the legislative or executive
branch from exercising sovereign power, the Government should not
be given carte blanche to disavow its contractual obligations (and
thereby the rights of contractors) without providing remuneration for
the injuries it has caused. As the court in Hughes stated:
In its contractual capacity, the government executes countless
agreements with private entities to receive and provide services,
goods, and supplies. These contracts routinely include provisions
shifting financial responsibility to the government for events which
might occur in the future. That some of these events may be
triggered by sovereign government action does not render the
relevant contractual provisions any less binding.
31
In short, the Government's power to regulate must operate within the
context of contractors' rights. It is hoped that the majority ofjudges
participating in the in banc reconsideration of Winstar will recognize
the important and fundamental distinction between the Government's
right to exercise its sovereign power and the Government's contractu-
al liability for sovereign acts.
VII. PROCEDURE
A. Discovery Against the Government
During 1993, the Federal Circuit issued two unpublished decisions
ruling on government mandamus petitions arising from discovery
728. Id. at 811.
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disputes in a lawsuit brought by McDonnell Douglas and General
Dynamics against the Department of the Navy.
732
In the first opinion, In re United States,73 the Federal Circuit
considered whether the Court of Federal Claims had the authority to
order the Air Force to permit additional contractor personnel access
to information classified under a "Special Access Program."
734
McDonnell Douglas Corporation and General Dynamics Corporation
filed suit against the Government after the Navy terminated for
default their contract to design, fabricate, and produce the A-12
stealth aircraft.735  McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics
alleged that the Navy breached its contract by failing to convey
"superior knowledge" about problems and solutions that prior
manufacturers encountered under the B-2 and A-1 17A stealth aircraft
programs.
736
Some of the information pertaining to this suit was classified as
"Special Access," a level of security classification beyond Top
Secret.737  McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics initially
requested that the Government grant permission to seventeen people
to review Special Access Program information concerning the Air
Force B-2 and A-117A stealth aircraft.73  The Secretary of the Air
Force issued a detailed decision granting access to ten people, but
cited the importance of maintaining the highest level of secrecy with
respect to this information.739 In February 1993, McDonnell Doug-
las and General Dynamics requested that two more people be granted
access to the Special Access Programs.74 The Acting Secretary of
the Air Force rejected the requests without providing any rationale for
denying additional clearance.
741
In March 1993, the Court of Federal Claims determined that
McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics had adequately supported
their need for two additional people and ordered the Air Force to
provide access for those individuals.74 The court noted that the Air
Force provided no further rationale for its refusal, other than
732. In re United States, Misc. No. 370 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1993); In re United States, Misc.
No. 374 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1993).
733. Misc. No. 370 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1993).






740. Id. at 2.
741. Id.
742. Id. at 3.
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"national security."743 The court also questioned the basis of the Air
Force determination that ten trustworthy people with security
clearances presented no danger to national security, while twelve
people would constitute such a threat.7' The Court of Federal
Claims then denied the Air Force's motion for a stay of the order,
and the Government petitioned the Federal Circuit for a stay and a
writ of mandamus.74
The Federal Circuit granted both the stay and the writ of manda-
mus,746 holding that the court below lacked the authority to review
and reverse the Secretary of the Air Force's decision concerning the
number of persons granted access to classified Special Access
Programs. 47  Further, the Federal Circuit rejected the Court of
Federal Claims' view that the Secretary's decision to limit the number
of people granted access was an affront to the court's authority to
manage and direct discovery. The Federal Circuit found that the Air
Force did not challenge the lower court's authority, nor did it deny
the contractors the opportunity to review the documents in ques-
tion. 48 Rather, the Air Force merely limited the number of persons
eligible to conduct that review.49 In addressing the issue of wheth-
er the court had the power to review the Secretary's decision to deny
access to classified documents, the Federal Circuit cited Department of
Navy v. Egan75 and "its progeny" for the proposition that, absent a
controlling statute, the grant of a security clearance is within the sole
discretion of the executive branch."1 The court thus concluded




746. Id. at 3, 10.
747. Id. at 8.
748. Id. at 5.
749. Id.
750. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
751. In reUnited States, Misc. No. 370 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1993) (holding that in absence of
congressional mandate, military personnel claiming superior officers violated their constitutional
rights have no remedy) (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)); see, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-58 (1975) (explaining that military has special
characteristics that strongly urge against civilian court intervention in military justice system);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that request from Kent State students to
review training procedures of National Guard was nonjusticiable claim as areas of military
training are vested in Legislative and Executive Branches of Government and cannot be
challenged by citizenry in court); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 144 (1953) (stating that
civil courts have limited function of ensuring that military courts have given full and fair hearing
to individual's claims); Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953) (holding thatjudiciary
is not competent to review questions of Army personnel assignments and loyalty).
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discretion to review the Secretary of the Air Force's decision limiting
access to Special Access Programs.
752
In the second opinion, In re United States,"53 the Federal Circuit
addressed the propriety of a Court of Federal Claims order requiring
the. Air Force to disclose to plaintiffs' counsel certain classified,
Special Access Program information for which the Air Force had
asserted the Military and State Secrets Privilege.75 4 In an unpub-
lished decision, the Federal Circuit ruled that absent questions as to
the classification or sensitivity of the information, the Court of Federal
Claims lacked authority to order disclosure of the Special Access
Program information.755
The facts of this case were the same as those described in the
previous case, but the dispute here centered on access for the
companies' counsel to certain highly classified information under
other Special Access Programs to which employees of McDonnell
Douglas and General Dynamics had previously been granted
access. 56 The Air Force invoked the Military and State Secrets
Privilege to deny access.
757
The Court of Federal Claims reviewed the Acting Secretary of the
Air Force's affidavits, both public and classified, and supported his
decision to invoke the privilege.75 After determining that the
Secretary was the correct person to invoke the privilege, the Court of
Federal Claims concluded that the right of the Air Force to invoke the
privilege had to be balanced against the plaintiffs' rights to discuss
fully their case with counsel. 59 Consequently, the court modified
the Secretary's decision and granted one attorney from each company
the right to be briefed on the classified information by their cli-
ent.'i The court also denied the Government's request for a
protective order and for a stay and certification.7 61 The Govern-
ment immediately petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus to vacate the Court of Federal Claim's disclosure or-
der.762  The Federal Circuit, ex parte, granted the Government's
752. Misc. No. 370, slip op. at 7.
753. Misc. No. 374 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1993).
754. In re United States, Misc. No. 374, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1993).
755. Id. at 4.
756. Id. at 1.
757. Id. at 2.
758. Id. at 2-3.
759. Id. at 3.
760. Id.
761. Id.
762. Id. at 4.
1494
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
request for a stay of the disclosure order pending review of the
issues.763
Upon its review, the Federal Circuit held that the issue involved in
both of these cases was the same; whether a "trial court has authority
to reverse special access decisions made by a service secretary under
Executive Order 12,356."06 The court reiterated that the Secretary
of the Air Force was the appropriate official to invoke the Military and
State Secrets Privilege, and that special access determinations are
committed by law to agency heads.7  The Federal Circuit further
stated that appropriate circumstances exist to invoke the privilege any
time there is a reasonable danger that "compulsion of the evidence
will expose military [information] which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged."766 Because the Court of Federal
Claims failed to consider the reasonable danger that military secrets
could be divulged, the Federal Circuit held that the lower court's
decision to order access to the classified information was improp-
er.
76 7
The Federal Circuit also held that the court below erred by
considering the plaintiffs' need for the information. 768 According
to the court, when the Military and State Secrets Privilege has been
invoked, the trial courts are prohibited from considering the
plaintiffs' need for the information.7 69 In such instances, the sole
consideration becomes whether the privilege was properly in-
voked.77 ° In the opinion of the Federal Circuit, the privilege is
properly invoked if the classification is not fraudulent or incorrect
and if the documents do in fact contain military secrets.77' Here,
the appellate court noted that, although the Court of Federal Claims
acknowledged that the Navy's national security concerns were
763. Id.
764. Id. Executive Order No. 12,356 governs access to classified material. Exec. Order No.
12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
765. Misc. No. 374, slip op. at 4.
766. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (emphasis added)).
767. Id. at 7, 9.
768. Id. at 8.
769. Id.; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953) (holding that once
military files formal claim of privilege showing reasonable possibility of military secret
involvement such filing represents sufficient showing of privilege to foreclose demand for
discovery even where request is based on necessity).
770. Misc. No. 374, slip op. at 8-9.
771. Id. at 8.
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legitimate, it nonetheless ordered disclosure," 2 an act in excess of
its authority.
773
The above cases demonstrate that the courts grant extensive
discretion to the Government in determining which materials merit
classified treatment and who, if anyone, is entitled to review such
restricted material. Such discretion is granted even when the
documents in question pertain to issues in ongoing litigation. With
these decisions, the Federal Circuit drew a distinction between
discovery matters, which are directed by the courts, and classification
issues, which are controlled by the executive branch. The court's
rulings thus conceivably allow the Government to affect the outcome
of complex litigation, as in the A-12 case, by declining to provide
access to a sufficient number of personnel. As a result, the trial judge
is left without the means to afford the plaintiff full, appropriate, and
expeditious discovery. One solution to this dilemma is for the courts
to perform a limited review of the special access decision by treating
it as a de facto denial of access.
B. Sanctions Against the Government
Despite the Government's broad discretion in discovery issues
concerning classified information, the following case demonstrates
that the Government's discretion in other discovery matters is far
from unfettered. In M.A. Mortenson Co. v. United States,774 the
Federal Circuit examined the issue of whether the United States
waived its sovereign immunity to an award of sanctions for abusing
the discovery rules of the Court of Federal Claims775 and held that
such immunity in fact no longer existed.776
M.A. Mortenson Company filed suit on behalf of itself and several
subcontractors in the Court of Federal Claims against the Veterans
Administration for additional costs incurred in constructing a
veterans' hospital.777  Pursuant to a pretrial discovery order,
Mortenson filed its first set of discovery requests in August 1987."' s
The Government failed to respond, and Mortenson filed a motion to
772. Id. at 9.
773. Id. The Federal Circuit did not rely on the Court of Federal Claims' finding that the
Navy's concerns were valid. Rather, it independently determined that the United States had
established a reasonable danger that military secrets would be divulged. Id.
774. 996 F.2d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
775. M.A Mortenson Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1177, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
776. Id. at 1184.
777. M.A Mortenson Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 362, 363 (1988).
778. Id.
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compel discovery."79  In addition, Mortenson requested attorney's
fees and costs incurred in settling the discovery dispute."8s The
Court of Federal Claims granted Mortenson's motion to compel
discovery and adopted a detailed discovery schedule, but did not rule
on the request for fees.781 After the Government failed to comply
with either the court's discovery schedule and a second court order
directing compliance, the Court of Federal Claims assessed evidentiary
sanctions against the Government pursuant to the Rule of the United
States Claims Court (RCFC) 37(b) (2).82 The Court of Federal
Claims also directed the Government to pay attorney's fees and costs
associated with the discovery dispute.83
Mortenson next sought a partial judgment against the Government
in the amount of the sanctions. 84 In response, the Government
argued that sovereign immunity precluded imposition of such
sanctions.85  The Court of Federal Claims rejected the
Government's argument and entered partial judgment for the
plaintiff.76
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the imposition of monetary
sanctions.787  In so doing, the court determined that the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 7s waived the United States' sovereign
immunity to "ensure that the United States as a litigant in a civil
action would be subject to court-awarded fees to the same extent as
would be a private party."789 The Federal Circuit found that the
EAJA waived the Government's immunity with respect to discovery
sanctions awarded pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.79 0
The court could find no basis to distinguish between the abilities of
the other federal trial courts to award monetary sanctions against the
United States for abuse of the discovery process and the Court of




782. Id. RCFC 37(b) (2) provides: "If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery ... the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just .... " Id.
783. M.A. Mortenson, 15 CI. Ct. at 363.
784. Id.
785. Id. at 364.
786. Id. at 365.
787. MA Mortenson Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1177, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
788. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d) (1988).
789. M.A. Mortenson, 996 F.2d at 1180.
790. Id. at 1181-82 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
791. Id. at 1184.
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affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' entry of partial judgment for
Mortenson. 92
C. Weight Accorded to Contracting Officer Decisions
Under the CDA, both the Court of Federal Claims and the boards
of contract appeals review de novo the decisions of contracting
officers. 7" Accordingly, a contracting officer's findings of fact
cannot "be binding in any subsequent proceeding."794 This rule,
which recognizes that the contracting officer must "wear two hats" in
the disputes process, ensures that the contractor receives full judicial
review of an adverse contracting officer decision while preserving the
opportunity for an early administrative settlement of the contractor's
claim. 795  What significance, however, should a reviewing body
accord to a contracting officer's findings of fact when the decision
favors the contractor, as opposed to the Government?
In Wilner v. United States,711 the Federal Circuit held, inter alia,
that a contracting officer's final decision favorable to a contractor may
be considered an evidentiary admission against interest by the Govern-
ment.79 7 Wilner was engaged by the Navy to construct a training
facility.79 Delays during construction postponed project completion
by 447 days.799 Wilner filed a delay claim with the Navy and was
awarded compensation based upon 260 days of delay.8 0 Wilner
sought additional compensation and appealed the contracting
officer's decision to the Court of Federal Claims.80 '
At trial, Wilner presented critical path evidence that conclusively
established that the Government was responsible for only ninety-one
days of the delay.80 2  'The contracting officer, however, testified
regarding the bases for his final decision and confirmed that he was
convinced that Wilner had experienced 260 days of compensable
792. Id.
793. Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that
contracting officer's determination is not equivalent to that of lower tribunal, which is owed
special deference on appeal).
794. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1988).
795. See SENATE COMMS. ON GOV'TL AFFAIRS &JUDICIARY, CONTRACT DIsPuTEs Acr OF 1978,
S. REP. No. 1118,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N. 5235,5235 (1978)
(noting that purpose of act is to "induce resolution to more contract disputes by negotiation
prior to litigation").
796. 994 F.2d 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
797. Wilner v. United States, 994 F.2d 783, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
798. Id. at 784.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Wilner v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 260 (1992), affd, 994 F.2d 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
802. Wilne, 994 F.2d at 785.
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delay.113  Although the Court of Federal Claims rejected Wilner's
claim for added-delay compensation, it permitted Wilner to recover
damages based on 259 days of delay.'" The court also denied the
Government's claim for reimbursement of delay compensation already
paid to Wilner, thus rejecting the Government's contention that
Wilner's recovery was precluded by its inadequate critical path
analysis. 0 5 The Government appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In the Federal Circuit, the Government argued that the trial court
failed to conduct a de novo review of the contracting officer's
decision. 0 6 In pertinent part, the Federal Circuit held that the trial
court's reliance on the contracting officer's testimony was not
improper for three reasons. First, the court determined that the
contracting officer's testimony was not hearsay because it was offered
"to explain the basis or foundation of the contracting officer's
decision" under Rule 801 (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
0 7
Second, while recognizing the CDA provision that a contracting
officer's decision is not binding in any subsequent proceeding, the
court observed that testimony on such decisions may be considered
and weighed by the tribunal in the same way as any other evi-
dence. 08 Third, the court reasoned that the Court of Federal
Claims was justified in relying on the contracting officer's testimony
because a long line of Court of Federal Claims precedent established
that decisions by contracting officers favorable to a contractor
constitute evidentiary admissions of government liability.809
In August 1993, the Federal Circuit agreed to hear Wilner in banc
and vacated the panel decision."0 The panel decision in Wilner
would undoubtedly have had a chilling effect on the partial allowance
of contractor claims by contracting officers. Such a result would
prevent the speedy and efficient resolution of claims under the CDA




806. Id. at 786.
807. Id. (footnote omitted).
808. Id. at 787.
809. Id. at 788; see, e.g., Dean Constr. Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1238, 1245 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(citing consistent holdings that while contracting officer's findings constitute evidentiary
admission, such findings are always subject to rebuttal); Robert E. Lee & Co. v. United States,
164 Ct. Cl. 365, 370 (1964) (stating that although courtis not bound to give contracting officer's
decision great weight, it may accept it as controlling evidence); Vulcan Rail & Constr. Co. v.
United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 234,241 (1962) (holding that contracting officer's findings are "strong
evidence" against Government, but they are rebuttable).
810. Wilner v. United States, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20065 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2, 1993).
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full court may well have had these concerns in mind when it decided
to rehear Wilner in banc.
D. DefaultJudgment
In Information Systems & Networks Corp. v. United States,81' the
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of when a default judgment is
proper pursuant to RCFC 55.82 The court concluded that entry of
a default judgment is appropriate only when the undisputed facts
establish a willful disregard for the court's rules and procedures.1
In May 1991, a contracting officer issued a final decision terminat-
ing Information Systems and Networks Corporation (ISN) for default
and asserting a claim for over $300,000 in damages. 814 Through in-
house counsel, ISN subsequently filed a complaint in the Court of
Federal Claims alleging that the Government had breached its
contract and that the default termination was wrongful. 5 The
Government filed an answer to ISN's complaint and subsequently filed
an amended answer and counterclaim. 6 ISN failed to file a timely
answer to the counterclaim, and the Government requested that the
Court of Federal Claims enter a default judgment pursuant to RCFC
55(a). 7 Following the court's entry of the default judgment, ISN
retained outside counsel, who filed a motion for relief from the
judgment pursuant to RCFC 55(c).818  ISN's in-house counsel
supported the motion with an affidavit stating that he believed the
priorjoinder motion he had filed suspended the requirement for an
answer."9 Therefore, ISN argued that its failure to answer the
counterclaim was excusable neglect. 2 The Court of Federal Claims
denied ISN's request for relief, reasoning that ISN's failure to file a
response to the Government's counterclaim, after receiving notice of
the filing, was "culpable" conduct rather than excusable neglect.8 21
ISN appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit.
811. 994 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
812. RCFC 55.
813. Information Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792,796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
814. Id. at 794.
815. Id.
816. Id.
817. Id.; see also RCFC 55(a) (providing that "[wihen a party against whom ajudgmcnt for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and
that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter such party's default").
818. Information Sys., 994 F.2d at 794; see also RCFC 55(c) (providing that "[flor good cause
shown" default judgment may be set aside).
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Noting the absence of binding precedent establishing criteria for
excusable neglect under RCFC 60(b) (1),22 the Federal Circuit
looked to the decisions of its "sister circuits" for precedent." a The
court found that other circuits normally weighed the following factors
to determine whether to grant relief from a default judgment:
(1) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced;
(2) whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense; and
(3) whether the defaulting party's behavior leading to the default was
culpable. 24
The Federal Circuit held that the Court of Claims incorrectly
applied this test by holding that an unfavorable finding with respect
to any one of the three factors requires denial of relief.8' More-
over, the Federal Circuit determined that the court below abused its
discretion in finding a defaulting party's behavior per se culpable if it
received actual or constructive notice of the filing of a complaint and
failed to answer.126  The Federal Circuit further held that the
proper standard for determining culpability is whether the facts show
a willful disregard for the court's rules and procedures, not merely
negligence. 27 As a result of the Court of Federal Claims' finding
that ISN had a meritorious defense and that the Government would
not be prejudiced if the default judgment was set aside, the Federal
Circuit concluded that ISN's motion to set aside should have been
granted.8 28  The Federal Circuit's decision is in accord with the
established principle that a decision on the merits is preferable to a
default judgment, and that close cases should be resolved in favor of
the party seeking relief from a default judgment.8"
822. RCFC 60(b) (1) (allowing court to "relieve a party or the party's legal representative
from a final judgment" for reasons including "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect").
823. Information Sys., 994 F.2d at 795.
824. Id. (citing Zawadski de Bueno v. Bueno Castro, 822 F.2d 416, 419 (3d Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted)).
825. Id.
826. Id. at 796-97.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 797.
829. See, &g., In reHammer, 940 F.2d 524,525 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding thatwhere defendant
has meritorious defense, any doubt should be resolved in favor of motion to set aside default
judgment); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that
despite important goal of finality, final judgments should be reopened to ensure justice);
Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting strong policies in favor of resolving
genuine disputes on their merits).
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E. Litigation Authority of the Department ofJustice
Pursuant to statute, the Department of Justice has "exclusive
control" over the negotiation, compromise, and litigation strategy of
the United States in any pending litigation in federal courts.83
Accordingly, although a federal agency attorney represents the
Government before the various boards of contract appeals, a
Department of Justice lawyer handles the Government's case before
the Court of Federal Claims.
Based on this statutory authority, the Department of Justice has
consistently argued before the Court of Federal Claims that a claim
pending before the court is within the "exclusive control" of the
Justice Department and therefore could not be considered by the
contracting officer.8 31  Thus, a defective claim could not be cured
and resubmitted to the contracting officer while the matter was
pending before the court. For example, in a case involving a
deficient certification the Justice Department successfully argued that
the Court of Federal Claims must dismiss a contractor's complaint
before the contractor could resubmit a properly certified claim to the
contracting officer.3 2 Such a dismissal invariably causes unnecessary
delays and added expense in resolving claims.33 Early in its 1993
term, the Federal Circuit appeared poised to abandon this harsh
treatment of prematurely filed complaints.
In Boeing Co. v. United States,' 4 the Federal Circuit required a
contracting officer to decide a contractor's claim despite the existence
of pending litigation.83 In Boeing, the contractor challenged the
propriety of a default termination in the Court of Federal Claims. 3'
While the suit was pending, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in
Overall Roofing & Construction, Inc. v. United States,837 which held that
the court lacked jurisdiction over such non-monetary claims. 38 In
830. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516520 (1988).
831. See. e.g., Sharman Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 763, 769 (1991).
832. Durable Metal Prods. Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 41, 46 (1990).
833. In similar instances, the boards of contract appeals would normally retain jurisdiction
over the appeal while the contractor resubmitted its claim to the contracting officer.
834. 26 Cl. Ct. 529 (1992), reu'd in par vacated in part without op., 991 F.2d 811 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
835. Boeing Co. v. United States, Nos. 92-5129, 92-5131, 1993 WL 76280, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 19, 1993). Curiously, the panel chose not to give this decision precedential effect even
though this issue was one of first impression for the Federal Circuit and would, in the authors'
opinion, have added significantly to the jurisprudence with regard to the authority of the
Department ofJustice. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b).
836. Boeing, 1993 WL 76280 at *1.
837. 929 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
838. Overall Roofing & Constr., Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687, 689 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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an attempt to cure its now deficient complaint, Boeing submitted to
the contracting officer a certified claim for money damages, a delay
and disruption claim, and a termination for convenience claim.
839
After the contracting officer failed to issue a decision on these claims
within sixty days, Boeing sought to amend its complaint to add these
monetary claims on a "deemed denied" basis.840  The Court of
Federal Claims denied the motion to amend on the grounds that a
complaint over which it had no jurisdiction could not be amend-
ed.al Boeing then filed a second complaint that contained counts
identical to the amended complaint. 4  The Court of Federal
Claims dismissed the second complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
concluding that because "[t] here was never a time when the contract-
ing officer had certified claims before her which were not also the
subject of a pending [Court of Federal Claims] suit," Boeing could
not proceed under the "deemed denied" provision of the CDA.843
The Court of Federal Claims reasoned that the contracting officer was
precluded from considering monetary claims submitted while the
original action was pending because they raised the same issues being
litigated by the Justice Department in the court." 4
In an unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the Court
of Federal Claims, stating:
We do not agree that 28 U.S.C. § 516 precludes the operation of 41
U.S.C. § 605(c) (5). While there may be some instances where
pursuing agency action would be essentially duplicative or disrup-
"tive of a matter already in court which is being handled by the
Attorney General, that is not this case. The Justice Department
could neither approve nor disapprove the certified claims submitted
to the contracting officer by Boeing; only the contracting officer
had that authority. Further, Boeing's action in presenting its claims
to the contracting officer is not duplicative but necessary.8
5
In August 1993, the Federal Circuit issued a published decision
directly contrary to the non-precedential decision in Boeing. In
Sharman Co. v. United States, 46 Sharman filed suit in the Court of
Federal Claims challenging a contracting officer's final decision to
839. Boeing, 1993 WL 76280 at *1.
840. Id.; see 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (5) (1988) (describing that claim is "deemed denied" if
contracting officer fails to respond in timely manner to contractor's claim).
841. Boeing, 1993 WL 76280 at *1.
842. Id. at *2.
843. Boeing Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 529, 537 (1992).
844. Id. at 536.
845. Boeing, 1993 WL 76280 at *2.
846. 2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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terminate for default Sharman's contract with the Marine Corps. 47
In the complaint, Sharman sought to convert the default termination
into one for convenience and asked for remuneration of all unpaid
progress payments for the work performed. 48 The Court of Federal
Claims granted in part and denied in part the Government's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4 9 The court
dismissed Sharman's claim for convenience termination costs because
the claim had never been submitted to the contracting officer for a
final decision."0 The court, however, decided that it had jurisdic-
tion over Sharman's challenge to the default termination as it related
to the contracting officer's determination that Sharman owed the
Government $1,391,240.29 in unliquidated progress payments.811
In response to the court's order, Sharman amended its complaint
to challenge the Government's entitlement to the unliquidated
progress payments.a 2 The Government counterclaimed, seeking
payment of the unliquidated progress payments.53 The court ruled
from the bench on June 11, 1992, granting the Government's
counterclaim. 54 Sharman appealed this decision to the Federal
Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the Court of Federal
Claims lacked jurisdiction to entertain Sharman's claim.8 55  The
Federal Circuit held that the jurisdictional prerequisite for both a
contractor claim and a government claim is a final decision by the
contracting officer prior to the claim becoming part of the law-
suit.8 56 Absent such a decision, the court lacked authority to hear
petitioner's complaint. 57
The Federal Circuit held that an October 18, 1990 "final decision"
letter from the contracting officer did not change this result, despite
the fact that Sharman amended its complaint after that date. The
court explained:
847. Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
848. Id. at 1567.
849. Id.
850. Id.
851. Ad. The contracting officer informed Sharman that it owed this amount on October 18,
1990. The letter also stated that it was a "notice of the Contracting Officer's final decision."
Id.
852. Id. at 1567-68.
853. Id. at 1568.
854. Id.
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Once a claim is in litigation, the Department of Justice gains
exclusive authority to act in the pending litigation. That exclusive
authority divests the contracting officer of his authority to issue a
final decision on the claim. Because the progress payment claim
was the subject of litigation at the outset, the contracting officer
had no authority to issue a final decision on the claim after the
complaint was filed. Therefore, the October 1990 final decision
letter was issued without authority and consequently is a nullity....
As a result, it provides no jurisdictional basis for the government's
counterclaim for progress payments...
This issue remains the subject of vigorous debate. Judge Schall
filed a dissent to the majority opinion, arguing that the Court of
Federal Claims had jurisdiction over Sharman's claim because of the
Federal Courts Administration Act (FCAA) Amendments to the
Tucker Act. 9  Judge Schall insisted that the Court of Federal
Claims had jurisdiction over Sharman's original complaint from the
time it was filed, and that the lower court's jurisdiction extended to
the Government's counterclaim against Sharman as well. 8 ° Judge
Schall also concluded, as did the panel in Boeing, that 28 U.S.C. § 516
did not divest the contracting officer of the authority to issue a final
decision on Sharman's claim.861
Whether the Federal Circuit will abandon its prior precedent to
follow Boeing remains to be seen. 62 The Federal Circuit generally
has refrained from considering government contract cases in banc, so
it is unlikely that the court will revisit Sharman. Meanwhile, it appears
that contractors who file suit on a claim absent a contracting officer's
final decision run the risk of being caught between a "rock and a
hard place." Once litigation begins, the lack of a final decision cannot
be cured at the Court of Federal Claims without outright dismissal of
the case. As the Sharman and Boeing decisions reveal, even the most
sophisticated government contractors can become entangled in this
procedural trap.
858. I& at 1571-72 (citations omitted).
859. Id. at 1576 (Schall, J., dissenting); see 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (2) (Supp. IV 1992)
(explaining that Federal Courts Administration amended statute governing Court of Federal
Claims to give it jurisdiction over nonmonetary suits brought under Disputes Act of 1978).
860. Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1573, 1577 (Schal, J., dissenting).
861. Id. at 1575 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988)).
862. Technically, the Boeing and Sharnan decisions do not create a conflict necessitating in
bane consideration because Sharman, as the precedential decision, is controlling. See FED. CIR.
R. 47.6.
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VIII. DAMAGES
A. Eichleay Formula
The Eichleay formula is a method of calculating a contractor's
extended overhead in instances where the Government causes the
contractor to "stand by" during contract performance and the
contractor is unable to take on any additional work during the period
of delay. 63 The Federal Circuit considered the application of the
Eichleay formula in three cases in 1993."k
In Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 65 the Federal
Circuit considered a contractor's claim to recover home office costs
under the Eichleay formula for an extended performance period.
Community claimed that it was entitled to compensation for home
office overhead under the Eichleay formula for an eight-month
contract extension as a result of government-ordered changes.8
66
The ASBCA rejected Community's appeal from the denial of its
extended overhead claim by the contracting officer.8 67 The ASBCA
reasoned that there was no suspension in contract performance
because of the additional work.8" Community appealed to the
Federal Circuit.
69
The Federal Circuit rejected Community's claim to recover home
office costs under the Eichleay formula because Community's claim
arose out of changed work, not suspension of work or a hiatus in
performance.8 ° The court affirmed the general rule that the
Eichleay method is appropriate only where contract changes result in
suspension of performance.
71
The Federal Circuit also considered the application of the Eichleay
formula in Daly Construction, Inc. v. Garrett."72 In Daly, the contractor
863. The formula is named after the first ASBCA case in which it was applied, Eichleay
Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 2688 (1960), affld on reconsideration, 61-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 2894 (1961).
864. See Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Daly
Constr., Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v.
West, 12 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
865. 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
866. Community Heating, 987 F.2d at 1581.
867. SeeCommunity Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 37981,38166,38167,38168,
38467, 40151, 92-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 24,870, at 124,071-73 (1992).
868. Id.
869. Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
870. Id. at 1582.
871. Id. at 1581-82 (citing C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (holding that use of Eichleay method is "specifically limited to contracts affected by
government caused suspension, disruptions, and delays of work")).
872. 5 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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incurred delays as a result of the Government's defective specifica-
tions.873 Through a series of negotiations, Daly's claim for extended
overhead was denied by the contracting officer.874 Daly appealed to
the ASBCA, which held that Daly had not produced sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the contractor was reasonably required
to stand by, without staff reduction, during the delay or that it was
impractical for Daly to take on additional work during the delay
period.875 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the board's
decision, concluding that Daly made no showing that it reasonably
incurred extended overhead costs attributable to the delay.878
The Federal Circuit again explored the prerequisite to receiving
compensation under the Eichleay formula in Interstate General
Government Contractors, Inc. v. West.177  In Interstate General, the
contractor did not receive notice to proceed under a contract for
repair or replacement of a heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
system on the anticipated date because of a pending bid protest.
878
Because the contract award exhausted Interstate General's bonding
capacity, it could not take on additional work during this period of
inactivity s79 Moreover, under the contract, Interstate General was
required to start work within ten days of receiving the notice.80
Consequently, Interstate General either dismissed or reassigned the
workers who would have performed the contract work."1 After the
bid protest was resolved, Interstate General received notice to proceed
and completed performance within the originally contemplated
performance period.8 2
Interstate General subsequently filed a claim for unabsorbed home
office overhead incurred during the delay in issuance of the no-
tice. sa The contracting officer denied the claim and Interstate
873. Daly Constr., Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520,520 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Government's
specifications for transformers were defective).
874. Id. at 521.
875. Daly Constr., Inc., ASBCA No. 34322, 92-1 B.CA (CCH) 24,469, at 122,045 (1991)
(stating that Daly was "able to bid other work during the suspension period, and suffered no
financial impact as a result of: (a) compromised bonding capacity, or (b) any requirement to
stand-by"), affid, 5 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
876. Daly Constr., 5 F.3d at 522.
877. 12 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (previously issued as nonprecedential opinion on June
11, 1993).
878. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. West, 12 F.3d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
879. Id. at 1055-56.
880. Id. at 1055.
881. I& at 1056.
882. Id. at 1055.
883. Id. at 1055-56.
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General appealed to the ASBCAY8 The board found that Interstate
General did not adequately show that it was forced to "stand by"
during the delay period and that Interstate General had not estab-
lished that it had incurred unabsorbed overhead during the delay
period.' Accordingly, the appeal was denied.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the ASBCA
even though it disagreed with the board's legal conclusion that the
contractor was not required to stand by." The ASBCA had found
that because the employees who were to work on the contract were
either dismissed or reassigned, Interstate General was not required to
stand by."8 The Federal Circuit noted that the board had focused
improperly on the employees assigned to the site; the correct inquiry
was whether the home office personnel were required to stand by.'
Under this standard, the court concluded that Interstate General was
in fact required to stand by."89 Nevertheless, the court determined
that Interstate General was not entitled to recovery under the Eichleay
formula because it failed to establish that it incurred unabsorbed
overhead under the contract.890
The Federal Circuit found that "where a contractor is able to meet
the original contract deadline or, as here, to finish early despite a
government-caused delay, the originally bargained for time period for
absorbing home office overhead through contract performance
payments has not been extended." 9' The court concluded that in
order to establish recovery under the Eichleay formula, the contractor
was required to show that it: "(1) intended to complete the contract
early; (2) had the capability to do so; and (3) actually would have
completed early, but for the government's actions."892 The court
held that Interstate General did not produce sufficient evidence
under any prong of the test, and thus it was not entitled to recover
unabsorbed overhead costs.893 In effect, the Federal Circuit found
884. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 43369,92-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 24,956,
at 124,363 (1992).
885. Id. at 124,367.
886. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. West, 12 F.3d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
887. Intertate Gen., 92-2 B.C.A (CCH) at 124,367.
888. Interstate Gen., 12 F.3d at 1057-58.
889. Id. at 1058.
890. Id at 1058-60.
891. Id. at 1058.
892. Id. at 1058-59 (citing Elrich Contracting, Inc., GSBCA No. 10936, 93-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
25,316, at 126,142 (1992); Fraizer-Fleming Co., ASBCA No. 34537, 91-1 B.CA (CCH)
23,378, at 117,287-88 (1990)).
893. Id. at 1058-60.
1508
1994] 1993 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
that Interstate General was already compensated through its direct
payments for all home office overhead allocable to this contract..
An important aspect of this opinion is the Federal Circuit's
adoption of the above mentioned three-prong test. The test sets forth
the standards by which to evaluate whether recovery of unabsorbed
overhead should be allowed where the contractor completes perfor-
mance within the initial performance period, despite a government-
caused delay.' Previously, this standard had only been applied by
the boards of contract appeals. 95
In denying Community's, Daly's, and Interstate General's attempts
to utilize the Eichleay formula for recovery of unabsorbed overhead,
the Federal Circuit did not make new law. The Federal Circuit
merely applied the accepted standard that the contractor must show
some cessation in contract performance during which it was unable
to take on extra work, and that it actually incurred uncompensated
overhead expenses in order to recover unabsorbed overhead under
the Eichleay formula. Notably, Community, Daly, and Interstate General
all relied heavily on the Federal Circuit's 1992 opinion in C.B.C.
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States.96 To date, C.B.C. Enterprises contains
the most comprehensive discussion by the Federal Circuit of the
application of the Eichleay formula and the recovery of unabsorbed
overhead.
B. Duty to Mitigate
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Government
is entitled to damages under a contract when the Government has
incurred no loss under the contract in Madigan v. Hobin Lumber
Co.s" 7 In Hobin, the Federal Circuit held that the contract terms
relieved the Government of its duty to demonstrate harm or loss
caused by the contractor's breach as a condition precedent to the
recovery of damages. 98 The Federal Circuit also narrowly construed
a Court of Claims decision "on all fours" with Hobin in order to reach
this result.
8 1
894. Id. at 1058-59.
895. See, e.g., Elrich Contracting, 93-1 B.CA. (CCH) at 126,142; Fraizer-leming, 91-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) at 117,287-88.
896. C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 987 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (limiting
recovery under and application of Eichleay formula to cases involving "government-caused
suspensions, disruptions and delays of work").
897. 986 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
898. Madigan v. Hobin Lumber Co., 986 F.2d 1401, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
899. Id. at 1404-05 (citing Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 756 (1981)).
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Hobin and the Forest Service entered into a contract for the sale
of timber that required Hobin to cut the timber by the termination
date of the contract..°° The contract provided that if Hobin failed
to cut the timber by that date, the Forest Service would be entitled to
damages equal to either the difference between Hobin's contract
price and the resale value or, if there was no resale, the difference
between the contract price and the appraised price.9" 1 Hobin did
not cut the timber prior to the termination date. The Forest Service,
however, chose not to resell the timber, but to preserve the trees as
a habitat for the northern spotted owl." 2  The Government de-
manded damages based on the difference between Hobin's contract
price and the appraised price at contract termination.9 3
Hobin appealed the adverse contracting officer decision to the
Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals.9" Both Hobin and the
Government moved for summary judgment. Relying on its reading
of Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States,9"' which involved a damages
clause virtually identical to the clause at issue, the board ruled in
favor of Hobin. °6 In Louisiana-Pacific, the Government unsuccess-
fully attempted to negotiate a contract modification designed to
reduce the amount of timber the contractor was required to
harvest.90 7 The contractor failed to cut all of the timber as specified
in the contract prior to the termination date. The Court of Claims
held that the Government's recovery under the damages clause was
limited to the contract amount less the amount of timber the
Government attempted to exclude from the contract.08 Applying
Louisiana-Pacific, to Hobin's situation, the board granted summary
judgment for Hobin.9" The board concluded that the Government
had not suffered any damages as a result of the contractor's failure to
cut the timber because the Government intended to keep the timber
uncuL 9 10
900. Id. at 1402.
901. Id. (describing "Failure to Cut" provision of contract).
902. Id. at 1402-03.
903. Id.
904. Hobin Lumber Co., AGBCA No. 87-170-1, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,213, at 121, 117
(1991), rev'd, 986 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
905. 227 Ct. Cl. 756 (1981).
906. Hobin Lumber, 91-3 B.CA. (CCH) at 121,117.
907. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 756, 757-58 (1981).
908. Id. at 758.
909. Hobin Lumber, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) at 121,117.
910. Id.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the board's finding and
granted summary judgment for the Government.9 In so doing, the
Federal Circuit limited Louisiana-Pacific to its facts, finding that the
case applies only when the Government attempts to negotiate a
reduction in the timber to be cut prior to the termination date.912
In Hobin, the Government did not attempt to renegotiate the amount
of timber prior to the termination date. As a result, the court stated
that Louisiana-Pacific was inapposite. 13 In response to Hobin's
argument that the Government did not mitigate damages by
attempting a resale, the court ruled that the contract clause specifical-
ly contemplated damages without a resale. The Government thus had
no obligation to resell the timber.
914
In Hobin, the Federal Circuit never expressly overruled Louisiana-
Pacific, nor could such a result ensue absent in banc consideration of
the case by the full court.915 The panel's attempt to distinguish
these two cases on their facts, however, is strained at best. Both cases
concerned contracts with the same operative damages clause.
Furthermore, the Government suffered no "out of pocket" loss due
to the contractor's failure to salvage timber. By granting recovery
without proof of actual damages, the Federal Circuit in Hobin
provided the Government with a windfall. As the Court of Claims
correctly held in Louisiana-Pacific, such a recovery is improper,
counter-intuitive, and contrary to the reasonable expectations of the
parties.91 6 In essence, the Federal Circuit panel in Hobin overruled
sub silento the more reasoned and equitable decision of the Court of
Claims in Louisiana-Pacific.
C. Debt Collection
The Federal Circuit in Cecile Industries, Inc. v. Chenej, addressed
the interaction of the Debt Collection Act (DIC)9Q 1 8 and the com-
mon law right to offset contract debt to the United States against
contract payments due the debtor.919 In Cecile, the Federal Circuit
911. Madigan v. Hobin Lumber Co., 986 F.2d 1401, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
912. Id. at 1405 n.3 (noting that in Louisiana-Pacific, fact that Government attempted to
modify contract during period of performance provided justification for court to estop
Government from fully recovering).
913. Id. at 1405.
914. Id.
915. See FED. CR. R. 35(a) (stating that "only the court in banc may overrule a binding
precedent").
916. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 756, 758 (1981).
917. 995 F.2d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
918. 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
919. Cecile Indus., Inc. v. Cheney, 995 F.2d 1052, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1511
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1417
held that the Government possesses a common law right to collect
contractor debt to the Government, regardless of whether the debt
was incurred in the same contract or different contracts.92 0 More-
over, the court held that this right was not affected by the passage of
the DCA.
921
Cecile was awarded three contracts to produce sleeping bags for the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).2 2 Contract one required the
sleeping bags to contain at least eighty percent goose down. Cecile
submitted a value engineering change proposal, for a cost-saving
suggestion in connection with the production of these sleeping
bags.9  This was accepted on contract one. 24 Both contracts two
and three required the use of government-furnished material (GFM),
the cost of which was to be deducted from the contract price.92
Cecile did not use all of the government-furnished material that it was
provided and returned the excess material to the Government for a
refund.926 Cecile was also entitled to payment of royalties as a result
of its value engineering change proposal under contract one.2
After Cecile delivered the sleeping bags and received the full
contract payment under contract one, the DLA discovered that the
sleeping bags did not contain eighty percent goose down. The DLA
terminated contract one for default and reduced the contract price
by the amount required to correct the defect.28 The DLA offset
the payments owed to Cecile under the value engineering provision
of contract one and for the returned GFM under contracts two and
three against the amount necessary to cure the defect. 29 The DLA
did not use the DCA procedures in executing this offset -3 0
When the contracting officer failed to act on Cecile's claim for
payment, Cecile appealed to the ASBCA.9 3 The ASBCA held that
the DCA did not apply to the intracontract offset of debts under
contract one.932 The ASBCA did hold, however, that the DCA
procedures must be used for the intercontract offset that occurred
920. Id. at 1056.
921. Id.









931. Cecile Indus., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40813, 40814, 40815, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,099, at
120,625 (1991), affid, 995 F.2d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
932. Id. at 120,626.
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under contracts two and three.933 The board then remanded the
intercontract offsets to the contracting officer for compliance with the
procedures of the DCA.9" The Government appealed the ASBCA
decision to the Federal Circuit.935
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's decision concerning the
intracontract offsets.936 The Federal Circuit ruled that the DCA was
intended to provide an additional means for the Government to
collect a debt.937 The court determined that passage of the DCA
did not repeal any of the common-law rights of offset that the Govern-
ment previously enjoyed.3 ' On this point the court further stated
that the Government has "long enjoyed the right to offset contract
debts to the United States against contract payments due to the
debtor."939 The Federal Circuit therefore held that the board had
incorrectly ruled that the DCA applied to the offset of
intercontractual debts.9" The ASBCA's remand to the contracting
officer for procedural compliance, however, rendered this error
harmless.94' Although the Government does possess the right to
offset debts between contracts, no further corrective action was
necessary in this instance.942
D. Equitable Subrogation
When a surety completes performance of a government contract,
the doctrine of equitable subrogation generally operates to confer to
the surety all of the rights and remedies that the Government may
933. Id.
934. Id. at 120,629.
935. Cecile Indus., Inc. v. Cheney, 995 F.2d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
936. Id. at 1056.
937. Id.
938. Id.
939. Id. at 1064.
940. Id. at 1056. In Cedle, the ASBCA followed DMJM/Norman Engineering Co., ASBCA No.
28154, 84-1 B.C. (CCH) 1 17,226, at 85,761 (1984), in holding that the Debt Collection Act
does apply to intercontract debts. Cecile Indus., Inc. ASBCA Nos. 40813, 40814, 40815, 91-3
B.C.A (CCH) 1 24,099, at 120,626 (1991). DMJM interpreted the Act to be applicable except
where it was specifically stated to be inapplicable. See DMJM, 84-1 B.CA. (CCH) at 85,774-79
(examining legislative intent and history of Debt Collection Act). This conclusion is inconsistent
with the Federal Circuit's determination that the Act merely augmented the Government's
common law rights without extinguishing any pre-existing rights. See 35 GOV'T CONTRACTOR
1 410 (1993) (citing Cecile and noting that Federal Circuit has ruled "that Debt Collection Act
does not abrogate Government's common law rights of offset").
941. Cecile, 995 F.2d at 1056.
942. Id. In another 1993 case, the Federal Circuit upheld an agency's invocation of the alter
ego doctrine in rendering administrative offsets under the Debt Collection Act. SeeMcCall Stock
Farms, Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 1562, 1565-67 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting "longstanding
existence of the alter ego doctrine as a means to achieve fundamental fairness in particular fact
circumstances"). Although McCall is not a government contracts case, it will undoubtedly have
an impact on Debt Collection Act procedures in government contracting.
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have had against a defaulting contractor.943 Under this doctrine,
the surety is usually held to be entitled to the monies retained by the
Government only under the contract on which the surety completed
performance.9  In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. United States,945
however, the Federal Circuit held that the doctrine of equitable
subrogation permits a surety to recover monies held by the Govern-
ment, notwithstanding the fact that those monies are held under a
different contract from the contract that generated the surety's
claim.946 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the surety should be
entitled to recover funds held under a different contract when the
defaulting contractor is the sole competing claimant for such
funds.947
In this case, Transamerica was the performance bond surety on two
government construction contracts, the second of which was defaulted
on by the contractor.94 8 Pursuant to its obligations under the bond,
Transamerica completed the second contract and claimed to have
sustained losses in excess of one million dollars.949 The contractor
completed the first contract and filed a claim for an equitable
adjustment in an amount exceeding $500,000.95" Transamerica
claimed to have submitted written notice to the Government seeking,
under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the funds owed by the
Government to the contractor pursuant to the settlement of the
contractor's claim under the first contract.9°1 The Government,
however, disbursed the funds to the contractor.952
Transamerica brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims,
contending that it was entitled to money damages because of the
Government's disregard of Transamerica's right to equitable
subrogation.953 The court rejected Transamerica's claim, reasoning
that prevailing precedent provided that a surety's rights and remedies
943. See Security Ins. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 838, 842 (Ct. CI. 1970) (explaining that
upon completion of contract performance, "[t ]he surety is not onlya subrogee of the contractor
and therefore a creditor, but also a subrogee of the government and entitled to any rights the
government has to the retained funds").
944. See Dependable Ins. Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 65, 66 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that
surety's recovery is limited to funds held by Government pursuant to underlying construction
contract).
945. 989 F.2d 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
946. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. United States, 989 F.2d 1188, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
947. Id.
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are limited to the recovery of retained funds from the contract
generating the claim.954 Transamerica, therefore, could not offset
its losses against the funds owed to the contractor under a different
contract.9 5 Accordingly, the court dismissed the action for failure
to state a claim.
956
The Federal Circuit, however, determined on review that cogent
precedent supported the proposition that where the only claimants to
monies held by a contracting agency are the surety and a defaulting
contractor, the surety that has performed under a performance bond
agreement is subrogated to all of the rights and remedies, including
the government common law right to set-off, which the Government
might have had against the principal had the Government been
forced to complete the project itself.95 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit found that the equities of the case clearly supported
Transamerica's position, because, had the Government chosen to
complete the work and incurred losses in so doing, the Government
would have had the option to set off its claim against the monies
owed the contractor on the second contract. 958 Moreover, the court
observed that it could see no reason to allow the contractor to profit,
at Transamerica's expense, from the Government's choice to have
Transamerica complete the work.959
The court denied the Government's request for rehearing in
banc.9 °  Two judges forcefully dissented from the decision.961
The dissenting judges stated that because Transamerica did not assert
that it had been subrogated to the contractor's rights under the
undefaulted contract, Transamerica could recover only if it acquired
subrogation rights from the Government.9 2 They further main-
tained that the Government did not step in and perform the
undefaulted contract, which would have entitled the Government to
the right of set-off.96 . Even if the Government had performed the
contract, the dissenters argued, it need not exercise its right of set-off
for the benefit of the surety.9' The dissenting judges further
954. Id. at 1189-90.
955. Id. at 1190.
956. Id.
957. Id. at 1191-94 (discussing surety law precedents in favor of decision to allow equitable
subrogation where Government has no competing interest in retained funds).
958. Id. at 1194-95.
959. Id.
960. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. United States, 998 F.2d 972 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
961. Id. at 972-74 (Nies, C.J., dissenting).
962. Id. at 973.
963. Id.
964. Id. (citing STEARNs & ELDER, THE LAW OF SUREMiSHIP § 6.51, at 191-92 (1972)).
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asserted that previous case law held that the surety is only subrogated
to the rights of the Government on the contract on which it com-
pletes performance. 96 According to the dissenting judges,
Transamerica was incorrectly decided because it effectively permitted
the surety to suspend performance of an undefaulted contract merely
by providing notice to the Government that it seeks money due on an
unrelated contract.
966
In the authors' opinion, the dissenting judges advance the better
argument. In such instances, the Government is not a stakeholder for
the surety, and, as such, a surety has no right in either commercial or
government contract law to obtain monies due under an unrelated
contract. The Transamerica decision will place an excessive administra-
tive burden on the contracting officer in weighing the competing
interests of the contractor and its surety. Further, an improper
withholding could authorize the contractor to cease performance of
the contract. In any event the surety has adequate recourse in the
courts to redress its claims against the contractor.
IX. ATrORNEY'S FEES
A. Equal Access to Justice Act
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)967 provides a statutory
basis for certain parties to recover attorney's fees and litigation costs
in lawsuits against the Federal Government.9" To recover under
the EAJA, a party must "prevail" in the litigation and be a small
business or an individual with a net worth under the statutory
limit.69  A business is considered small if it has less than five
hundred employees or a net worth of not more than seven million
dollars at the time the action is commenced. 90 If the party is an
individual, its net worth cannot exceed two million dollars at the time
that the proceeding is initiated.97' In addition, before a party or
individual may recover under the EAJA, the Government's litigation
965. Id. (noting that "a completing surety does not become subrogated to 'all of the
government's rights,' only the rights of the government on the contract of which it completes
performance") (citing Dependable Ins. Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 65,67-68 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Security Ins. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 838, 841 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
966. Id. at 974.
967. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (pertaining to administrative proceedings); 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (pertaining to court proceedings).
968. 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. § 2412; see Donald A. Tobin & George W. Stiffler, Recovering
LegalFees UnderEAJA/Edition II, BRIEFING PAPERS,June 1991, at 1-10 (explaining provisions and
means of recovery under EAJA).
969. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1), (b)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d) (2) (B) (ii).
970. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
971. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B)(i); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i).
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position must be found not to be "substantially justified."9 72 Wheth-
er a party is "prevailing" and whether the Government's position was
"substantially justified" are questions that are addressed by a substan-
tial amount of case law.
73
In TGS International, Inc. v. United States,9 4 the Federal Circuit
considered the appropriate award of attorney's fees where the
prevailing party has entered into a contingent fee arrangement with
counsel.975 The court determined that such a party may recover
only the actual attorney's fees incurred under the contingency
arrangement.
976
TGS International (TGS) was the prevailing party in an earlier
Federal Circuit decision on the merits of its claim.977 For its success-
ful appeal, TGS had retained new counsel on a contingency fee
basis.97s TGS sought to recover the fees it incurred in pursuing its
successful appeal concerning the Government of Kuwait's liability for
delays in accepting and activating an electrical substation.979 The
United States argued that TGS was not yet a prevailing party because
on remand, TGS was required to establish that it was entitled to
compensation for the delay.9"' The Government also argued that
TGS was not entitled to attorney fees under EAJA because the
Government's litigation position was substantially justified.9"'
The Federal Circuit rejected both of the Government's arguments.
First, the court clarified that it had decided on appeal that the
Government was liable for the delay and that the only issue to be
addressed on remand was the measure of damages to TGS.9 s2
Second, after examining the totality of the record, including the
972. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A).
973. See, e.g., Cotton & Co., EBCA No. 441-2-90(E), 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,507, at 117,864
(1990) (noting that "substantiallyjustified" has been interpreted to mean "justified in substance
or in the main," or "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person," or "justified if
it has a reasonable basis both in law and in fact"); Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., ASBCA
Nos. 28889, 31900, 87-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 20,034, at 101,422 (1987) (concluding that EAJA does
not require "total victory to satisfy the requirement of prevailing," as victory in entitlement phase
of litigation was sufficient); Yamas Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 27366, 87-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,695,
at 99,724-26 (1987) (denying attorney's fees toYamas as "prevailing party" because Government's
position was more than reasonable and therefore "substantiallyjustified" under EAJA).
974. 983 F.2d 229 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
975. TGS Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 983 F.2d 229, 229 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
976. Id. at 230.
977. SeeTGS Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, No. 90-1440,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 23621 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 8, 1991).
978. TGS, Int'l, 983 F.2d at 229.
979. Id.
980. Id.
981. Id. at 229-30.
982. Id. at 230.
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underlying agency action, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Government position was not substantially justified.8 3
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that when the court remands for
a determination of quantum, recovery of attorney's fees for the appeal
normally need not await completion of the proceedings. 94 Rather,
the prevailing party may recover the amount of fees actually incurred
in pursuing the appeal.9" In this regard, the court noted that TGS
had a contingency fee arrangement with its counsel. Therefore, even
though it had submitted a petition for fees based on an allocation of
attorney's fees to the prevailing issue,986 the actual fees TGS in-
curred was some percentage of the quantum of the damages. Because
the quantum of damages had been settled by the time the Federal
Circuit issued its decision, the court held that TGS was entitled to file
a petition to recover the attorney's fees incurred under the contingen-
cy agreement.987 Accordingly, a prevailing party under the EAJA will
only be permitted to recover funds actually expended on attorney's
fees, regardless of whether that sum is equivalent to that attorney's
normal billing rate for the number of hours expended in the
litigation.
9 88
B. Attorney's Fees for Government Breach of Contract
As previously stated, a prevailing party must meet EAJA size
requirements in order to recover attorney's fees.98 9 In Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. v. United States,"° the Federal Circuit considered whether
a contractor could recover attorney's fees for a government breach of
contract even though the contractor does not meet the size require-
ments of the EAJA."9 The Federal Circuit rejected the contractor's
request, holding that such a recovery would effectively nullify the
EAJA
992
The case involved a consolidation of two appeals brought by Texas
Instruments (TI) before the ASBCA.'9 In each case, the contract-
ing officer determined that TI had defectively priced two separate







989. See supra notes 967-71 and accompanying text.
990. 991 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
991. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 991 F.2d 760, 763-65 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
992. Id. at 768.
993. Id. at 760-61.
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prices of the contracts.994 TI appealed both contracting officer
decisions to the board.995 The board eventually sustained both
appeals and determined that the Army had improperly reduced TI's
contract price.996 Subsequently, TI filed claims to recover the costs
of litigating the defective pricing claims.997 Both contracting officers
issued final decisions denying the claims.9 ' TI appealed these
decisions to the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that the Govern-
ment had breached the disputes clause of its contract by pursuing
"negligent, arbitrary, [and] capricious" claims against TI.999
The Court of Federal Claims consolidated the two actions and
dismissed TI's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.000 The court determined that the company's
claims were really tort claims against the Government over which it
had no jurisdiction. 0 1 The court also determined that even if the
Government had breached its contract against TI, the court would
have no authority to award attorney fees against the Govern-
ment.
1 002
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that TI's argument that the
Government breached the disputes clause of its contract was nothing
more than an attempt to circumvent the requirements of the
EAJA 1'0 According to the court, the EAJA permits the award of
attorney's fees in adjudicative proceedings before the boards of
contract appeals and the Court of Federal Claims, but only for entities
with net assets less than seven million dollars.00 4 Because TI had
assets considerably above this amount, it was ineligible for an award
of attorney's fees against the Government.
00 5
CONCLUSION
In all, the Federal Circuit performed a competent review of
government contract appeals in 1993. While the Federal Circuit
generally continued to follow established precedent in many areas of
government contracting, it did so in some cases by foregoing valuable
994. Id. at 761.
995. Id. at 761-62.
996. Id. at 762.
997. Id.
998. Id.
999. Id. at 762-63.
1000. Id. at 763.
1001. Id.
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 764.
1004. Id. at 767.
1005. Id. at 766-67.
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opportunities to revisit unworkable decisions. In such cases, the court
chose instead to apply rigidly precedent that contravenes fundamental
principles of government contracting and, in some instances, the
dictates of common sense. Nowhere has this been more evident than
in the area of CDAjurisdiction, where the court steadfastly refused to
abandon unworkable statutory interpretations despite clear congressio-
nal intent to the contrary.
Moreover, while the Federal Circuit appears to be gaining a greater
familiarity with government contracts law, the court as an institution
still appears reluctant or unwilling to recognize that, as in the area of
patent law, it is essentially the court of last resort for government
contractors. Given its important role in the contract disputes process,
it is unfortunate that on some occasions the court has not been more
willing to look beyond legal principles and weigh the equities of each
government contracts case and more vigorous in rehearing cases in
banc when necessary to resolve troublesome issues. Commendably,
the court has agreed in 1993 to consider two government contract
cases in banc.10 6 To the authors' knowledge, however, this marks
only the second time in the court's twelve-year history that the full
court has agreed to rehear a government contracts case. As many
practitioners have suggested, the court's reluctance in this area may
be attributable to the lack of active judges on the court with signifi-
cant government contracts backgrounds. The infusion of such
experience would undoubtedly prove invaluable in the court's review
of cases involving more complex and specialized government contracts
issues, and would render the Federal Circuit well-equipped like its
predecessor, the United States Court of Claims, to perform its role as
the final arbiter of government contract disputes.
1006. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc
granted, Aug. 18, 1993; Wilner v. United States, 994 F.2d 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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